RHODESIA BECOMES ZIMBABWE

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Prepared for
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Research
Services, inc.

Quaker Ridge Road, Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520

20 September 1977

HRS-142-RR

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Rhodesia is a small, land-locked country of roughly 6.7 million people, ruled by a white minority of about one-quarter million. In international law, Rhodesia is Africa's last colony, a colony in rebellion against Britain since its Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. Following the independence of Mozambique and Angola from Portugal, African pressure for termination of white minority rule became focused almost exclusively on Rhodesia. Because of the dramatic Cuban intervention in Angola, world attention focused on southern Africa, and the struggle for Rhodesia engaged the big powers' attention to a greater extent than any African issue since the struggle over the Congo in 1960. Blacks within Rhodesia, and black African governments, as well as the Western world, seek a quick transition to black majority rule of an independent state to be called Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, guerrilla groups based in Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana are harassing the Rhodesian regime and causing considerable economic distress. As the guerrilla groups grow rapidly, 1,000 whites emigrate each month.

RHODESIA'S INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Because Rhodesia is small and land-locked, and because its status as a colony legitimizes heavy international involvement, it is more vulnerable to international pressures than most countries of the world. The principal international actors involved in Rhodesia's transformation into Zimbabwe are the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, Cuba,

the nearby black African states known collectively as the front line States, and South Africa. Indirect pressures are generated by Nigeria and by the influence of world opinion as mediated by the United Nations.

Most immediately engaged are the frontline States, Tanzania, Mozambique, Batswana, Zambia, and Angola, an economically and ideologically diverse group of states which have succeeded in papering over their differences sufficiently to adopt unified diplomatic stands on key issues and to provide sanctuaries and other forms of support for guerrillas seeking to overthrow the Rhodesian government. The power of the frontline States derives from their ability to succor the guerrillas, or alternatively to close off the sanctuaries and the flow of supplies in order to enforce a Rhodesian settlement acceptable to them. They are united in the view that the Patriotic Front, composed of the competitive followings of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe and various associated guerrilla groups, has played the major role in bringing the Smith government to the negotiating table and therefore deserves power even if it is unable to win elections. They are also united in the view that, in the absence of direct Western military support, it is necessary to accept Soviet military and economic aid and to pay at least some substantial temporary deference to the Soviet policies and ideology in return for that support. They are equally united in their desire to achieve as quick and peaceful a transition as possible in the interest of their own economies and of Rhodesian blacks, and also to minimize their dependence upon any outside powers. While there were once major divergences among the front line States due to Mozambique's ideological insistence upon the coming to power of a radical socialist regime in Zimbabwe, now there is a much greater

consensus on the need for a quick and peaceful transition regardless of doctrine.

Mozambique's position has changed from a relatively ideological one to a relatively pragmatic one because it fears the consequences of disorder in Rhodesia, and because its shattered economy needs the boost that would come from an economically dynamic Zimbabwe. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia desperately needs a settlement because of the expenses connected with the struggle, because his economy is severely affected by ecnomic sanctions, and because the Zambian population is becoming restive in response to the inflation and stagnation that they blame on the Rhodesian struggle. The other frontline States have similar motives for seeking a relatively quick and peaceful transition.

Angola and Zambia both support Joshua Nkomo, for different reasons. Neto of Angola supports them out of ideological and personal ties and because of shared ties to the Soviet Union. Kaunda of Zambia has family and early political ties to Nkomo and thinks that Nkomo is the only leader who could unite Zimbabwe: Kaunda does not trust Mugabe and his guerrillas and does not believe the moderate Bishop Muzorewa to be a serious political leader. On the other hand, because Muzorewa is a symbol of peace and moderation in much of the region, he generates a great deal of ineffectual public opinion support from neighboring populations weary of the economic consequences of struggle. While ideological differences and feelings are not altogether absent from the policy of the frontline States, the only dominant ideology is anti-racism, and most ideological rhetoric in their joint position is a veneer necessary to obtain Soviet support.

South Africa is the other neighbor directly involved in the conflict. The worst complexities of the Rhodesian settlement derive not so much from Rhodesia itself as from the complications of having to deal simultaneously with related problems in South Africa and South West Africa. South Africa is a huge neighbor, economically, politically, geographically, and militarily. Its army is overwhelmingly powerful, both by comparison with Rhodesia and by comparison with any combination of nearby states. Its economy is larger, more prosperous and more modern than any other economy in Africa--with a technological superiority symbolized by worldwide suspicions that South Africa might become a nuclear power. South African policies are decided and implemented with a toughness derived from Calvinist religion, from the rigors of conquering the African environment, from a history of having successfully defied much of the world for much of its history, and from the determination of a people which after three centuries of residence in Africa has come to perceive itself as a white tribe in Africa with no other place to go. South African policies are chosen with a sense that compromise is tantamount to weakness, with powerful right-wing ideological leanings at home (although pragmatic abroad), and with an unusually high although imperfect concern for formal legality and for avoidance of precedents that other countries could later use against South Africa.

South African foreign policies are entirely designed around a single core objective, namely the protection of South Africa and the preservation of its current political structure for a period of time sufficient to implement the homelands policy. This policy assigns to black tribes small, relatively undesirable portions of territory and then gives them

independence as separate states. Pursuing its core objective, South Africa has proved willing to deal with communists, with radical regimes such as the one in Mozambique, and with black regimes generally. That is to say, its foreign policies are pursued with utter pragmatism. This basic lack of ideological content in South Africa's foreign policy decisions has been greatly reinforced by recent changes in American and Western European foreign policies. Accustomed to thinking of itself as the intermediary between the West and Black Africa, and as a prominent bastion of Western opposition to Communist influence, South Africa has been jolted to discover that the West now avoids such South African intermediation as the kiss of death and, moreover, regards South Africa as a major ideological and political liability.

In this policy context, Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence has been a constant embarrassment to South Africa's important relationships with Britain and more generally with the West. The controversy with Rhodesia blocks South Africa's development of economic and political relationships with the black regimes to the north and presents South Africa with severe dangers of political disorder and radicalism on its northern border and of potential sanctions directed against itself. Given these concerns, South Africa's interest has been in a quick and peaceful transition to the most moderate possible from of black rule for Rhodesia. Similarly, South Africa has come to perceive its primary interest in the trust territory of Southwest Africa as abandonment--in order to minimize the radicalization of that territory and to extricate itself from the fact of illegal occupation of the territory. (Southwest Africa, soon to become Namibia, can be abandoned

without disastrous political consequences because, although it has substantial economic value, its population includes few whites.) But added to these South African concerns are other fears that have become particularly prominent since the West turned on South Africa, namely that solution of the Rhodesian conflict could simply become a prelude to rising frontline, Western, and Soviet pressures on South Africa itself, already troubled by domestic unrest.

In these circumstances, South Africa's policy is one of non-intervention, modified by a strong willingness to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem, and by marginal willingness to encourage the rise of a relatively moderate Zimbabwe government at the expense of the more radical factions. Militarily this means a policy of absolute non-intervention, a policy unlikely to change except in the extreme and unlikely circumstances of a systematic massacre of Rhodesian whites, of the rise of a thoroughly Soviet-dominated Marxist government in Zimbabwe, or of substantial Cuban military intervention in Rhodesia. This policy parallels South Africa's policy regarding Mozambique and all other black African states except Angola. The intervention in Angola was a historical aberration for South Africa, and the disastrous results of that intervention have confirmed South Africa's desire not to repeat the aberration.

South Africa does seek to facilitate a relatively peaceful solution of the Rhodesian conflict through overt support of the Anglo-American initiative (discussed below), and possibly through quiet support of an internal settlement excluding the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), on terms hopefully acceptable to the frontline States and to the West.

While South Africa's support of the Anglo-American initiative has included some tough conversations between South African Prime Minister Vorster and Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith, as well as an abortive diminution of oil supplies to Rhodesia in 1976, South Africa now resolutely refuses to adopt any sanctions against Rhodesia due to fear of a precedent legitimizing later sanctions against South Africa itself. South Africa's unwillingness to impose sanctions is likely to persist because Vorster has become more vulnerable from the Right in the wake of domestic riots and of U.S. hostility. The no-sanctions policy is also sustained by South Africa's inability to control the consequences of applying sanctions to Rhodesia and by confusion as to the precise goals to be attained by any application of sanctions.

In a period of conflict between black groups in post-Smith Zimbabwe, South Africa would be likely to give covert financial and political support to relative moderate groups. Moreover, although its sympathies for Rhodesian whites are not sufficient to motivate intervention in any but the most extreme circumstances, South Africa will seek through international diplomacy to stabilize the situation of Rhodesian whites, for instance by insisting that whites obtain a share in any international development fund that is created for Rhodesia.

Whereas South Africa was badly burned by its intervention in Angola, the Soviet Union has achieved a series of massive successes through intervention in Africa. Angola and Mozambique have become radical regimes, with strong ties to the Soviet Union. The frontline states have adopted Soviet perspectives on many issues, due to the Soviet Union's

role as the only large and dependable source of weapons, funds and diplomatic support for the various liberation movements. To the north, in the horn of Africa, both Ethiopia and Somalia have become radical Marxist states dependent upon the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is using Guinea, Angola, and Somalia as military bases and has acquired access to facilities elsewhere in Africa. The Soviet Union can look forward to involvement in a long struggle to depose the white minority in South Africa and can reasonably expect in that struggle always to be able to outbid the West--and therefore to be able to facilitate radicalization of other African regimes and to consolidate its relationship with numerous African states during the long struggle.

Within Rhodesia itself, the Soviet Union has a long-standing relationship with Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and in the past has aided Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Both the Mugabe group and the Nkomo group are dependent upon Soviet supplies and have adopted Soviet positions and Marxist language on most key issues.

Thus the Soviet Union appears to enjoy an opportunity to intervene in Rhodesia, thereby consolidating its rising regional power, extending its string of bases for military and economic purposes, and humiliating the West in ways that will enhance Soviet power even outside Africa. It would gain a particularly useful base for direct or indirect operations against South Africa. It would consolidate a bloc of mutually supporting radical states, constituting a "critical radical mass" in southern Africa, for expansion to the north as well as to the south. It would do this

under cover of a worthy and widely recognized cause, namely anti-racism, and it could involve itself knowing that the U.S. is determined not to become militarily involved.

On the other hand, there are costs and risks associated with a Soviet, or Soviet-sponsored Cuban, intervention in Rhodesia that were not present in the Angolan situation--both because Rhodesia is different from Angola and because the world environment has changed. By most accounts, although the Soviet military strength is rising rapidly relative to the United States, the Soviet Union still has not surpassed the U.S. in military strength, particularly in the ability to project air and naval power long distances from domestic soil. Although the Soviet Union has accumulated major advantages in southern Africa, it still has interests elsewhere--for instance, detente, arms control, the Sino-Soviet-American triangle, and others--which could suffer. Although the Carter Administration has privately and publicly expressed determination not to become militarily involved in southern African, the Carter administration still appears to the Soviet Union as a volatile, contradictory, unknown quantity which has proved tougher than its predecessor on some issues (such as the SALT negotiations and human rights), and which is not hampered by an active Vietnam war and an active Watergate controversy. The Soviet Union has taken major losses in the Middle East, in India, in relations with China, and in relations with the Eurocommunist parties and has severe problems with the human rights movement in Eastern Europe. These other areas generally have higher priority in Soviet foreign policy than does Africa. Finally, Soviet over-involvement in the

horn of Africa led to its supplying both Ethiopia and Somalia in a war against each other, thereby angering both sides--just as happened in the Lebanese War. Such experiences are enough to given the Soviet Union pause.

Moreover, there are specific problems having to do with Rhodesia. Rhodesia is a more modern state, with better equipped forces, than Angola. There is no true communist party parallel to the MPLA in Angola for the Soviet Union to support. Rhodesia is legally British territory until it is given formal independence; thus, prior to independence, a Soviet intervention would engage the Western powers far more directly than was true at the time of the Soviet intervention in Angola. Moreover, the most probable tool of the Soviet intervention is Cuba, and Cuban calculations may well have changed.

In Rhodesia there would likely be no such clear invitation for Cuban intervention as there was in Angola, and the Cubans would face better-armed and better-trained soldiers than they did in Angola--at a time when they already have 17,000 troops tied down in the continued conflict in Angola. Although they would find the logistics easier once they got into Rhodesia, the Cubans would have a harder time getting their troops into Rhodesia and supplying them. A further Cuban invasion in Africa would increase fear of future Cuban interventions in Latin America and thus potentially disrupt current Cuban progress toward better relations with their Latin American neighbors. Similarly, it would eventually disrupt moves toward diplomatic normalization with the United States and toward improved access to Japanese and Western European technology--prospects that were not so salient at the time

of the Angolan intervention. Within Africa, another intervention might crack African solidarity, contrary to Cuban desires. The frontline states, having noted that Cuba restored Neto to power in Angola during an attempted coup by other MPLA leaders, would fear Cuban involvement in their own domestic politics.

Moreover, the gains Cuba achieved in its Angola intervention would not necessarily be extended by a foray into Rhodesia. In Angola, Cuba proved to itself and to others its ability to ignore and to offend the United States with impunity; that having been achieved, Cuba has little additional to gain on that score. Similarly, whereas Cuba's ability to intervene in Angola with impunity weakened the United States, a further engagement in Rhodesia might strengthen the resolve of the new American administration and further unite NATO. Whereas the Angolan intervention strengthened Cuba's ties with its Soviet ally, the additional ramifications of Cuba's African involvmenet have frequently strained Cuban-Soviet relations; thus involvement in Rhodesia could as easily harm the alliance as enhance it. Whereas Cuba's Angolan adventure strengthened its solidarity with the Third World, particularly because of the prior South African involvement, Cuban involvement with Rhodesia would frighten the frontline states and many other African and Third World states. For all these reasons, then, Cuban intervention in Rhodesia, either independently or at the behest of the Soviet Union, seems far less likely than a simple extrapolation of the Angolan experience would indicate.

Finally, it seems relatively unlikely that the Soviet Union would intervene directly or that it would send in the troops of its other

allies. North Korean troops would be the obvious choice, but Soviet-North Korean relations have been strained, and North Korean intervention on a decisive scale could have consequences in Northeast Asia that would outweigh potential Soviet gains in Rhodesia. Eastern European troops would not necessarily be available, reliable, or effective. Thus Soviet intervention directly or through proxies seems unlikely although its cannot be completely discounted.

The United States and the United Kingdom are the final major actors in the Rhodesian drama. Until the MPLA victory in Angola, the United States emphasized a goal of stability, with considerable sympathy for the role of South Africa and of Portuguese colonialism. Kissinger dramatically changed American policy toward support of black rule in Rhodesia, because of the manifest intellectual failure of an analysis which had concluded that the Portuguese colonial regimes in Angola and Mozambique were stable, and because of the manifest political failure that had led to a successful Soviet intervention, via Cubans, in Angola. But Kissinger continued to rely heavily on South African intermediation and to orient American policies primarily around a balance of power struggle with the Soviet Union.

The principal reason for the reversal of American foreign policy was the rise of an administration in which foreign policy is viewed primarily in political terms, rather than primarily in terms of a game of economic and military balance, as well as an administration which instinctively emphasized moral considerations and the North-South conflict more than military considerations and the struggle with the Soviet Union. Supporting and rationalizing this change of policy were certain background trends,

including improvements in Third World and African solidarity, U.S. disillusionment with military intervention in the wake of Vietnam, and the new potency of the U.S. black electorate in asserting foreign policy preferences.

The interests driving U.S. policy include moral repugnance over white minority rule and also over the potential consolidation of a group of totalitarian regimes in southern Africa, a felt need to be able to work sympathetically with African and other Third World regimes, a desire for continued access to key minerals, particularly chromite and platinum, a fear of Soviet influence in Africa, and also a set of similar interests in the future evolution of South Africa which will be affected by what happens in Rhodesia.

U.S. and British leverage in Rhodesia is primarily intangible. Military sanctions will not be used, and economic sanctions have proved ineffective. Even moral leadership is difficult, given the legacy of past policies and U.S. unwillingness to supplant the Soviets in arming the guerrillas. The Anglo-American team is therefore limited primarily to persuasion, to diplomatic ingenuity, to exploitation of Britain's special legal role as one of the keys to conferral of formal independence, and to marginal economic pressures and hints of economic pressures directed against Rhodesia itself and against South Africa.

The U.S. policy in Southern Africa is to ride the tide of black political aspirations and, in an attempt to capture the high moral ground at all cost, to press challenges to the existing orders in Rhodesia, Southwest Africa and South Africa immediately. The first part of the policy, namely the decision to ride the tide of black aspirations,

is now recognized nearly universally as the essential component of any potentially successful policy. The second aspect of the policy, the decision to announce a policy of insisting upon transformation of the South African regime and to send American diplomats to encourage black opponents of the current regime, at a time when South African help is needed in bringing the Rhodesian negotiations to a successful conclusion, is more controversial. American avoidance of all positive association with South African policies as the kiss of death, and American refusal to reward South Africa for acting in its own interest to secure a favorable settlement in Rhodesia, both follow from the first aspect of the policy. But the decision to mount an early challenge to the very structure of South African society, rather than delaying that challenge until the Rhodesian and Southwest African transitions have occurred, is an entirely separate decision. That policy runs the great risk of encouraging South African intransigence and uncooperativeness and thereby setting the stage for a prolonged military conflict between Rhodesian blacks and whites. If such a risk materializes, then the policy will be viewed by historians in the same light as they would have viewed an American policy which lost World War II by insisting upon fighting equally hard on both the Asian and European fronts. On the other hand, the alternative policy of greater tactical flexibility would run the risk of incurring cynicism and losing whatever moral and political leadership Andrew Young and his colleagues have managed to gain for the U.S.

Within these overall perspectives in southern Africa, the Anglo-American initiative itself seeks to achieve agreement among the Rhodesian principals on a constitutional outline, then transfer power to a neutral government which would hold elections. The initiative insists upon the participation of the Patriotic Front, both because the Patriotic Front possesses a powerful political and military base and because the support of the frontline governments, necessary to role out future guerrilla warfare, cannot be obtained without the participation of the Patriotic Front. Currently the Anglo-American team seeks to persuade both sides to disband their opposing armies in preparation for the election, an effort that is most unlikely to succeed. The U.S. and Britain both refuse to supervise the transition, and they are having some difficulty finding other sufficiently neutral parties to do so. Finally, the Anglo-American initiative seeks neither to determine the ultimate structure of the government nor to support particular personalities. It does promise a substantial development fund, which would underwrite the possibility of a relatively prosperous transition and provide a carrot for relatively moderate political and economic policies.

In practice, tangible American pressures on South Africa are likely to be fairly far in the future and even then are likely to be exceedingly moderate until such time as either internal disturbances or the involvement of major external powers makes the issue of South Africa's future an immediate one. Pressure on U.S. businessmen to freeze their investments or to disinvest is possible in the future, but there is none now. The Carter administration does not lean toward direct economic or military

sanctions, although Export-Import Bank and other loans might be shut off. There will, however, continue to be more or less subtle playing upon the South African fear of future sanctions. But this relatively moderate policy on the tangible issues is not the central issue. The most important policies are the intangible ones, namely the provision of direct moral support for the black opposition and the unmistakable labeling of the South African regime as a pariah and a liability in the eyes of the Western world. Just as it is the moral force of American policy which has given it leverage in the frontline states and elsewhere in black Africa, so it is the moral force of the U.S. policy toward South Africa which has greatly raised the morale of the black opposition and pushed the Afrikaners into a greater and more reactionary solidarity.

The details of the Anglo-American initiative may change substantially, for instance modifying the demand for complete disbanding of the opposing armies, but the overall framework of American policy in southern Africa is likely to persist, unless (1) Soviet involvements expands dramatically, or (2) violence among Africans intensifies and spreads over a very broad areas, or (3) a combination of peaceful settlements in Rhodesia and South-west Africa with an unchallengeable partition of South Africa into a white sector and an acceptably generous black sector defuses the conflict or, (4) an overwhelmingly important conflict with the Soviet Union develops elsewhere in the world.

THE POLITICAL TRANSITION FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE

The Rhodesian Polity Today

The Rhodesian political situation is dominated by a small number of parameters:

1. The white regime headed by Ian Smith is terminally ill. The end may come peacefully in a few months or it may come after three or four years of violent struggle, but the rapid increase of trained guerrillas, the economic pressures on the Rhodesian economy as working-age males are shifted into military service, and the rapidly increasing rate of white emigration appear to be irreversible and fatal trends.

2. The black portion of the polity is disastrously fragmented. The three major tribes are mutually suspicious. The urban moderates, particularly Muzorewa and Sithole, and the expatriate guerrillas under Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, are intensely hostile to one another. The urban moderates, Sithole and Muzorewa, are engaged in an intense organizational struggle with one another. Despite their official alliance in the Patriotic Front, Mugabe and Nkomo dislike each other intensely. There are three distinct guerrilla armies in the field and an additional one training in Tanzania, in addition to the regime's Rhodesian Security Forces. This extreme fragmentation means that, although Rhodesia's best hope is for a quick and relatively peaceful transition, it will pay a heavy price for not having had a struggle that would have eliminated all but one major political force prior to formal independence.

3. Rhodesian literacy and experience with a modern economy are the highest in Africa. There is a competent civil service and a competent private economy. All of these, together with an unusually well-developed

economic infrastructure, provide the basis for reasonably competent administration of Zimbabwe and for considerable economic dynamism if these assets are not destroyed in the interim.

4. The moderate urban leaders can attract adulatory crowds and presumably votes, but lack an organized political and military base. The rural guerrilla leaders possess a military organization, and Nkomo possesses at least a large residual political organization, but both lack acquaintance with administration and economic management.

5. Rhodesian politics is essentially unideological. Even the rural guerrilla leaders, who depend upon Soviet supplies and employ Marxist rhetoric, are essentially pragmatic opportunists who share with the moderates an intense hatred of racism but have adopted a veneer of Marxism in order to maintain access to the only available major source of supplies, namely the Soviet Union.

6. Rhodesian race relations lack the intense hostility characteristic of race relations in South Africa, Mozambique, and Angola. This opens up the possibility of a transition without racial violence, and of a transition without the economic collapse that would necessarily follow a massive white exodus. Of course, it does not ensure an auspicious transition.

7. There is a high level of communications throughout Rhodesia, contributing to a relatively uniformity in the distribution of information and ideas. High literacy, good infrastructure, and the splitting of a very high proportion of the Rhodesian black populism between males who work in the cities and women and children who work in the countryside, have created a nationwide communication network.

8. There is no consensus on the desirability of democratic elections. Democracy is associated with white racism and economic exploitation in much of the popular mind. The Patriotic Front, knowing that it would probably lose an election, explicitly opposes the holding of elections.

From these characteristics one can derive numerous scenarios for the future. By emphasizing fragmentation, one can deduce a likely civil war and economic disaster. On the other hand, by emphasizing the literacy, the infrastructure, the competent administration, and the agricultural and mineral resources, one can imagine a great economic takeoff. But, before proceeding to alternative scenarios, one can pin down some crucial fixed conclusions about the future and political structure of Zimbabwe.

The first is that Zimbabwe will be governed by an authoritarian, rather than a democratic, regime. This is evident from the experience of other African nations, from the lack of mass Rhodesian political participation over a long period of time in strong democratic institutions, and from the lack of a political consensus regarding the virtues of democracy. The intensity of ethnic conflict, the excessive popular economic expectations that inevitably accompany the overthrow of a relatively wealthy ruling minority, and the fact that a top leader who loses his job is likely to lose all political status and economic security, combine to make stable democracy structurally impossible. All of the military organizations are under the control of leadership with undemocratic aspirations. The authoritarianism may be mild, as in Kenya, or intense, as in Angola, but it will be authoritarianism in some form.

Second, the regime will lean to the left in its political tone rather than to the right. Although Rhodesian politics is basically pragmatic and personalist rather than ideological, the hardening of political positions when past policies and statements must be defended, the legacy of Soviet backing, and the pressures to the left coming from foreign-trained guerrillas, from the peer pressure of frontline leaders, and from a cadre of left-leaning intellectuals, will have their impact. The central issue will be distributive economic justice rather than law and order or economic growth. The result may be a government of the moderate left or a government of the fervent left, but it will be a government whose aspirations have more in common with Zambia and Tanzania than with Brazil and South Korea. It is important to add that its aspirations are also unlikely to be those of North Korea and Vietnam.

Under these circumstances, elections, if they occur, will serve the crucial purposes, not of choosing a government as an expression of popular sovereignty, but of legitimizing the formal concession of independence and of maximizing the unity of initial black government so as to keep the ensuing power struggle as short and peaceful as possible.

Finally, all of the Rhodesian leaders, and particularly the Patriotic Front leaders, have had direct experience of the economic tragedies of Mozambique and of Tanzania and have expressed their horror at the results in those countries. Thus, although it would be silly to presume that totally untutored administrators and economic managers could assume supreme power and run the economy well, it is a safe assumption that, given the superior infrastructure, resources and administrative training

available in Rhodesia, and given the political leaders' experience of neighboring countries' economic disaster, no Rhodesian leader is likely to duplicate the Mozambican destruction of the economy. If the Rhodesian economy is to be destroyed beyond hope of early reconstruction, it will be through civil war, not through the ideological impositions of a leader relatively secure in his power.

The basic alternatives for Rhodesian politics are now as follows:

Smith's continuation in office could lead to a protracted struggle between blacks and whites in which the economy would inflate and stagnate and the rates of white emigration would increase rapidly. Meanwhile, the guerrillas would grow far more numerous, far better trained, and would become increasingly unified and radicalized. The result would be an extremely radical regime, hostile to whites, coming to power after a struggle which would have destroyed the economy.

Smith could transfer power to the urban moderates, Muzorewa and Sithole, or could hold an election resulting in transfer of power to these urban moderates. The urban moderates would lack the political base of the rural guerrillas and would find the Rhodesian Security Forces deteriorating and unreliable at a time when the guerrilla forces were becoming larger and better. In either case, the result would be an extended struggle very destructive to the economy.

Under South African and other pressure, Smith might agree to a settlement which might include both the urban moderates and the ZAPU guerrillas under Nkomo, but exclude Mugabe and ZANU. The frontline states would initially be unhappy, but if the combined forces of ZAPU and the present Rhodesian Security Forces were able to minimize Mugabe's

influence for a period of several years, the frontline states would probably acquiesce in the settlement and deprive the ZANU guerrillas of their sanctuary and supply lines. One might conceivably see then a moderate left government under Nkomo, implementing pragmatic and successful economic development policies. The problem with this scenario is the dependence upon an unlikely degree of South African pressure.

In accordance with the Anglo-American initiative, it is barely imaginable that the opposing armed forces could be substantially disarmed and an election held. If such an election put Muzorewa in power, alone or with other urban moderate leaders, the political situation would probably polarize gradually into the civil war between urban moderates and rural guerrillas outlined above. But if it brought to power a coalition of Muzorewa and Nkomo, or Nkomo alone, a stable government could evolve after a few months of sporadic struggle. Alternatively, even if the opposing sides were not completely disarmed, a stable government could conceivably evolve from an Nkomo-Muzowera regime after a year or so of rather muted armed struggle with Mugabe and ZANU, which is finally curtailed by a combination of central government success within Rhodesia and frontline denial of sanctuaries and supplies.

An election and other arrangements which simply put Nkomo or Mugabe in power together could lead to an extended civil war, or to a radical regime after an assassination or exile of Nkomo, or to a relatively moderate regime after an assassination or exile of Mugabe. In each

of the latter cases there would be a relatively short period of intense struggle between the ZANU and ZAPU organizations, but a relatively quick resolution of such struggle is quite imaginable.

These brief scenarios could be supplemented with others in varied and numerous ways. What is startling is that, although one can estimate that certain of them are slightly more likely than others, the degree of fragmentation of the Rhodesian polity is so great, and the level of information about crucial variables (e.g., rural black political sentiment and economic expectations) so low, that it is virtually impossible to narrow down the list of scenarios to the usual manageable two, three, or four. One must therefore fall back on a rather abstract comparison of the principal Rhodesian parameters with the parameters for other African and Third World countries. The principal parameter which points in a pessimistic direction is the extreme degree of political fragmentation, a degree that is even more severe than was the case in Angola. The higher level of development of Rhodesia means that the power struggle will be shorter than in Angola, but one can also imagine that it will be more intense. On the other hand, the levels of literacy, of administrative competence, of tolerance between blacks and whites, and of international consensus regarding the principal aspect of a solution, all would lead one to be relatively optimistic about the economic and political prospects for the new Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe's Economic Prospects

The economy will be driven by the political imperatives of the new government rather than by any autonomous economic logic. One cannot analyze the detailed economic consequences of the transition, first because of the inescapable ambiguity regarding the structure and leadership of the new government, and second because the political leaders simply do not have coherent economic programs, are not trained economists and managers, and take advice from lieutenants whose economic perspectives are contradictory. However, there are some baseline scenarios which can be used to triangulate the problem.

First, any protracted conflict resulting from Smith's regime intransigence and continued guerrilla warfare would destroy the economy, as would any of the scenarios which end up producing a war between black factions of roughly equal power. In these scenarios, the civil service would be decimated, the private economy would be taken over for purposes of military control, the infrastructure would be severely damaged, and whites would flee. The fleeing of the whites would hamstring industrial production and would throw out of work the very large proportion of the black non-subsistence sector of the economy which is based upon personal services to whites. Agriculture, which is the backbone of Rhodesia's relative prosperity, would be crippled by the emigration of the whites who run the modern agricultural sector, and by the destruction of their farms as they left. The struggle would radicalize the politics of the opposing parties and would lead to bureaucratic control and politicization of the economy as both sides struggled to gain total control of all available resources. It might be decades before the economy returned to its present standard of living.

A second and opposite possibility is that a stable government would be formed from a coalition of Nkomo and some of the urban moderates, with Nkomo exercising the strongest political power and his followers occupying the most prestigious political positions in the society, but with heavy reliance upon the existing institutions for managing the economy. Blacks would quickly move into most of the senior positions, and inexperience would cause some disruption, but conceivably the institutions would hold. There would be heavy intervention to assure rapid black movement into positions previously occupied by whites throughout the economy, but most whites would not be left bereft in this scenario. Because of the relatively serious land envy, many of the white farmers would be at least partially dispossessed, but massive disruption of the economy and of the white presence in it might be avoided. Confusion as to economic goals, and as to the relationship between economic goals and political survival, would lead to considerable inconsistency, but this could gradually be cleared up through a learning process for the political leaders and through the gradual assertion of the institutional influence of the civil service. This is an extremely optimistic scenario, both in the assumption that a government so constituted could be stable, and in the assumption that policies would be so moderate and competent. Even this extremely optimistic scenario would lead to an economy with more difficulties at home and with the multinationals than the Botswana economy has had. But it would also be an economy with advantages from the termination of the embargo, from an inflow of foreign investment, and from a large inflow of economic aid.

Third, a Rhodesian government which encompassed Nkomo, Mugabe and Muzorewa would probably evolve in its economic policies into a struggle in which Muzorewa was left on the sidelines. Mugabe and Nkomo would have to make competitive promises to their followers and to make constant efforts to avoid being outflanked on the left. This could lead to rapid radicalization of economic policies and to competitive takeovers of much of the economy in order to repay political debts. The result could be an economy which proceeded rather far in the direction that Mozambique has headed, despite the firm intentions of both major political leaders to avoid the Mozambican disaster. Such a political system could evolve very far toward the Mozambican disaster, or it could evolve into civil war, or else the early triumph of one of the principal parties to the conflict, together with the early intimation of possible economic disaster, could lead to a relatively fast learning process which would return the economy to more moderate policies after a much shorter period of time and with much less disruption than occurred in Mozambique. The Rhodesian economy has far greater capacity to learn quickly, and far greater capacity to snap back from a period of disruption than did the economies of any of Zimbabwe's black neighbors at the time of independence.

In addition to these thumbnail sketches, it will be useful to pursue in somewhat greater detail the consequences of at least one scenario, in order to obtain a baseline which one can then use in estimating the economic consequences of a range of alternative political options. For this heuristic purpose, and not in any effort to make a prediction, we can outline a baseline economic scenario.

A Somewhat Optimistic Baseline Scenario for the Zimbabwe Economy

Suppose that the removal of the Smith regime occurs fairly smoothly, and that there is a transfer to a government encompassing all of the major political factions, including especially the followings of Mugabe, Nkomo, Muzowera and Sithole. Suppose further that very quickly Nkomo or a figure like him becomes relatively dominant but is unable to assert complete control of the society. The frontline nations, fearing protracted disorder and continuation of regional economic troubles, squeeze out most pockets of guerrillas outside Zimbabwe, but small guerrilla groups remain a problem for the government. For two years, various factions within the government attempt coups, realign with each other, and create a sense of instability and uneasiness. The leading figure in the government changes one or two times, but the casualties are low (e.g., 250 people killed per year), and disruption is sporadic and does no major damage to the infrastructure.

The first priority of such a government will be control, which will imply an effort to centralize power as much as possible. There will be a struggle over every civil service job, as occurred in Kenya. The most tense and dangerous struggle would be between the Karangas and the other tribes, and in fact the unifying pressure on the government could be the common struggle against the Karangas. The first phase of struggle would be for control over all potentially loyal military forces and for disbanding of all potential opposition. The second primary struggle would be for control of the civil service. The economic resultsof such struggle will be inconsistent policy, arbitrary and disruptive decisions, and very high inflation--perhaps in excess of 100

percent for a year or two. Development would be almost completely disregarded.

Unemployment would become severe because of the forced emigration of many of the 250,000 non-Rhodesians and the fleeing of some proportion of the whites, together with the reduction of industrial and agricultural production due to uncertainties. However, both the inflation and the unemployment, as well as any possible food shortages, would be kept within tolerable limits (by Third World standards) because there would be substantial financial support from the United States (at least initially) and from other Western countries, substantial support from the IMF, a rapidly growing dividend from the termination of sanctions, and whatever U.S. food aid is necessary to relieve potential food shortages.

The official ideology would change from a dedication to free enterprise to a dedication to socialist and redistributive ideals. However, this would not necessarily mean government controls over the economy much more disruptive than the current heavy government management of investment decisions, management of foreign exchange allocations, and racial division of the economy.

The key to the future of the economy is agriculture. Half of Rhodesia's agricultural production is exported, and much of Rhodesian industry consists of the processing of agricultural products. The bulk of export agriculture is produced on a very small percentage of the white farms, and one must expect some disruption of their production as blacks insist upon access to some of the most prosperous farmland. A certain amount of squatting on white farms might well be tolerated

by the government, partly from impotence, partly from a need to expand the base of black political support for the regime. But under this scenario the government would become alerted and concerned fairly early about the consequences of a massive takeover of the most productive agriculture; thus this process would likely not proceed to the point of totally disrupting white agriculture.

Just as the agricultural sector depends upon the role of white farms, so the whole wage sector (the non-subsistence sector) of the economy is dependent upon a continuing white presence. One-third of the Rhodesian labor force of three million people is in the wage sector, with about one-third in agriculture, 30-40 percent in manufacturing, and 15 percent in domestic service. Each white job supports half a dozen black jobs, so massive white emigration would cause very severe unemployment among blacks. Under this scenario, white emigration would probably range between 10 and 20 percent of the 250,000 whites currently living in Rhodesia. The economy can tolerate a loss of 10 percent without serious permanent damage. Moreover, there would be a dividend from the transition here, because 8-10 percent of the white working-age population are currently in military service.

Thus, within this scenario it is quite possible that the decline of economic activity could be kept within tolerable limits in two senses. First the decline would not necessarily be permanent and in fact there would be a strong basis for absorption of foreign aid, possibly amounting to $50 million a year, and large-scale loans, possibly amounting to as much as $100 million a year. It would take time to begin exploiting the trade potential opened up by the removal of

sanctions, but the basis for such an expansion would not be destroyed, Second, although unemployment would still be a severe problem, particularly in light of black expectations for rapid improvement of their situation, it might be kept short of political explosion.

The great drama of course will be the struggle over the competing goals of sound economic management and social justice--goals which are in the long run quite consistent, but in the short run seriously contradictory. Africanization of existing white management positions will probably proceed very quickly, particularly in the public service. However, only 10 percent of the wage sector (approximately 100,000 jobs) consists of whites, and some proportion of those whites must be retained. The bulk of improved economic status for blacks must therefore be derived from some form of income redistribution. Rapid progress will be made even more difficult, ironically, because many barriers to blacks have already been removed. The public sector will be expanded at considerable cost in inflation and efficiency, and education will undoubtedly be drastically expanded. The proportion of secondary and college-educated students will be raised relative to primary school pupils. Major firms will be pressured to promote blacks and to hire more, and there will be an attempt to reduce profits in order to provide greater employment. There will probably be little effort to impose worker control or worker management schemes on the major corporations.

In the agricultural sector, land is available for 50-60,000 families to be resettled without disrupting white agriculture. However, it is unclear whether there is the administrative capability to carry out such a program, and it is unclear whether massive resettlement

efforts would lead to stability or to radicalization of the disrupted families. Moreover, it is extremely likely that the popular demand will not be for resettlement onto relatively virgin land but rather for access to the more prosperous land of white farmers.

Just as none of the principal black political groups has articulated a clear and coherent set of domestic economic priorities and programs, likewise there has been no statement of attitudes toward the multinational corporations. Attention will undoubtedly be focused upon land, education, housing, jobs, and racial justice, and the multinational corporations will have little independent salience for the new regime. While there is undoubtedly some moderate resentment of the multinational corporations' role in supporting Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence and in circumventing the international embargo, and while certain foreign-trained ideologues will be ideologically hostile to the multinational corporations, there is remarkably little record of expressions of hostility to the multinationals as such. An ideological attack on the position of the multinationals does not seem to be in the cards, except in the most radical and relatively unlikely scenarios.

But the multinationals will be major targets of pressure for improved employment opportunities, and for revenues to pay for expanded public services. They may also become the occasional objects of rhetoric designed to divert attention from some particularly intractable domestic problem. They must therefore expect at best to experience an initial period of severe uncertainty and disruption, and it would be quite surprising if they were not even truly subject to demands for full or partial Zimbabwean ownership of local mining facilities. Throughout Africa

It is the preservation of this institutional structure, together with avoidance of massive emigration of whites that holds the key to Rhodesia's economic future.

Rhodesia thus has before it the prospect of becoming an economic showcase of black Africa. It has the good fortune that the frontline states, South Africa, the U.S., and the West all share an intense common interest, for a variety of reasons, in facilitating such a future for Zimbabwe. But Zimbabwe also faces the stark possibility that political fragmentation would lead to fighting between tribes, and between hostile guerrilla groups, quickly destroying the economy and making Zimbabwean politics for a time the plaything of less benign powers.

Chapter II

OPTIONS AND PROGNOSES FOR ZIMBABWE: ALTERNATIVE GOVERNMENTS AND THE FRONTLINE STATES

Options and Prognoses for Zimbabwe:

Alternative Governments and the Frontline States

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The parties to the Rhodesian conflict have long recognized that the stability and prosperity of southern Africa depends significantly upon the manner by which a settlement is obtained and the colony's future arranged. Rhodesia as Zimbabwe is important to its region, to its neighbors, and to the United States geographically, strategically, economically, politically, and--not least--psychologically and symbolically. The outcome of the ongoing struggle for power there will--as all the contenders know--shape both the immediate future of the region and, because of the interest of South Africa and external Western and Soviet forces, southern Africa's longer range future as well.

The contending and interested parties (even the liberation groups) agree on only one point: that an end to the war is both necessary and urgent. Each of the parties, including South Africa, the liberation groups, the frontline states, and the external powers--but excluding the Smith regime--urgently desires a transfer of power to blacks which is negotiated. But beyond that point the contenders diverge. There are fundamental disagreements about the nature and conditions of the proposed transfer of power, about the groups and persons to which and to whom power should be transferred, and about

how best to ensure social justice, economic prosperity, and stability in the future Zimbabwe. Indeed, there are poorly articulated but nonetheless real disagreements over the desirability and/or compatability of one or another of these last three goals.

In recent months, as the Western initiative over Rhodesia has produced few results and been attacked systematically by the Patriotic Front, South Africa, and critical Commonwealth nations, the frontline nations have oscillated in their attitudes sharply from optimism to pessimism. Now theirs is the pessimism of frustration and desperation--frustration at the inability or failure of the West to obtain South African support for an immediate end to white rule in Rhodesia; desperation in terms of the damage continued warfare (and the lack of a settlement) is doing and will do to their own economies and political legitimacies. Desperation is also fostered by the fear that warfare will spill over (as it has sporadically) onto their own lands and inhibit the growth of their own fragile economies. Prudence, coupled with frustration and disillusionment, might therefore dictate a moderating of support by the frontline states for the liberation of Zimbabwe. But, despite the costs and the inherent dangers, the commitment of the frontline states collectively and the pressure of each upon the others is too great for any policies other than a confrontation borne of desperation to motivate the frontline states in the nearterm. These very same policies will have an impact upon the initiatives of the Western powers and, more directly, upon the Patriotic Front, which must continue to depend

upon the patronage of its host governments and the logistical support of the Soviet Union.

The creation of the Patriotic Front has been the signal accomplishment of the frontline states in their campaign against white domination in Rhodesia. At present, the frontline states (Botswana is less sure than the others) are therefore committed (as ratified by the Organization of African Unity last month in Libreville) to a future Rhodesia in which the Front plays a dominant, if not an all-encompassing, role. For Mozambique, Angola, and Tanzania, the accession to power of the Front would provide a guarantee that white rule would not linger in Rhodesia behind an Ivory Coast-like or Gabon-like facade--that the transfer of power would satisfy symbolic and psychological criteria and would boost the credibility of black Africa in the international sphere. Of equal importance to the same three frontline states, the coming to power of the Front would inhibit any compromise or threat to the ideology of central planning which exists in each state; in the short term Rhodesia would be governed, believe these three states, by a cadre of men sympathetic to an approach which is more socialistic than capitalistic in approach. (This is not simply a Soviet-oriented ideological preference on the part of the Presidents Julius Nyerere, Samor Machel, and Agostino Neto. Rather they seek support for their own experiments and the legitimacy that comes from shared arrangements, especially in a country potentially as wealthy as Zimbabwe.)

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Botswana shares none of these aspirations, and is not very excited by the kind of government which is envisaged by Tanzania,

Angola, and Mozambique. However, although Botswana is the most vulnerable of the five because of the Rhodesian-owned railway which is its lifeline, and desires a neighbor which shares its own ideology of pragmatism and free enterprise, it is the least influential. It disagrees with the others privately and acquiesces and supports them publicly.

The Zambian will in and about Rhodesia is expressed personally by President Kenneth Kaunda. His are the policies of the nation; they do not, by all accounts, personify the national will, which has become very chauvinistic- and consumer-oriented. The sordidness and dangers of exile politics, the economic sacrifices which have been deemed necessary or blamed upon the need to support the liberation struggle, and the common man's (now urbanized and more and more middle class) growing xenophobia have all soured Zambians, if not their leadership, on confrontation for its own sake, and on the Patriotic Front. There is a widespread sentiment in Zambia for Bishop Abel Muzorewa. But this sentiment can still safely be ignored, and President Kaunda is determined, preferably by negotiations but if necessary by protracted war, to install the Front in power in Zimbabwe. In this case the association of the Front with notions of central planning and socialism, however defined, is less important than Kaunda's personal assessment that only the leadership of the Front, and particularly Joshua Nkomo, can create and then lead a strong and enduring new nation. For Kaunda, who backed Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in the Angolan struggle, the ties are personal and

are largely based on an assessment of the capabilities of the various potential leaders. Important, too, is Nkomo's legitimacy as conveyed by long involvement and historic centrality. But, most of all, Kaunda views Nkomo as the only Zimbabwean leader capable of uniting the country and preventing its subsequent takeover by a military regime of Marxist orientation. For him, even more than his fellow presidents, the need for a compatible government is overriding. Neto also backs Nkomo, but largely on account of their shared patronage.

Although Kaunda, Neto, Machel, and Nyerere have swung their support behind the Patriotic Front, the last two see Nkomo's participation as temporary and expedient. Kaunda and Neto would like his leadership to become complete and the role of the other arm of the Front to wither. These different views of the utility of the Patriotic Front, and of the nature and quality of the Front itself, contain the stuff of discord and promise conflict in or over an independent Zimbabwe.

The unity of the Front is transient and fragile. As in any marriage of convenience, the purposes and motives of the partners may and do differ. Uniting for victory (and because the frontline states demanded it) is insufficient to ensure commonality of purpose or mutual cooperation after or even on the eve of independence. Only the expressed British and American determination to hold elections in Rhodesia prior to independence, and the evident popularity of Bishop Muzorewa within central Zimbabwe, gives content and meaning to the alliance. Without his surprising success and

the determination on the part of the frontline five that Rhodesia shall have but one liberation movement, the Front would never have been created.

The Patriotic Front, which has no joint office or unified military command, is composed of two distinct parts between which there is historic enmity, ethnic distrust, and deep-rooted rivalry. Originally, from 1957 when African nationalism in Rhodesia entered its modern period and Joshua Nkomo was asked by younger men to head what became successively the African National Congress, the National Democratic Party, and then the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), there was only a single organization of Africans opposed to white rule. Nkomo, T. George Silundika, Robert Mugabe, Ndabaningi Sithole, and a number of others were its principal leaders. In 1961 Nkomo temporarily lost favor by agreeing to constitutional changes proposed by the British government and supported by the white government of the day. In 1963 he fled to Tanzania to avoid arrest, again losing credibility among a proportion of his followers. Whatever his motives, from about 1962-63 Nkomo began to act less militantly than a number of his followers. The younger, more educated members of his entourage were particularly displeased with behavior which to them seemed less militant than appropriate. From about 1962 this last group became dissatisfied with Nkomo's leadership or--to them--lack thereof. Nkomo was accused of being too willing to compromise with whites, of being personally too easy for whites to seduce with promises of luxurious living, and of being too non-ideological (in the sense that Nkomo had little

interest in debates over socialism, capitalism, and so on). In the 1960s, too, younger militants saw that he accepted advice and gave privileges only to his older associates, most of whom spoke Sindebele, the minority but historically dominant language of Rhodesia. Many of the better-trained young men were from Shona-speaking sections of the colony. For them Nkomo's legitimacy, which originally stemmed from his early involvement with striking railway workers and his association with the African politics before the Congress of 1957, had been dissipated by years of easy living, egregious negotiation errors, and a generally flabby approach to what they considered the hard questions of nationalistic tactics. Nkomo's failures in 1953 and again in 1961, and his flight to Tanzania, disappointed them. They sought someone more ascetic and more willing to accept the argument that only violence could free Rhodesia from white rule. (Nkomo did not then approve of violence.) The fact that the younger men could never easily explain away Nkomo's support from the masses failed to interrupt their reverie with a future that excluded him.

For all of these reasons--ethnic, stylistic, ideological, and personal--in 1963 Sithole, Mugabe, and a number of the younger militants broke away from Nkomo's ZAPU and formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Sithole became its president, with Mugabe its chief organizer and second-in-command. Antagonisms between ZANU and ZAPU quickly grew bitter, with the better financed ZAPU at first remaining dominant in internecine nationalist struggles of the mid-1960s. But even before Ian Smith's declaration of

independence in 1965, the white government banned both ZAPU and ZANU and imprisoned its top leadership. Outside the country ZAPU was the first to mount guerrilla attacks, but these were poorly led and reflected the lack of training of their liberationist tyros. In exile, ZAPU by 1970 was no more than a shrill band of blusterers. ZANU, meanwhile, was only active overseas. But from 1972, after several years of training, it launched guerrilla forays from Zambia and parts of Frelimo-held Mozambique which were remarkably successful. (These attacks were successful in the sense that Rhodesian whites became fearful and could no longer ignore the threat of guerrilla incursions.) In terms of the rivalry between ZANU and ZAPU, these military successes seemed to promise a victory which would specifically exclude Nkomo and others of the "old guard" who had been "too soft" and too muddled to follow the model of nationalistic attack pioneered by Frelimo. After the coup in Portugal (1974) and the availability of safe havens in Mozambique (1975), it seemed that ZANU guerrillas had a clear road to domination over ZAPU, if not Smith. Indeed in the early 1970s, with Nkomo (and Mugabe and Sithole) still in detention, Kaunda and Nyerere largely backed ZANU, then led by Herbert Chitepo and Josiah Tongogara, its field commander.

Another figure became prominent in 1971, when the then British government agreed to transfer power and legitimacy to Smith if he could obtain the consent of the black majority. To ascertain the views of these six million Rhodesians, Britain sent a large group (the Pearce Commission) of politicians and former civil servants (including some colonial governors) to Rhodesia to hold meetings

(indabas) with urban and rural Africans. As a part of the Rhodesian-British agreement, a number of second-echelon ZANU and ZAPU leaders were released from prison. They formed the African National Council (ANC) to mobilize African opinion against the proposed devolution of power to Smith. As their leader, the ex-detainees (Eddison Zvobgo, Edson Sithole, etc.) asked Abel Muzorewa, a Methodist bishop, to assume the mantle of leadership. He was then apolitical and secure mostly in religious favor. For them, he was an excellent choice who proved capable of giving the stamp of respectability to what was, sub rosa, a reasonably militant organization determined to frustrate the proposed transfer by encouraging Africans to give a firmly negative answer to the opinion-seeking Pearce Commission. But, as a result of their successful ability to mobilize African sentiment against the handover to Smith, Bishop Muzorewa gained stature and as the militants one by one left the country or were arrested, his credibility and leadership grew. Moreover, Muzorewa had not been party to the nationalist feuds of the 1960s, and that helped.

When Nkomo, Mugabe, Sithole, and others were released from prison and detention in 1974, Muzorewa was still a force with which to be reckoned. Although Kaunda and Nyerere tried to bring all of the leaders together in one common organization, the success of the ZANU guerrillas made them reluctant to play a secondary role behind a leader like Nkomo, whom they failed to respect, or Muzorewa, who had few credentials of militancy. Mugabe and Sithole had meanwhile grown personally antagonistic in prison, and Mugabe led the major

portion of ZANU out of the old organization into the guerrilla camps in Mozambique. Sithole thus lost his following, and retained only a minor constituency within Rhodesia. Thus, from the end of the long imprisonment until the Geneva negotiations of 1976, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe had not one or two, but four, contending nationalist organizations.

The basis of their differences were personal and historical. But they were also tactical, Mugabe espousing all-out violence and using more extreme language, the others less so. And they were ethnically chauvinistic in a way which was new and more irreconcilable than ever before. Of Rhodesia's six million Africans, nearly 80 percent speak Cishona. The remainder speak Sindebele. Nkomo and many (but not all) of his lieutenants speak Sindebele. Only a very few, however, are of royal blood, or true Ndebele. Several important ones, like Josiah and Ruth Chinamano, are Cishona speakers. Nkomo and ZAPU drew on a Sindebele speaking base and, accurately or not, ZAPU's appeal from about 1974 has been largely based on its linguistic affinities. Of the 4.8 million Shona, nearly half are from the Karanga area of the south. By 1974 they had composed the bulk of the black soldiers in the Rhodesian army and dominated the ZANU guerrillas. Tongogara and Simon Mutuuswa (Rex Nhongo) are both Karanga. Many of the political leaders closely allied in Mozambique with the soldiers are Karanga. Mugabe is not a Karanga, coming from the Zezeru area northwest of Salisbury. But he has gained the backing of the guerrillas and, since 1975, has been their political spokesman and, less assuredly, leader. He

is ascetic and dedicated, with a fervent streak which contrasts starkly with that of Nkomo. Without Karanga support, Mugabe would have no strong ethnic political base. Likewise Sithole discovered after the split with Mugabe that he, too, had no important ethnic constituency. An Ndau, his Cishona-speaking followers are few numerically and located largely in the east of the country along the border with Mozambique. Muzorewa also speaks Cishona, but his version of the language is that of Central Mashonaland--the area around Salisbury and traditionally the politically most attuned part of the colony. Any assessment of modern Rhodesian politics must take into account these ethnic realities. The cleavages which they represent will endure, and bedevil the integration and stability of Zimbabwe.

Such cleavages would be less worrisome if the Patriotic Front had a widespread national following. Unhappily, however, the Front remains an artificial construct with no verifiably independent existence. Until recently Mugabe's ZANU half was the stronger. With about 1000 guerrillas in the field, another 2000 to 3000 in camps in Mozambique and a further 3000 to 4000 in training in Tanzania, it was receiving a steady flow of materiel from and through Mozambique and Tanzania and had demonstrated a satisfactory ability to threaten Rhodesian control of the isolated eastern and north-eastern sections of the colony. With steady Chinese and some intermittent Soviet and/or east bloc support ZANU seemed poised to dominate events in a black-ruled Zimbabwe. The alliance of Karanga soldiers led by Tongogara (Soviet-trained) and Mutuuswa (Chinese-trained)

and Mugabe, the erstwhile political commissar, seemed far more effective and lasting than observers would have supposed. The same trio also had the support of Machel and the armed forces in Mozambique. For a time (in 1975 and again during the Geneva meetings of 1976) this congeries of force made it abundantly clear that a settlement with whites was less desirable than outright military victory after a protracted struggle. Although if it comes to an election Mugabe's ZANU can probably count upon the uncoerced support of the bulk of the Karanga--a very large but politically untutored bloc--and many urban intellectuals, his and ZANU's appeal cannot hope to be universal. Moreover, ZANU existed above ground for too brief a period in the 1960s to have developed an extensive national organization. For ZANU a negotiated settlement which resulted from black military success would be far preferable to any which derived from Western pressure upon South Africa (and, by extension, on Rhodesia).

The Front's ZAPU half, led by Nkomo, has managed a surprising renaissance over the last six months. Rhodesia's destruction of ZANU camps in Mozambique helped give a comparative advantage to ZAPU, but stout Soviet support, the fresh backing of Kaunda, and a renewed determination on Nkomo's part have proved significant. A year ago ZAPU's military arm could claim no more than 1000 soldiers. Now small squads penetrate northwestern Rhodesia and shoot their way with relative ease toward the Tuli block area of Botswana. Several hundred are in the field, several thousand are in the final stages of readiness for combat in camps in Zambia, and another 6000,

according to reliable reports, are being trained. There has been a celebrated exodus from Rhodesia into Botswana near Francistown. The flights of these putative freedom fighters continue (paradoxically in Rhodesian-owned aircraft leased to a South African cover firm and flown by Botswana-hired South African pilots) on a thrice daily basis. In sum, ZAPU is gathering in the bulk of recruits. For the first time in the struggle against Rhodesia ZAPU can legitimately claim that it is participating in the military struggle. But as important as it is to Nkomo and his supporters to appear credible on the military front, ZAPU's new fighting capability is intended primarily to counter the potential transition period or post-independence influence of ZANU's armed might. Since the early 1960s all of the black groups have devised their strategies for the pursuit of power more than the gaining of freedom. In 1977 rivalries and distrust remain; the recipe for civil war only lacks the ingredient of a poorly arranged or administered transition from colonial rule to independence.

Ideologically, the two wings of the Front are divided. Tongogara, Mutuuswa, and the Karanga intellectuals (many of whom are American-trained) who have emerged only occasionally from Mozambique still espouse rather doctrinaire Marxist ideas about the desirability of a fully planned, centrally-directed economy in accord with Mozambiquan rhetoric. But just as Machel has acted pragmatically, so there is likely to be a heavy dose of realism lurking behind ZANU's enunciated principles. Certainly Mugabe, whose speeches in China and his oft-expressed antagonism to special privileges

for whites have given little comfort to supporters of free enterprise (notably Sir Seretse Khama), is much more pragmatic than he usually appears. A year ago he privately expressed his horror at what Machel had done to the Mozambiquan economy. He has lived in Ghana under Nkrumah and would not be the first to seek the destruction of the modern economy and infrastructure which provides the basis of Rhodesia's wealth. But, given some scenarios of independence, Mugabe may not be free to lead Zimbabwe according to his own assessment of the ways best to attain desired goals.

Politicians, especially those who have over the years but occasionally espied the promised land through narrow keyholes, may be forgiven for altering their ideologies to suit circumstance and patron. Mugabe may have shifted his views more than is assumed. But it is even harder to credit the fervent espousal of state socialism which has been uttered in recent months by Nkomo. A sometime businessman who has almost always enjoyed the backing of liberal commercial interests in Rhodesia (and, for a time, in South Africa), Nkomo is an unreconstructed capitalist who is almost certain to disappoint the ideological hopes of his Soviet backers. True, one of Nkomo's key lieutenants has been close to the Soviets for more than a decade, but one suspects a pragmatic streak not far below the surface of the rhetoric of this particular aide. Moreover, others among Nkomo's inner circle include virulent, outspoken protagonists of liberal capitalism and, more precisely, of the kind of personal liberties which are not common in Marxist-governed states. A few weeks ago, in Guyana, Nkomo told Ambassador

and sanctions) a robust economy. But this optimism must be tempered by the realization that even Nkomo and Muzorewa will need to demonstrate their true independence at the expense of, probably, established multinational extractive enterprises. The new state will think that it has stronger leverage, whatever the realities of the technological position. And, given the presence of Mugabe and others farther to the left, Zimbabwe can hardly be expected to reflect the ideological unanimity of a Botswana. This tension will not work in favor of preferred conditions for a foreign enterprise, and the least favored will be those known to or suspected of having cooperated with or abetted Rhodesian rule since 1965. A reputation, deserved or not, for harsh labor relations, reliance upon migrant labor, and similar sins can also be expected to detract from a particular concern's bargaining position after independence. A multiplicity of investment opportunities, and the likelihood that a variety of foreigners will clamor for opportunity in Zimbabwe, should also act to limit an established firm's inherited (or developed) position. Only the need for its demonstrably nonsubstitutable expertise, the development of a relationship of trust between black leaders and the concern, a willingness to reorder relations between the concern and the government, and/or special circumstances can tilt the bargaining balance in the direction of the foreign enterprise.

Precisely how the coming of independence will affect multinational corporations depends upon the manner by which the transfer of power is achieved. In August 1977, on the eve of what could be

Front. Two years ago Smith hoped to "do a deal" with Nkomo. Now he may hope to transfer the trappings of power to Muzorewa and Sithole while keeping the engines of that power in white hands. This kind of deal Muzorewa is pledged to reject. (Sithole has tended to waver in recent weeks, largely because his own role is so tenuous.) Muzorewa knows that his hold on legitimacy is weak and that he can ill afford to connive at a transfer of power which could easily be challenged by the Front, its patrons, and the West. However, three factors are beginning to work in Muzorewa's favor: 1) exiles, some of whom were among the founders of Zimbabwean nationalism, are coming home from Lusaka and Dar es Salaam to work with Muzorewa; 2) violence within urban Rhodesia has begun to worry middle-class blacks and the perpetuation of the war has begun to weary ordinary citizens in the patron states, like Zambia; and 3) rightly or wrongly demonstrations of support for Muzorewa have undermined the confidence of outsiders in the ability of the Patriotic Front to achieve a substantial victory in any externally supervised election.

It is therefore at last plausible that a white Rhodesian government could next month--before the Patriotic Front is able to launch its summer offensive--devise a plan for the transfer of power to blacks by means of elections in January or February. A constitution would have to be drafted which fulfilled most of the criteria set out by the West in their dealings this year with Smith. The sum of these arrangements would have to approximate genuine majority rule on a full black franchise. If there were clauses

which protected the persons and properties of whites, the West and the frontline nations could hardly complain. Indeed, if provisions for the impartial supervision of elections were suggested which were capable of allaying Western and indigenous fears--a criterion unlikely to be met--then it would be difficult for such a transfer of power to be derided as illegitimate. Much would depend, of course, on the real distribution of power and on the ability of exiles, whatever their politics, to contest the election. Given the willingness of Smith to go or be pushed this far, it would be difficult for Muzorewa to refuse to accept the opportunity to contest such an election and to lead any resultant government. It might also be very difficult for the West, and even some of the frontline states, to burke such an arrangement. In it could be the makings of a solution to today's Rhodesian dilemma, especially if Mozambique and Zambia were persuaded to rein in the guerrillas which operate from their territories. A government which issued from such a favorable conjunction of forces would be well placed to maintain postindependence stability and to provide an atmosphere conducive to foreign investment.

Such a scenario could be realized. But for twelve years the whites in Rhodesia have cleverly outwitted Western attempts to sanction or cajole them into submission. They have been led by an able and unscrupulous premier who is more a manipulator than a racist. He wants to preserve power for himself and for whites, but is not an ideologue. Smith will bargain himself out of power only when it is apparent to him that there is no other alternative

and when such negotiations seem to hold out the likelihood of a better future for whites than negotiations after subsequent guerrilla victories. To make an internal settlement work Smith or Frost needs to be generous (or realistic) and self-abnegating in ways which would be new. Absent realism or pragmatism on the part of whites, the millennium of the internal settlement will probably not occur. Millennialism in politics is rare, even in Africa. Less ideal and well-ordered scenarios are inherently more persuasive.

The guerrillas could overcome Rhodesian resistance and dictate peace terms. Although the Rhodesian army, with continued South African support in the form of munitions and fuel (and absent a mutiny of its black cadres) could probably withstand guerrilla incursions for years, the present level of combat cannot sustain emigration rates of 1000 a month indefinitely. Nor can the economy of Rhodesia endure the burden of large scale call-ups and the frequent absence of productive managers and workers. Many observers talk of an outside limit of three years before Rhodesia--given today's level of combat--would be compelled to sue for peace. Yet long before that point the desperate Rhodesians might feel compelled to try preemptive strikes against guerrilla camps in Zambia as well as Mozambique. Such escalation would widen the war but could, given the obvious reaction, hasten the peace. Moreover, from the Rhodesian point of view, carrying the war to the bitter end would prove the kind of gamble to which Smith has inured his backers. On past experience, too, Africans might succumb to internecine conflict

and thus permit whites to perpetuate their hegemony. If rivalry between Mutuuswa and Tongogara should turn bloody and bitter, then the fighting ability of the most experienced guerrilla movement is bound to suffer. So far, however, both main guerrilla groups have avoided the kind of public schisms which have so crippled SWAPO's battle for Namibia.

There are no sure answers, but only a gambler would predict the ability of whites to sustain their rebellion for more than a few years more. The longer that they can, the more surely they will erode the forces of moderation; the African government which gains power as a result of battlefield victory is apt to be far more committed to authoritarianism and, even if Nkomo is then still a leader, to radical rearrangements of the economy. (By that point, too, the economy may have been weakened beyond easy repair.) No established foreign enterprise, much less South Africa and the powers of the West (or even Zambia) would welcome a power that emerged from the barrel of a gun. Even if in the medium term such a government would probably return to the path of economic pragmatism, in the short term confiscation of existing extractive industries would constitute a high priority. It could be worse, too, for the leaders of tomorrow's military would be far more uncompromising than today's politicians. Beholden to their distant patrons, they would be anxious to demonstrate ideological purity and commitment.

Most middleways are more probable. The United States and Britain are heavily committed to resolving the Rhodesian dilemma

before conflict there embroils the superpowers in any direct manner, and before all hope for white participation, stability, and economic growth are destroyed. Lacking any direct influence on Smith, the powers of the West must work through South Africa, the United States being determined to trade nothing for South Africa's cooperation. Others will indicate why South Africa has been slow to act in her admitted self-interest, and why no immediate scuttling of Rhodesia is likely. Even so, a peaceful transfer of power is inherently beneficial to South Africa. A willingness to assist the Anglo-American effort cannot but assist her fragile relations with both powers. Therefore it may not be polyannish to assume that South Africa will again be able to persuade Smith (should he win at the polls) to transfer power, if not in the ideal manner indicated earlier, then by some other means. The West and South Africa may even be able to persuade Smith that unless the Patriotic Front is somehow involved in the settlement the war will continue to a bloody, uncomfortable end. An election supervised internationally (or by the colonial power) would satisfy most criteria and could lead to peace. It could also provide the surest guarantee of guerrilla disarmament (since only such a settlement would have the full backing of the frontline states) and of substantial aid funds from the West.

There is no easy way to predict the outcome of an election. If black and white opportunities for coercion were limited, victory would probably go to that group which best combined organizational ability, ethnic mobilization, and personal appeal. At present it is probable that Nkomo's ZAPU has maintained the most extensive

national organization. Nkomo's appeal to the masses cannot be discounted; it extends beyond and encompasses his ethnic appeal. Others in his entourage would have an appeal to particular constituencies. It is reasonable to assume that Nkomo could do almost as well on a national basis as Muzorewa, with his appeal to the central Shona, and perhaps to the middle-class throughout the country. Mugabe and his followers could only count upon the Karanga vote. The sum might be enough for a victory of the Nkomo-Mugabe coalition upon which they now count. If so, each would vie with his armed or formerly armed supporters for hegemony. Alternatively, a Nkomo-Muzorewa alliance would arouse the enmity of the Karanga and the then ex-guerrillas. Either result, indeed almost any combination, is a recipe for further civil war or a series of coups d'etat if no mechanism can be devised definitively to disarm all of the guerrillas and/or maintain the peace after independence.

Even a government by coalition which does not immediately lead to war will be fraught with dangers for outside corporations. Tension within a government of conflict would probably lead to the kinds of demands which would return extractive industries to the control of the state. Until a secure government emerged, pressure on multinationals would be a convenient and politically rewarding posture.

Only 1) given an outright, legitimized political takeover by Muzorewa (and Sithole), or 2) by Nkomo alone or in combination, and the exclusion of guerrillas and their present leadership,

A mechanism for the effective preservation of law and order during and following a transitional period is a primary prerequisite of a meaningful settlement. If Smith's army is defeated in the field or security in the country collapses, obviously the satisfaction of this first requirement will be especially difficult. The Anglo-American suggestion that guerrillas be incorporated into the existing military apparatus also appears, on initial inspection, to be unhelpful with regard to the preservation of law and order. But subsequent control over the guerrillas and the quality of their incorporation, not to mention the nature of their retraining, might in fact enhance rather than detract from the keeping of order. From a realistic perspective any subordination of the guerrillas to the existing military and police command might prevent rather than exacerbate internecine conflict. The superimposition of a British or international command structure would not necessarily hinder the maintenance of law and order if--a crucial if--either sufficient, impartial outsiders were recruited or today's Rhodesian command structure was simply subordinated to the outsiders but otherwise left intact. The prevention of coups and civil wars could well be enhanced by an adoption of one or more of these procedures. Alternatively the absence of a well-trained, locally experienced force (whatever the officers) could make post-transition conditions precarious and obviate serious efforts at development.

Similarly, it is in the interest of the new government of Zimbabwe to draw as much as possible on the administrative experience of the existing bureaucracy. The extent to which middle and higher

level civil servants are or are not frightened away will benefit the reconstruction efforts of the new state. The same homily is relevant to the managerial classes in the private sector. If the experiences of Zambia and Kenya are relevant to Zimbabwe, bureaucrats and managers will stay initially if the transition is neither painful nor frightening. But there is the more recent Mozambiquan model.

Law and order and managers and bureaucrats are both essential to the preservation, for ultimate black benefit, of the Rhodesian economy. To a surprising extent agriculture is still the heart of the economy; the industrial and extractive sectors benefit from the ripple effect of agricultural prosperity. Black businessmen, teachers, and clerks, as well as any and all black governments, will be affected even more than the handful of white farmers or multinational corporations who now are in the public eye of the economy. A rapid, orderly settlement would obviously enhance the likelihood that this robust economy would be preserved, if not enhanced, by the lifting of sanctions. If Smith delays too long, warfare comes to the cities, or security deteriorates and whites flee, then foreign corporations, almost irrespective of the ideology of the black victor, will inevitably find the resultant atmosphere unattractive.

It is still not too late for Rhodesian whites to maximize their chances of continuing to prosper in the new Zimbabwe. Providing the kind of conditions which end the hostilities, legitimate the transition, and compel the participation in free elections of all

of the contending parties is essential, and still within a long reach. A lack of ambiguity about the real independence of any new government, a full franchise, a reasonably lengthy period during which to campaign, and a respectable method of supervising the election and transferring power are all prerequisites. Bargaining with the West permits a bridge and, when there is agreement, the kinds of guarantees which both sides now lack. Disarmament could follow. Conceivably some such arrangement would sunder the Patriotic Front and lead to a commonality of purpose between Nkomo and Muzorewa. Or more simply, it might isolate the guerrillas. Whatever ensues constitutionally, multinational corporations cannot think about Rhodesia with as much optimism if, on the other hand, either an internal settlement or prolonged warfare become the means for a winding down of the Rhodesian conflict. Even the internationally approved form of devolution has its risks. Each halt down the road of devolution will develop its own dangers. On past experience the passage will be rough and only for the strong and confident.

Chapter III

WHAT MODEL FOR ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMY?

WHAT MODEL FOR ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMY ?

By
Ian Hume

Now that the transfer of power from whites to blacks in Rhodesia is imminent, the critical question should no longer be about the colour of people in control, but rather of whether the transition will succeed in delivering to blacks at large those benefits which, in their aspirations, they have attached to the acquisition of power. These benefits, I believe, are seen most importantly as economic rather than social or political. Clearly, one should not underestimate the enormous emotive impact which blacks will experience simply from being in power and suddenly becoming the designers of the social structure in which they have formerly been only residual participants. While recognizing the importance of these factors, however, it should be remembered that there are yet other aspirations for more land, more jobs, higher incomes, better homes and education which are arguably of equal or greater significance.

There is a widely held feeling among blacks that, somehow, these things, too, will follow from black rule, but little has been done to articulate exactly how this will arise. Rhodesia ranks at the lower end of the middle income group of developing countries. It is much more highly developed than Zambia, Tanzania or Mazambique, and for this reason has more to lose from an unstable transition. Notwithstanding this, it remains a developing country in which, like other such countries, it is simply not possible to guarantee by any means (let alone by merely changing the structure of political power) that more jobs, higher incomes and the rest will be made available for those demanding them. While the

political transition will clearly bring with it the instruments to effect a reordering of the blacks' relative position in the economy compared to whites (basically through a combination of Africanization, land reallocation, and wage-profit redistribution) there are no instruments of political power which can automatically alleviate such absolute conditions as an overall low per capita income, an acute insufficiency of wage paying employment, and fiscal revenues which are simply incapable of providing secondary education for more than a small minority of the country's burgeoning population.

At present, Rhodesia's population growth (some 3.6 percent per annum) expands the labour force by something around 110,000 a year. To provide jobs in the wage sector for all of this increase would require an annual investment of around Rh$ 800-900 million, or about 40 percent of GNP, a target which would be very difficult to achieve. During the period of most rapid economic growth (before the 1976 recession), when job creation was at its greatest, the investment level was around Rh$ 450 million and employment increased at a rate of about 50,000 new jobs a year. While this catered substantially for new male entrants to the labour force, it still constituted a number of new jobs less than half the total number of people reaching working age in the same year. To meet a rising expectation for more jobs, therefore, a new political situation would need to herald in a period of accelerated investment beyond present levels.

How will the political transition itself affect the critical relationship between investment and employment growth and what model for the economy can be advocated in the post transition period to best sustain the growth in job opportunities and incomes? These questions are really

another way of asking whether economic stability can be maintained during and after political transition, and whether the ensuing economic regime will be authoritarian socialist or largely free enterprise. That is, will the transition involve two leaps (from white to black rule and from free enterprise to socialism) or just the one leap from white to black rule?

It is impossible to predict what degree of economic stability will be sustained during and after the transition. It seems clear, however, that there will be a close correlation between the degree of instability and the extent to which a 'two leap' transition with a radical economic regime emerges as the probable outcome. 'Instability' in this sense could be measured by the number of whites who leave and the extent to which blacks substituting for them fail to sustain the level of economic activity. The causality in this correlation could run in both directions: if whites panic and flee regardless, the economy will collapse, and reconstruction (on the lines of Mozambique) will require a centralized and authoritarian regime; if on the other hand there is an attempt to impose some variation of a centralized socialist system this itself would both drive whites out and antagonize existing black business, leading to the same result.

Since there is now a widespread acceptance among whites of impending black rule and a general preference to stay, conditional on the nature of the regime, it seems that those involved in the present negotiations ought to see themselves as having a real choice between a 'one leap' and a 'two leap' transition. So far as it is possible to speculate on these matters, what can be said about the likely differences between these two

options in terms of their impact on the structure of employment and incomes and their relative capacities to deliver to the black population at large something of the aspirations it attaches to gaining political control?

Under a 'one leap' transition, with a reformist economic regime and minimum white flight, it is possible to envisage something of an investment boom which will create conditions in which such things as land reform and wage profit redistribution become sustainable alongside an expansion of jobs in the wage sector. It is seldom realized how much scope there is for restructuring the economy in favor of blacks without destroying the economic base built up by white interests or disrupting national production. Properly managed, there is ample land available for reallocation without destroying the productive elements of what is currently white farming.

Equally, there appears significant scope for wage-profit redistribution in the major industrial sectors without dislocating existing business interests and without generating inflation. The profit share of value added in manufacturing, mining and agriculture has increased several points during the last decade. Restoring the share to what it was in 1970, and paying the remainder to black labor, would allow non-destabilizing wage increases of between 25 and 40 percent. Presumably this would be a significant start in meeting the income expectations of the black majority.

A reasonably stable 'one leap' transition would, of course, also enable the country to benefit both from the fillip of foreign development assistance and from foreign private direct investment, which together

would accelerate the investment boom. In these conditions the economy would have both the administrative ability to absorb and the debt capacity to service Official Development Assistance at around Rh$ 100-150 million a year, with some additional volume of private foreign investment. Added to the local investment level, which would no doubt be enhanced in these circumstances, these flows could raise total investments above Rh$ 600 million, and would generage 60,000-70,000 new jobs a year.

How does this prospect compare with that which could be envisaged under a 'two leap' transition involving a radical restructuring of the economy along socialist lines with state ownership and central management? For reasons unrelated to the desirability or otherwise of socialist principles--and some of these principles such as that or a more equitable distribution of income should clearly be pursued in Zimbabwe--it seems likely that such a model would prove less effective than its 'reformist' counterpart in meeting the expectations of the people. Three considerations may serve to justify this view.

First, socialism can only be effective if the central administration of the economy is strong. Judging by the experience in other politically emergent developing countries, this is probably unlikely to be the case in a revolutionized Zimbabwe. Second, industrialization has succeeded under socialism principally where there has been a productive peasantry to provide (wittingly or otherwise) the agricultural surplus needed for industrial investment. The peasantry in Rhodesia (as in all of Africa) lives so close to subsistence that there is very little to be squeezed from this sector for capital accumulation. Given the certainty that private industrial investments would cease under State ownership, this

makes foreign aid indispensible to the task of boosting investment to levels commensurate with reasonable wage employment generation. In socialist countries, however, it seems the exception rather than the rule that any significant reliance is placed on foreign aid. This is partly for doctrinal reasons, no doubt allied to the fact that development aid is overwhelmingly from OECD rather than socialist countries. Considering also that private venture capital is seldom attracted to developing countries propounding state ownership principles, this is a third reason why the socialist option penalizes the people, by denying them the benefit of more job opportunities from the investment of imported savings. In addition to these considerations it would also seem that in Zimbabwe's case the major structural collapse in investment, wage employment and income growth which would follow the adoption of a socialist model would set the economy back several years. In this situation (of which Angola and Mozambique provide forerunning examples) it would seem unlikely that there would be the administrative capacity to handle a significant volume of development aid, even if it were sought. Thus, the savings available for growth would be less under this model. It would therefore start both far behind and have a slower engine than the 'reformist' alternative.

Some figures may illustrate the sort of magnitudes involved here. At present there are about 1 million blacks in wage employment in the economy, about a third of the total labour force. Their average wage is around Rh$ 500 a year, about 6-8 times the income of the remaining two-thirds of the labor force still living in subsistence or semi-subsistence agriculture. Of the 1 million in employment, over one half

(i.e. 52 percent) are employed on white farms and in domestic service, both of which are particularly vulnerable to white flight. In white farming in particular, where about 6,000 farmers employ over 350,000 black workers it is clear that over a third of total wage employment could be put in jeopardy by the loss of only a small number of whites. Admittedly, these sectors offer lower wages and for other reasons may be seen as unpalatable relative to other forms of wage employment. Nevertheless, average wages in this form of employment are 3-5 times as great as subsistence sector incomes. Whether no wages for these workers would be preferable to relatively low wages would depend on the success with which, as farmers on their own account, they could work the land at better levels than their erstwhile wages. This is not the only question, however, since squatter farmers would certainly not produce the large agricultural surplus presently exported to provide foreign exchange for the importation of equipment for industrial expansion. Employment growth in industry, therefore, would be slower.

Add to this the layoffs which would arise from the close down of many small scale manufacturing and service industries, run by whites, and it is easy to visualize total wage employment declining to well below half its present level, possibly even to a third of it.

This would mean, say, 500,000-600,000 people out of work, leaving a wage sector no greater than it was in 1955. To create alternative wage employment for this number alone would take about a decade at present investment levels. At the diminished investment levels which would pertain in this model, however, re-employment would take much longer than a decade. Meanwhile, each year would add an additional 110,000 or

so new members to the labor force, apparently with no prospects for employment. What fulfillment of these peoples' aspirations will have been delivered by the arrival of black rule in such circumstances?

These considerations may point to real operational differences between the situation in Rhodesia and, for example, that pertaining to the drive for civil rights in the United States, which was clearly never in danger of leading to that country's economic collapse. Equally, it would be inappropriate to assume parallels between the prospects for socialism in Zimbabwe and the growth of socialism in Europe, which began at a level of development altogether higher than that presently attained in Rhodesia. While granting that there are other models of socialism more grounded in a pastoral type economy, it would seem the onus would lie on those seeking to impose such a model to show that it accords with the broad aspirations of the people in Zimbabwe. Simple observation tends to suggest that, rightly or wrongly, most blacks appear to have already grasped the goals of western consumerism as fitting for them too.

Informed discussion on the politics and economy of this country has rightly been preoccupied with the stark disparities betwen whites and blacks in a social structure which has systematically discriminated against and penalized the latter. There has long been a danger, however, that the retributive stance towards whites which this preoccupation has understandably engendered will lead to the essential interdependence of blacks and whites in the economy being overlooked. Too zealous an attack on the issue of the blacks' relative poverty may lead to their being condemned to a degree of absolute poverty which the economy as presently structured could well be geared, with reform, to avoid.

Chapter IV

SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSES TO RHODESIAN CONTINGENCIES

SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSES TO RHODESIAN CONTINGENCIES

Benjamin Pogrund
Rand Daily Mail

1.0 In assessing South Africa's policies towards Rhodesia, whether of the present or the future, two preliminary points need to be stressed. Firstly, the policies are inextricably bound up with South Africa's general relations in the sub-continent; they are also heavily influenced by the country's place in Africa and in the world at large. Even though there is a specific attitude concerning Rhodesia, it is set within a wider matrix. Secondly, the policies are fundamentally influenced by the particular events of the past three and a half years. Indeed the pivotal point in time is April, 1974 when the Caetano government fell in Portugal and, with it, 500 years of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique and Angola.

2.0 Until April, 1974 the white South had given every appearance of being secure and stable, despite the inherent factors which should have made for instability.

2.1 Until a late stage, in Mozambique and even more so in Angola, the African nationalist movements tended to be dismissed as not presenting any immediate threat to the Portuguese army. In 1969, a Handbook on "Portuguese Africa" written by American scholars (and edited by Abshire and Samuels) said confidently that "there is little doubt that Portuguese rule will continue in the foreseeable future". The book looked hopefully to the internal changes then being introduced by the Portuguese and foresaw gradual development, leading eventually, at an unspecified date, to some form of African self-determination. The gap between the widely

believed situation and reality was so great that it was only a matter of a few months prior to April, 1974 that some of the true weaknesses of the Portuguese occupation began to be realised.

2.2 In 1974, Rhodesian UDI had been in existence for nine years. The Rhodesian regime had, of course, experienced difficulties because of sanctions. But these were not remotely paralysing. Britain, apart from maintaining its formal stance on sanctions with an occasional public action to prove that they were still in effect, had virtually given up on Rhodesia. The UN sanctions were widely disregarded.

2.3 In South Africa, the period of the 1960s, characterised by what came to be known as the granite policies of Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, were past. Since the Afrikaner Nationalists had come to power in 1948, a process which has been described as one of action, reaction, and counter-action had occurred with a series of entrenchments of white power, black challenges, and suppressive white responses.

After Verwoerd the ideologist had come Prime Minister John Vorster with his more pragmatic outlook. Vorster's policies were beginning to bear fruit in 1974. Detente with Africa was underway. At home the policy of separate development was being rapidly taken forward; its highpoint, independence for the first Bantustan, was in sight. White confidence in the future and in the ability to control change was at a peak.

2.4 South West Africa, despite having been a source of friction with the United Nations since 1946, hardly seemed to present any great problem. The issue had been wending its way through international bodies and it

had become a thorough bore. There was some guerilla activity in SWA itself and although this had grown since 1966 , when Swapo followers armed with bows and arrows took on military helicopters, it still did not present any discernible threat to uninterrupted South African control. In SWA too, the process of implementing ethnic division and government was underway.

3.0 The events in Portugal, followed swiftly by the collapse of Portuguese military morale in Mozambique and Angola, altered these situations with startling suddenness. The change was both strategic and psychological.

3.1 In strategic terms the existing white security was profoundly disrupted.

3.11 In regard to Rhodesia, its eastern flank became exposed, opening up the possibility, later to be realised, of a new south-eastern war front. The sanctions loophole maintained by the Portuguese became endangered and was in fact closed early in 1976.

3.12 South West Africa's northern border similarly now became exposed, with the prospect that Swapo guerillas would have a base previously denied to them. Instead of operating from Zambia and having to make their way through hostile territory, there was the prospect that they would be able to set up camps close to the border.

3.13 Regarding South Africa, the border with the black north could no longer be viewed as being the Zambezi River; now it was the Limpopo River. And with Rhodesia clearly imperilled, South Africa's northern border was no longer as secure as before. The country's eastern flank was also suddenly exposed.

3.2 Almost transcending the strategic consequences in importance were the effects of these events on the minds of people. The white south was no longer seen as being impregnable.

Among whites of South Africa, the swift change in the strategic situation created a sense of shock. Past certainties no longer existed. There was an entirely new feeling of apprehension. The erosion of white confidence began.

Among blacks on the other hand, a new confidence was born - a belief that the tide of history was at long last flowing in their favour. People remained cowed: extensive government controls, the mass of "bannings" and the activities of the Security Police ensured that; but at the same time the developing confidence and aggression were discernible.

And arising out of this, fresh impetus was given to world, and particularly African, interest in Southern Africa. The dormant Rhodesian issue came alive. There was the start of a renewed movement of pressure in regard to South West Africa. South Africa itself became a sharp focus of attention.

4.0 Within the South African government, the analysis was rapidly made. A matter of a few months after April, 1974 the direction in foreign policy became evident: in essence this was the acceptance of the notion that the country could live with a neighbour ruled by a black government, however hostile the new rulers and whatever their political ideology.

At the heart of this view was the conviction that what had to be protected at all costs was the inner citadel: South Africa itself. And in referring to this, what was and is meant is the protection of white interest and

position, and more particularly white Afrikaner interest and position.

White South Africa needed time to bring separate development to its full flowering. The ultimate goal was the transformation of the Bantustans into nine independent African states. This was the Afrikaner answer to world criticisms of apartheid; it was also the way in which Afrikaners met their own moral dilemmas about the justice, or injustice, of apartheid. Above all, it was seen as the means of ensuring white survival.

Everything else was subordinate.

4.1 Against this background and following April, 1974, the key perception was that black-ruled Mozambique not only had to be lived with, but could be lived with. However great South Africa's attitude of repugnance towards the Marxists who were certain to take over, the assumption was that Samora Machel and his Frelimo movement would continue to require far-reaching economic links with South Africa unless they were willing to precipitate Mozambique into total ruin. From South Africa's point of view there was everything to gain, and little - even nothing in the short term - to lose from a policy of live and let live. The country's zealous opposition to communism could be subdued for the sake of accord and securing the eastern border.

There was already the experience of existing side by side with the independent black states of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. Even though they were to varying extents hostile to South African apartheid, the practical effects of their opposition was minimal and, up to that stage, boiled down to these countries being an escape route for fleeing political opponents of the South African Government. The three existing black nations were in

many ways vassal states because of the overwhelming nature of their links with the South African economy and their geographical situations.

If Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana could be kept in check, then why not Mozambique also? And even if Mozambique could not be viewed in precisely the same light because of the far more radical outlook of Frelimo, then self-interest on the part of the new rulers could be anticipated.

This aspect was the gamble: if Frelimo, taking over a colonial economy additionally hard-hit by the outflow of Portuguese skills and capital decided to concentrate on the rapid achievement of better standards of living, South Africa would have a vital bargaining counter. If, on the other hand, Marxist principle and black African solidarity predominated, Frelimo would offer itself as a military base against South Africa and be uncaring about the consequences of retribution. With Mozambique dependent for an estimated 80 per cent of its foreign earnings on South Africa, the retribution could indeed be far-reaching.

Up to now the gamble has worked. Frelimo has quietly told the African liberation movements that, however sympathetic it naturally is, it cannot be of direct assistance to them at this stage. South African skills are keeping the rail-line to Maputo going and the port itself at a reasonable level of efficiency; Mozambique miners continue to go to work on South Africa's mines (the numbers have decreased, but remain large). Where the occasional border incident has occurred, both countries have been at pains to minimise the trouble.

Apart from improvement in the state of the Mozambican economy, the only other way to create a situation of independence from South Africa would

be to seek international aid. That is what was done last year when the Rhodesian border was closed. Mozambique said at the time that it needed an estimated $45- million a year to make up for the losses; a UN team that went there reported the need as at least $110- million to $135- million annually. Obviously, a vastly greater amount would be required if the South African connection was severed; obtaining that degree of finance internationally cannot be a proposition.

From South Africa's side, the port of Maputo is useful but not vital. The Cabora Bassa hydro-electric scheme stands largely in the same situation, even though 10 per cent of South Africa's electricity needs are now being met by it. With the proportion of South African blacks on the mines steadily increasing, anxiety about a cut-off of Mozambique supplies is no longer what it once was. So, for the moment, South Africa continues to hold the cards.

There are varying views about how long this situation might remain stable. Judging by the public utterances of South Africa's Minister of Defence, the most immediate precautions are needed on the borders, including the Mozambican one. But this seems to be part of a general propaganda line with wider aims and needs to be discounted.

Some, however, seriously argue that principle and solidarity will triumph and that Mozambique will make itself available to the liberation movements within the relatively near future. Certainly, at some stage this is almost bound to happen. But all other factors being equal, the time period must be viewed as being of the order of at least 5 years from now. And perhaps even beyond that. In this light and on this longer term basis, South African military preparedness is correct.

4.2 Concerning South West Africa, the policy adopted in 1974 and now rapidly being implemented is the withdrawal of South African sovereignty.

The basic recognition again was that with the ending of Portuguese colonial rule, in this case in Angola, an entirely new ball game existed. Although never spelt out in frank terms, what this meant in practice was that South Africa's continued possession was seen as constituting a dangerous embarrassment: it drew international attention and brought unwelcome publicity and pressure to bear on South Africa. In other words, it acted like a magnet. At the same time, the ongoing thrust is to attempt to perpetuate as much white control as possible, whether in the political or economic spheres. There remains too a lingering hope of being able to push ethnic development to such an advanced state that the United Nations and Swapo will be faced by a fait accompli. Gradually, under the pressure of the current initiative by five western nations - America, Britain, France, Germany and Canada - the South African Government is being made to yield more and more.

Relations with Angola, however, remain problematical, both because of South Africa's disastrous 1975/76 military intervention and the continuing Unita operations in that country.

5.0 It is against these backgrounds that the policies concerning Rhodesia can be examined. The same perceptions apply; but there are in addition certain other specifics.

5.1 The underlying theme of the South African attitude is the acceptance of the inevitability of a black government.

to occur, and with it a dramatic possibility of the whites being threatened by mass violence, there would be considerable pressures on the South African Government from its own supporters to go to the aid of their "kith and kin" in Rhodesia. That, however, is a dreaded prospect to the Government because it would open the way to an outright inter-nation racial war in the sub-continent - one of the alternatives to peaceful settlement "too ghastly to contemplate" which was no doubt in Prime Minister John Vorster's mind when he spoke in December, 1975. The possibility of direct South African military intervention to aid Rhodesia's whites must be excluded in present circumstances.

With the fear of conflict is the recognition that the more violent it becomes, the greater the risk of intervention by the communist nations, whether by way of increased arms supplies or direct action by Cuban soldiers. Additionally, much as South Africa wants the West to accept its role as a bastion against communism, it cannot relish the prospect of having the East-West conflict assume reality right on its doorstep.

5.5 However much South Africa would prefer to see a moderate black government in office, the principle of live and let live will be offered to whoever gains power. The expectation will be that the new rulers, whatever their ideology, will have more than enough on their hands for the foreseeable future in coping with their internal problems, both political and economic, to make any substantial contribution to the cause of African solidarity. Even though a black-ruled Rhodesia will regain access to the sea through Mozambique, its rail and road highways to the south will remain significant. As Zimbabwe's most developed neighbour, South Africa expects to continue to

play a leading role in the supply of goods and services while serving also as a market for Zimbabwe's products.

Thus, as with Mozambique, mutual self-interest will be the cornerstone of South Africa's approach.

5.6 South Africa does not expect to be alone in having this view. It is hoped that Zambia and Zaire in particular will want to see a stable situation between South Africa and Zimbabwe so that they too can benefit from the trade outlets through the south. The influence of Zambia and Zaire in this respect is likely to be all the stronger for as long as Angola continues to suffer its current instability, with use of the Benguela rail-line uncertain.

5.7 The desire for settlement, because of all the racial passions that the Rhodesian issue arouses, is strong. The quicker the world stops watching Rhodesia, the less attention will be paid to the race question in South Africa. That is the hope, although it is weaker now since South Africa's own racial unrest began in June, 1976, adding to the publicity.

5.8 During the past few years, since the start of this decade, South Africa has begun to see itself as being part of the continent. The desire for detente and for trade with the black north emanated in part from this. Progress was being made until 1974 but it slowed down as a result of the changes in the sub-continent and the prominence given to the Rhodesian and South African racial situations. The existence of white-ruled Rhodesia has been seen by South Africa as an obstacle in the way of reaching out to the north.

5.9 The particular stumbling-block to the desired settlement is Prime Minister Ian Smith. The feeling among Afrikaner Nationalists fluctuates between sympathy and even support for him as there is at present (in regard to achieving a moderate government with perhaps even white participation) and intense bitterness and anger when he is held responsible for imperilling South Africa's own safety.

The obvious South African way to act against Smith and Rhodesia is to close the border. The South African Government has, however, been unable to effect this. Sanctions and boycotts are a sensitive issue because South Africa itself is subject to them. The whole idea of such tactics is regularly attacked as being wrong and immoral and the Government would have grave difficulty in doing an about-face and applying such measures to Rhodesia. In addition, even while there has been the continuing desire, and more, to get rid of Smith, the Government has had to tread cautiously: it cannot be seen too openly to be sending him down the river for fear of arousing white emotions at home in his defence. Those emotions extend through a goodly part of South Africa's whites, whether Afrikaans or English.

More recently, however, there have been indications that extremely strong pressure, involving at least the threat of oil sanctions, has in fact been used to advance progress towards settlement.

6.0 Having set out this framework, the particular scenarios can be approached ...

A. Protracted conflict

This precisely represents the situation most feared by the South African

Government. The anxiety that Rhodesia could well degenerate into this is a mainspring in South Africa's settlement activities.

There is the apprehension about an inter-nation racial conflict. There is the most unwelcome prospect of South Africa's provision to white Rhodesia of essential supplies, including military supplies, receiving publicity on an entirely new and embarrassing scale. And there is the knowledge that white demands for intervention would reach fever pitch.

In the event of this scenario -and indeed before it even got to this stage - South Africa would be likely to impose oil sanctions to force capitulation. It would have little choice because the West could surely not allow the situation to decline to such a level and would exert its own pressures on South Africa to apply them in turn on Rhodesia.

If forced into open action of this kind, the South African Government would seek to quieten its supporters by an intensive propaganda campaign aimed at revealing Smith or his successor as the nigger in the woodpile whose intransigence was jeopardising their own security. Virtually any alternative would be seen as being preferable to this scenario.

B. Protracted Power Struggle

The declared principle would be that of non-interference: South Africa will have done its bit towards bringing about change and will publicly rest on this. But should an open power struggle develop within Zimbabwe and a particular faction seek covert aid, it would be likely to get it -- provided South Africa believed that it could safely tolerate any

backlash from elsewhere. It would be especially hesitant about giving assistance in the event of B (1) because of the charges of interference which it would face from the "Front Line" and other African nations. But in the event of B (2) it would seek to act in quiet concert with those African and Western nations who shared at least some of its policy perceptions: this would come down to support for a faction opposed to any spreading of communist influence. An additional factor in determining support would be the hope that a particular faction wanted accord with South Africa.

After the Angolan debacle, the possibility of military intervention must be ruled out. But aid could be given by way of supplies and training.

The bitterness about Angola is, however, intense because of South Africa's belief that it was betrayed by the West and in particular by America. It would therefore move far more cautiously before committing itself to give military aid within Zimbabwe.

Again in the event of B (2), the guerilla forces would be operating from Mozambique and, as a lesser possibility, from Zambia too. Presumably, the Mozambican border, and possibly that of Zambia, would be closed and Zimbabwe would be in the same position as Rhodesia of today in having to depend on the highways running to the south.

The B scenario would also confront the South African Government with acute dilemmas about its stance. On the one hand there would be a strong desire for as stable a government as possible in Zimbabwe for the sake of peace and order in the sub-continent. On the other hand, there would be the temptation to prefer a situation of chaos as this would render organised Zimbabwean aid to anti-South African forces more difficult of

accomplishment. The instability of black government could also offer a prime propaganda weapon in warning South Africa's whites, and the world, of the follies of a handover of power whereas stability would offer an entirely different lesson.

On balance, however, South Africa would prefer to have stable government, if only because chaos could eventually produce something even worse.

C. Peaceful Nationalism

South Africa would adopt a policy of non-interference. It would offer an open hand of diplomatic friendship (but with little hope of this being accepted). Despite this, it would seek energetically to maintain and develop trading links, making its rail system and ports freely available in the hope of ensuring that Zimbabwe is as dependent on it as possible.

Should Zimbabwe allow anti-South African guerillas to operate, the South African responses would depend on the extent to which this occurs. If on the same pattern as Botswana at present, with small numbers coming through, South Africa would probably resign itself to the inevitable and try to protect its borders as best it could.

If, however, the guerilla operations assumed sizeable and dangerous proportions and economic pressures failed to bring Zimbabwe to heel, it could well consider severing all contacts and attempting to seal off the border as much as possible. The degree of muscle which could be applied to Zimbabwe would also depend on the situation of Zambia and Zaire at that stage; that is, the extent to which they might or might not be relying on the southern highways and therefore willing to apply a moderating influence on Zimbabwe.

to deepen economic links. Its overriding concern would again be the use of Zimbabwe as an operational base and it would act as set out in scenario C.

F. Black Radicalism with Potential to Peaceful Nationalism

South Africa would maintain a neutral stance. It would be willing to extend economic links for the primary reasons set out under previous scenarios. Its attitude would again be largely influenced by the guerilla situation as discussed in scenario C.

7.0 Thus far, the entire analysis has been predicated on the continuance of stable white-controlled government in South Africa. Since June, 1976 South Africa itself has been subject to widespread internal black unrest and there is every indication that this will not only continue but is likely to escalate over a period of time.

This will introduce new variables into South Africa - Zimbabwe relations. The most important aspect will be the acceleration of world, and more particularly African interest in South Africa. As noted earlier, this in turn could lead to an increase in pressures - whether in coercive or aid form - on Zimbabwe (and Mozambique and Botswana too, for that matter) for greater involvement in the struggle against the South African Government.

Continuing unrest spreading ever further afield would impose severe strains on white South Africa's ability to maintain security, both internally and on the borders. This would naturally encourage hostile neighbours to behave more militantly, which would in turn again accelerate South African black opposition.

The possible time-span for difficulties of this nature for the Government is unlikely to be less than 5 to 7 years from now.

JOHANNESBURG

August 17, 1977.

Chapter V

CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN SOUTH AFRICA: A PESSIMISTIC PROGNOSIS

CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A PESSIMISTIC PROGNOSIS

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Preface

This writer has followed Southern African developments--and those in Rhodesia in particular--since a visit to the region in 1964. On that visit I had the opportunity to talk at length both with Ian Smith and his leading cabinet members as well as with black leaders then free or in detention camps--one of whom I was subsequently to supervise the Ph.D. program of. A personal awareness of and sympathy for black problems and aspirations in the region has continued to this day. To that I must now add, however, a broader concern for the context in which Zimbabwians will some day take their independence: one in which there is a declining probability of stability and an increasing one of Soviet involvement.

A stint in the U.S. government--1975-76, with consulting work continuing to this day--enabled me to examine systematically the prognoses available as to the intentions of the parties on the basis of "all source" intelligence. My own assessment of the developing momentum of the parties respectively has led me to different conclusions from most government agencies, and so in some senses the ensuing essay should be read as a "minority report" on a subject on which there is already considerable written speculation, though little hard data.

My conclusion, based on a careful assessment of all the variables, is that a Soviet-Cuban intervention, in the manner of that in Angola, is all but a foregone conclusion. I thus envisage a radical ZAPU government, buttressed by Moscow, reinforced by its increasingly radical

neighbors, and willing and eager to serve in the front line of trouble-makers for South Africa.

I. THE SOVIET PROJECTION OF POWER AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Although the Soviet Union has never hidden its global ambitions nor its understanding of politics as something determined (at least in the first instance) by military might, it is only since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 that Moscow accelerated its military programs sufficiently to overtake, within a comprehensible time frame, the United States at the three critical levels--strategic, conventional, and most importantly for this volume, power projection. At the strategic level there is at least parity, but all trend lines show Soviet superiority as either attained or imminent; unlike current American fashion, Soviet doctrine specifically sees military and political advantage from this position (so did American policy makers when they had it; as they lose it, they rationalized their need even for parity. Hence Kissinger's famous lament, "What in God's name can you do with nuclear superiority?"). At the conventional level, Soviet power in Europe is unquestionably supreme; most NATO commanders who have delivered themselves of judgments have given Western Europe from a week to two of resistance before Soviet divisions would be at the Channel should war break out.

It is power projection that interests us here--namely the ability to establish infrastructures of influence far afield and, where appropriate, to inject instruments of force to determine the outcome. The Soviets saw the Western-American international system which they desired to replace as dependent on American power projection: our Lebanon démarche of 1958 deeply impressed them, and they tried to emulate us in

1960 in the Congo with disastrous results--and humiliating ones in 1962 in Cuba. Since 1962 they have therefore proceeded at a near-wartime pace to improve their capability: they have increased their capacity to project a payload 3000 miles by a factor greater than ten. They have introduced new long-range aircraft (An-22, Tu-76) for airlift. They have doubled the assault forces of their naval infantry (one unit of which is in the Indian Ocean and deployable in Southern Africa). Their seven airborne divisions now vastly exceed ours in capability and firepower.

For all that, this remains one area where the United States maintains at least a technical residual advantage. Though Jane's All the World's Ships ranks the Soviets higher in naval strength than the United States, when it gets down to useful crafts for influence projection, we are ahead; so too by many times in our number of marines.

Even more than at the strategic and conventional level, there is a pertinent political variable--will--however, which in the United States is at a historic low. Thus senior members--politically appointed individuals with access to the President and a dominant voice in establishing policy in the bureaucracy--have stated that they "see no conceivable circumstances in which the United States will ever again intervene--anywhere, anytime, for whatever purpose." In a litany of questions posed by this writer as to the effect on American interests of a collapse of numerous regions of the world to predominant or sole Soviet power (including Southern Africa), two senior White House officials replied persistently "So what?" Indeed in that circumstance was born what they blessed as the "So-What School of American foreign policy." It is thus not possible to imagine a broader gap between Soviet and American will at this time.

Angola comes as a compelling example. At least as far as the five-ship naval task force the Soviets sent to support their joint intervention with the Cubans, we can say with certainty that the disposition and intention of Washington was the determining variable. The Soviets knew as well as, at least, our military knew that a minor detachment from the Sixth Fleet could head off, cut off, or blow the Soviet convoy out of the sea. Thus they watched closely before dispatching it for sign of our fleet movement. But they had clear sailing, and thus could appear as "liberators" in Southern Africa. With this asymmetry of will in mind, and with the trends in the building of new instrumentalities of projection, one must reluctantly conclude that in this third area the Soviets in fact are superior in every pertinent operational sense.

Two other trends must be mentioned as reinforcing these Soviet advantages. While the United States has been closing down its bases for reasons of "efficiency," abjuring from using other people's for reasons of domestic politics (Simonstown), and getting chased out of others (Indochina), the Soviets have been doing the opposite. There is a momentum to decline as there is to movement forward: with the United States defense planners justifying base closures on the grounds of declining political need (as with the Thai bases in 1976), while the Soviets justify their new bases on the argument simply of their expanding naval needs. Success breeds success.

In parallel is the change in alliance patterns. SEATO has been abolished, NATO withers, and our bilateral ties are everywhere up for serious question (as in Japan and the Philippines, where these words are written); but the Soviets have created incipient alliance systems

in the Middle East and in Africa of enormous potential significance. They sit in Africa's horn able to play Somalia and Ethopia off against each other by arming both, while storing nuclear weapons in the former country with which they could threaten the Western oil supplies coming out of the Gulf. They preposition matériel in Libya with which to resupply proto-allies anywhere in the continent (as in Uganda after the Entebbe incident). And they develop ideological momentum everywhere, putting Western-inclined regimes on the defensive, by harnessing the Middle East and Southern African conflicts to the ends of their greater power.

Secondly, it is worth noting that this happens at a time of increasing instability in the third world, from which a revolutionary power has an automatic advantage over a status quo power. Ethnic tensions mount throughout Africa and the old canon of the inviolability of boundaries--of necessity Africa's first rule--is discarded. A new permissiveness toward the use of force is in evidence throughout the third world, but particularly in Africa. Conflict over resources at a time of resource scarcity, conflict over traditional issues which had long been suppressed by the colonial power or as a result of a brief national harmony following independence--all manner and occasion of conflict grow. The great power willing to train literally thousands of saboteurs and to supply guns in unlimited numbers must surely be considered to have an advantage in such situations.

What is the Soviet Union up to? In view of the preceding analysis it perhaps hardly matters, as country after country at the margin of the Western system falls out of the sphere of Western power and influence and into (in incremental stages) the Soviet one (as Turkey may be doing

at present); the margin will shift incrementally. But that is too facile; the Soviets have grave insecurities in some areas and are cautious strategists: they know from long experience how their rapid moves change the American consensus, which they are now working hard to preserve. They certainly do not want war ("No aggressor ever did," Clausewitz argues), but they surely do have a strategy. The background against which this essay is written is an assumption that their strategy is the one which is most likely to avoid war: but most likely to change the correlation of forces in the world, enough to make the United States, Germany and Japan at most the producers of the food and goods which their system needs, while they go about the world's serious political work. That strategy is resource denial.

To be sure the locus of their moves has in part been determined by opportunity. But the thrust of their diplomacy--their conscious, studied efforts--shows a clearly emerging pattern. In the horn of Africa, for example, situated as it is in a position to cut off Western oil supplies, the Soviets nurtured the Somali military from 1962; their chance came only in 1969 with a coup. While we foolishly wrote off Africa in 1964-65 as being of no strategic significance, the Soviets heightened their interest. They showed they knew which areas were important: Zaire, with its mineral wealth, and Southern Africa--with whose resources combined with their own the world market in numerous minerals, essential to Western survival, could be controlled.

The Angolan case is worth looking at briefly, because it illustrates the mixture of opportunity and strategy that sets precedent for Rhodesia. Angola, moreover, helps make a Soviet-Cuban intervention in Rhodesia

possible because, as we shall see, it demonstrated whose star is rising--in a very power and fashion-conscious part of the world.

Angola. The Soviets began helping the MPLA in the late 1950s, and increased their assistance (and made it more open) as MPLA fortunes improved. The mixture of strategy and opportunity is especially clear, however, in the summer and fall of 1975. The Soviets had financed the mission of several thousand Cubans before Kissinger's covert intervention began, When MPLA fortunes declined, the Soviet General Staff was able to organize a massive airlift literally over a weekend. But it is not the modalities and details of that intervention which concern us here (except to note how precisely weaponry was chosen to outfire any Western guns on the ground). The important point for Rhodesia is to note how sudden and massive was the effect on African assessments of their own options; our argument in part hinges on an understanding of how impressable Africans are with projected power.

An anecdote makes the point. At an important conference in Washington, in July 1976, attended by senior government and academic foreign policy specialists, the dominant view in a panel examining Soviet involvement in the third world was that the so-called cold war dimension of the Angolan conflict should be played down, as "Africans were not concerned with American obsessions with communism; they are only interested in liberating white-controlled regimes." An African present had a different view, surprising to all but the present writer; "Africans have been conquered and reconquered for hundreds of years. If they have learned nothing else they have learned to watch which way the wind is

blowing. The lesson of the Angolan civil war in Africa is that Russia is winning and America is losing."

Developments since the Angolan war confirm that analysis--and show the self-fulfilling dimension of it. For new, largely unstructured states, largely devoid of either internal or external power, are even more impressed with projected power than states have traditionally been. The immediate effect of Angola was a new receptivity to a Soviet role in all the pertinent black capitals--Lagos, Dar-es-Salaam, Lusaka, and, most pertinently, Maputo.

The Nigerians became enraptured of the Cubans and were subsequently to legitimize for them every successive delay in their departure from Angola. Kenneth Kaunda flipped over night--in mid-February 1976, to be precise. Where his newspapers had been invoking the spirit of the cold war to cheer on the UNITA forces one day, the next day they were praising the Cubans and urging them on to Salisbury. Thereupon the Soviet ambassador in Lusaka, Vasily Solodovnikov, had a much freer hand in arranging for the training and deployment of Nkomo's army.

But nowhere was the volte-face less expected than in Maputo, Peking's supposed best pupil in Africa. The very ministers who had excoriated the Russians were praising them within two weeks after the Angolan démarche had succeeded. It is absolutely vital to grasp how basic this flip has been to understand what is likely to happen now. For the momentum created then, continuing to this day, has largely escaped the West's notice. The front-line states (absent, perhaps, Botswana) are on a separate track from the West, and are expecting a Soviet-Cuban intervention presently, if the guerrillas cannot dismount Smith in short

order. If this analysis is correct, then President Carter's attempt to achieve a settlement peaceably is not only ill-fated, it is irrelevant, not to say somewhat silly.

II. RHODESIA AND THE SOVIETS

The background to Rhodesian-Zimbabwian nationalism concerns us here only in so far as it bears on the Soviet-Cuban connection. Two epithets are sufficient to characterize the early stages of protests, prior to the period of all-out guerrilla warfare: political failure and military ineptness. The relevance of these to the Soviet connection is direct: the failure led to new dependencies to keep the cause alive.

As the "winds of change" blew through Southern Africa in the early 1960s the nationalists rejected several critical opportunities to accept a minority role within an essentially white government, and to agitate, as nationalist groups had done throughout Africa, for an incrementally increasing role thereafter. Sir Edgar Whitehead, prime minister at the pertinent time, told the present writer that, though it was commonly said (for purposes of fending off hard-right reaction) that the blacks would not rule in their lifetime, it was in fact accepted that it could be no more than fifteen years off (this being in 1960, reported in 1964). But, he pointed out, had they accepted the opportunity, the blacks in fact--as he was a realist--would have had power five years from then, or by the end of the 1960s at the latest.

Having missed the opportunity (as they knew they had) the nationalists turned in on themselves in internecine warfare, in 1963-64, which caused more casualties than the guerrilla war heretofore. The Xhona radicals were unwilling to accept Joshua Nkomo's leadership, feeling he

had compromised with the whites when it was to no purpose, and having not done so when opportunity awaited.

From 1965 Ian Smith's government had effectively ended internal black opposition, which had been appallingly ineffectual. Now he had to cope with external threats: on which Bowyer Bell, writing in 1971, could comment: "Again the nationalists proved inept, squandering blood, idealism, and high purpose in one of the most unsuccessful of contemporary guerrilla operations." In operation after operation in the late 1960s Smith's forces--the Rhodesian African Rifles--mopped up the infiltrators in the Wankie area until the threat was almost negligible. A key variable was popular quiescence, once Smith had eliminated the opposition, after which, again quoting Bell, "only the bad memories of violence in a losing cause remained" for the Africans.

It was with this as backdrop that the external leadership, communicating effectively with the leadership detained within Rhodesia (confirmed in detail by a recent Ph.D. study, written by a detainee) launched the effort to nail down massive Soviet support. Militants began receiving training in guerrilla warfare--in sabotage, weapons training, cartography, explosives, and so forth--in the mid-1960s at Simferopol on the Crimea. In the early 1970s alone some 500 insurgents from Rhodesia were trained there. ZANU preferred the Chinese, but never spurned Soviet aid, whether it came through Nasser, Nkrumah, or straight. ZAPU never had a chance with the Chinese, given their level of ideological sophistication, and perforce relied on the Soviets. Having so done, the leaderships began touting their action as a good thing: making a virtue of necessity. The point is that it was their own failure in a seemingly ideal situation

that drove them to the Soviets, hardly an optimal situation for sustaining one's organizational strength, self-confidence, or autonomy.

In assessing the likelihood of a Soviet-Cuban intervention we must consider the ideological factor--as the Soviets would see it--and thence examine the extraordinary choice Moscow has made between the two contending guerrilla forces. Since the Angola struggle remains the pertinent comparison, we must return to it anew.

We find immediately some striking differences in the chosen instrument of Angola (the MPLA) and the choices available in Rhodesia. The MPLA is not just a Marxist party. A Soviet handbook, "Africa Today" (Moscow, 1962), describes the MPLA as a Marxist-Leninist party founded in 1956 "on the initiative of the Communist Party and the allied Party of Joint Struggle of the Africans of Angola" (a clandestine party). The Soviets can be pragmatic in their dealings with foreign communist parties when state interests are involved: but when state interests and the existence of a <u>real</u> communist party are involved, then intervention is highly probable. Communism, American liberal interpretations to the contrary notwithstanding, is taken very seriously indeed in Moscow today.

In contrast, neither Zimbabwian party has a structural Marxist basis or substantial Marxist organizational design. This is confirmed by an unpublished but highly important recent study of Rhodesian nationalism written by one of the ZANU leaders, Eddison Zvobgo, who in four hundred pages of analysis of the organization and ideological background to the present configuration of the parties, never once uses the customary code words for a Marxist party: socialism, yes; indebtedness to the Soviets (and Chinese) for guerrilla training, to be sure. But true Marxist-Leninist content and organization, not at all.

In these circumstances it is therefore highly interesting that the Soviets settled on ZAPU relatively early on and have gone through various linguistic gymnastics to accommodate ZAPU in the communist pantheon. Thus a 1974 Soviet Military History Institute classification of African parties refers to the fourth and ideologically most sophisticated level of African wars as follows: "National liberation wars headed by revolutionary democratic parties with a relatively high level of political and military leadership, and firm links with the masses (the PAIGC...Frelimo...the MPLA in Angola, the ANC in SA, and Zapu in Rhodesia). These parties' fighting ability is determined to a significant degree by the approximation of their leaderships' views to Marxist-Leninist ideology and their co-operation with Communist parties and Marxist-Leninist groups." Nikita Khrushchev fell in 1964 partly because of his violation of communist orthodoxy in attempting to discover new Cubas in Africa: essentially opportunistic parties and leaders like the CPP and Nkrumah in Ghana were deemed to be "building Socialism" (i.e. becoming true Marxist-Leninists and accepting Moscow's leadership) for purposes of including them (for example) at party congresses and the like. It was an opportunistic policy that was to blow up in their face when most of such leaders were overthrown.

Now, after a decade of relative conservatism in these matters, they are up to the same game--for the simple reason of profound opportunity. Most students would agree that ZAPU is potentially a better Marxist-Leninist party. Not only that, ZAPU is identified with the Shona who comprise the overwhelming majority of Rhodesians. ZANU is mostly Ndebele led--and indeed by a minority strand of that ethnic group at that.

Furthermore, ZAPU is based in Zambia, hardly hospitable ground compared with Mozambique, where the leadership has made an astonishing volte-face in Moscow's favor.

Why then has Moscow opted for ZAPU? The conclusion is compelling that they have found Joshua Nkomo more malleable; indeed they must have found him willing to undertake serious commitments to their advantage. Of the many virtues that Nkomo may have, steadfastness of purpose, moral principle and vitality would be near the bottom of the list. Nkomo--as thie writer found him in detention 13 years ago and as others have reported since--is an easy-going, not terribly intelligent, leader, self-indulgent and not prone to self-criticism. As already noted he missed most of the opportunities to assume real leadership through the foundation-laying period of Rhodesian nationalism. Small wonder, then, that Moscow has settled on him as their man.

It is tempting, indeed irresistible, to go further, in seeking to explain why the Soviets would opt for much the smaller guerrilla force. Would it not precisely be because such an army would in fact be more dependent on Cuban forces? If the answer is yes then it follows that the Soviets and Cubans are already planning an intervention. It is not proposed that this is the explanatory variable for the choice of ZAPU; it is rather a contributory one. It is simply impossible to speculate with any more precision, but this possibility is overpoweringly suggestive. For the Soviets have shifted their course with every turn in the wind: when it looked as if war would not work in Rhodesia the Soviets were open to talk of negotiated settlements (1974). As guerrilla capacities improved, Soviet pronouncements steadily increased their praise for

the "liberation" forces--as too their promises of support (1975). In 1976 they increasingly ruled out negotiation and by the end of the year had committed themselves to war as the only option. This shift corresponds with the arrival in Zambia of increasing numbers of guerrillas from Simferopol and their increasing effectiveness. The dramatic shifts in U.S. policy, it can now be seen, have played directly into Soviet hands, as we commit ourselves with increasing precision not to intervene.

But the Soviets are realists. They not only know the ZAPU forces are no match for Salisbury (even if not backed up by Pretoria): they in no way could defeat both Smith and the various ZANU clans. Unless we are to assume that the Soviets have unthinkingly painted themselves into a corner we must assume that they are planning an intervention (which is not the same as saying that it is inevitable). To assume that the Soviets have not thought this through, when they have dispatched their head of state and their Cuban ally throughout the region in a highly coordinated effort to stir the pot, is to make a leap of faith far greater than any made in this section.

In any event it should be obvious from the foregoing why the lack of a true comparison with Angola's MPLA in Rhodesia is not highly pertinent. A senior American diplomat dismissed the likelihood of a Soviet-Cuban demarche in Rhodesia Angola-style because ZAPU "just isn't as good a wicket to bat on." That misses the point. In Rhodesia the "opportunity variable" and the potential spinoff are vastly greater than in Angola. Angola was a shot in the dark, with little risk (given the American temperament) but the possibility of immense payoff. And precisely because an intervention on its scale was so unpredictable (like

all the events that have moved history) there was no downside risk from not intervening.

This line of reasoning is explicitly contradicted by administration thinking. Indeed, there is a remarkable unanimity in views of the most senior U.S. intelligence and diplomatic officials charged with responsibility in these matters--namely that the logistical and other related problems make a Cuban intervention in Rhodesia, Angolan-style, most unlikely. The reasons cited are real enough. Rhodesia's land-locked geography would make intervention on t he scale required much more complicated than it was in Angola. The favored group, ZAPU, operates from even more remote land-locked Zambian bases, rather than Mozambican ones, exacerbating the problem.

It is also true that Cuba has "enough" problems on its hands in Angola, as administration experts note. They are bogged down in some regions with insufficient materiel and foodstuffs, resentment of them abounds in others, and many are getting killed by an increasingly successful UNITA effort. The intervention established a new level of anxiety in centrist regimes in Africa over Soviet-Cuban goals, which the duo presumably would not wish to exacerbate further.

Is the conclusion that there will be no additional intervention in Rhodesia wishful thinking or sound analysis? A DIA intelligence appraisal (dated 7 July 1977) notes that "increased efforts [by the Cubans] have apparently been required to ensure continued MPLA rule. As recent press reporting indicates, the Cubans are willing to insert additional troops and equipment to provide this necessary support." (Six shiploads of troops, for example, arrived in July.) "However, Cuba's capabilities

have been severely strained by the effort, and Havana, in concert with Moscow, may eventually decide that the costs outweigh the benefits of continued support to the MPLA."

The fallacy in that analysis is the same in so much appraisal of the potential for intervention: a projection by Americans, onto the Soviet-Cuban duo, of our own problems in Vietnam and elsewhere. Our biggest constraints in Vietnam were political sentiment at home and the not unrelated problem of military morale in the field. These are not the duo's problems, at least not to any serious extent (as Western intelligence appraisals of the Cubans in the field would indicate). They can ignore sentiment at home, and they need not indulge their troops with R & R, one-year tours, and extravagant accommodations. The Soviets have shown again and again that, where they have an important objective, they will keep to it, however frequent and numerous the setbacks. (They were ejected from Guinea twice before President Sékou Touré decided he needed them badly enough to grant the strategic basing privileges the Soviets had long sought, and from which they now constrain U.S. naval movement in the South Atlantic.)

Moreover the Cubans, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, are not free agents. They are not wholly Soviet puppets, not wholly mercenaries at the Soviets' beck and call. But they are to a considerable extent, something again verifiable by American intelligence. So sending another expedition to Africa, when another--greater--nation is paying the bills and co-ordinating (if not always calling) the shots, is something less than an adequate analogy to American freedom of maneuver at the time of the Vietnamese imbroglio.

But there are always economic and logistical reasons for thinking that an adversary will not do what he desires politically. The main variable has always been political will. The arguments used by Washington today are quite similar to those argued against the likelihood of the original Soviet-Cuban Angolan intervention; by others against the 1964-65 U.S. involvement in Vietnam; indeed against virtually every military demarche any power has ever attempted, none of which has ever been deemed cost-effective by those who hoped it would not happen or who had an interest in a different outcome.

Ultimately, the Soviets and Cubans will be bound to intervene, precisely because of their long-vaunted commitment to "liberation." The capital amassed from past posturing and support on Southern African questions could be dissipated in strategic parts of Africa were the duo not to put their troops where their rhetoric has been. Moreover, Moscow moves on momentum, working greatly in their favor owing to U.S. policy and the movement of events in the Southern African theatre. Failure to intervene would be the classic failure of will at the moment of "truth"--as Africans would see it. The Soviets are now seen as having "history" on their side. They dare not lose it.

What is the most likely sequence of Rhodesian events in coming months, if the present regime continues to weaken at the present rate? Once Smith is out, if the Soviets and Cubans have not already begun their intervention, then ZAPU and ZANU will fight it out, settling once and for all the scores left open from the battles in the Salisbury townships in the mid-1960s (as indeed from the wars in the late 19th century as Ndebele battled Shona for control of what became Rhodesia). Who will win? If

of the enemy. But such a force, which could be emplaced in less than a month, would roughly match the Rhodesian armed forces proper in size (which helps to explain why parties in the region were so overwhelmed by a Cuban force of 15,000 in Angola). It would be less than 10% of the remaining troops Cuba had left on home ground, surely a manageable proportion given the lack of any disorder at home, and the growing political assets Castro has as a result of the Carter Administration's various attempts to please him.

The intervention will be more difficult than that in Angola. There is not the same confidence in the air corridor, for one thing. Use of Somalia and Mozambique is possible, but that would require overflight of Iran or Pakistan. Iran has succumbed to Soviet blackmail and played along with Soviet deceptions in past military overflights, waving some ahead openly, but it would be unlikely to allow a great airlift, particularly in view of the Shah's known regard for South Africa where his father was once exiled. Use of Yugoslavia, however, presents few difficulties, and thence the Angolan air corridor--Algeria, Mali, Guinea, Congo, and Luanda. Then only Zambia remains a question mark--but not much, given the momentum that exists and the change that has already taken place in Lusaka.

A word about timing. There are too many variables for predictions to be worth bothering about at this point. The writer was involved in a past governmental exercise designed to put Southern African developments in a future time frame, in terms of probabilities. In fact, many of the hard conclusions to which experts came were ignored in order to tailor the conclusions to the needs of the moment: namely to convince

Ian Smith that he had no more than 'x' amount of time left before an apocalypse. 'X' amount of time has come and gone.

But it might not have. An analogy with Viet-Nam is in order. Whatever the merits of the case there (which we will ignore), it is obvious to all who watched developments closely there in 1975 that the North's final solution was in no way inevitable. Had the US not severed its aid and the Soviets not doubled theirs, for one thing, morale alone would have been different. The critical point is that, somewhere in March 1975, all timetables for incremental change came unstuck. A 'critical mass' of North Vietnamese success had been achieved, whereupon all hell broke loose. The South Vietnamese army, its structure busted, then fled and the US sent in its evacuation helicopters.

At any point beginning in 1978, the same could happen militarily in Rhodesia. True, the 'Patriotic Front' is not the North Vietnamese army. But then, in relative size to its adversary's, Smith's army is not Thieu's, either. And Smith's army in many experts' minds has been overestimated, while Thieu's was generally underestimated, in my view. The struggle might drag out for five years. It might be all over a year from now.

The important point is that, the longer the conflict drags out, the worse it is ultimately for the whites, the more likely is a Cuban intervention, and the less stable will Southern Africa be for Western interests in the long run.

The result--continuity or change? Having ventured this far in prophecy, it takes little additional courage to attempt to sketch some general picture of Southern Africa post-intervention, in a context of the conventional wisdom on this subject.

The conventional wisdom is that, even where the Soviets have 'won' and achieved 'treaties of friendship' with African states the Africans have not nationalized, much less 'communized' the polity and economy. Gulf not only continues doing business in Angola, it does it on highly concessionary terms, receiving its most favorable oil price anywhere, according to a company official, despite the 55 percent interest taken in Gulf by the Angolan government. Mozambique remains as dependent on South Africa as ever (though that picture changes substantially this month when Pretoria frees the price of gold, ending Maputo's enormous windfall subsidy of recent years). So, is it wishful thinking or sound analysis to presume that a victorious, duo-assisted ZAPU would leave well enough alone in the economy, deal with the realities of South Africa as they must, and otherwise not rock the boat?

There are two points. The balance has tilted against the multinational firm, as numerous writers have noted, and nowhere more so than in black Africa. Zambia's 1970 takeover of Roan Selection Trust, Malagasy's of U.S. oil refining and shipping interests, the various Nigerian 'indigenisation' programs, and of course the nationalizations in Tanzania are all pertinent. Even in friendly countries like Kenya, the trend is hitting U.S. interests.

True, as Thomas Biersteker has argued, less has changed than is apparent and the companies in most cases have continued to do well. But

the second point tends to make the evidence of other countries less persuasive. Invariably in Africa, post-independence economic policy has varied more or less directly in radicalism with the intensity and violence of the achievement of independence. Guinea and Mali, for example, had the harshest colonization and decolonization process of any French territories--and the most radical polities thereafter. Rhodesia, coming to independence through war, could well follow this pattern. But Mozambique (like Angola with Gulf) does business with South Africa in an orderly way: why can't Rhodesia? The fallacy here is to assume that, because they do so, such is their preference. They will cease to do so the minute they can avoid doing so, once they have a practical alternative. The point is, once Zimbabwe takes its independence through Soviet help, there may well by then be a critical mass of Soviet involvement in the region to have a greater effect that hitherto on economic policies. It is hard to have 'socialism in one country,' as numerous African dictators have found out. But a marxist Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe would reinforce each other--and no doubt compete with one another to be 'the most socialistic,' and be given positive incentives by their great-power protector in some areas.

The one reassuring factor is that the Soviets have learned how potentially expensive Third World economic ventures can be to them. No doubt, in this writer's predicted option, Moscow would in fact caution prudence to the Zimbabwians in particular areas of the economy. But it would be prudence of a relative sort. The Soviets would be biding time. For, in the southern African economies is located the purpose of Soviet

involvement in the wars there in the first place: control over the West's vital resources. There is thus little room for optimism in the economic arena.

III. THE AMERICAN CARD

With respect to the trends that can be envisaged in U.S. foreign policy in the next few years, it is first of all crucial to separate trends from hopes. Virtually every interest group with a foreign policy objective threatened by a Carter campaign promise or administration policy line has taken refuge behind an assumption that the administration 'can never' do what is deemed so unthinkably radical (or whatever). Such wishful thinking is a form of cognitive dissonance, as the present writer has learned to his own cost. The military refused to believe Carter would ultimately bust one leg of the strategic triad out from under American security and scrap the B-1, but he did so. Diplomats and many Asia specialists refused to believe Carter would remove ground forces from Korea, in view of what ensued when America last tried that (in 1949). He is proceeding with it, against the advice of virtually every specialist on the questions involved.

Radical policies develop their own constituency and momentum, leading to further such decisions. Short of a grave international crisis in which the Soviets show their hand more bluntly than hitherto, it is safe to say that Carter will proceed further down the road on which he has already set out. The implications of this are extremely important.

With respect to Rhodesia, it means that only token efforts will be made to safeguard white economic interests (and personal safety) as the

situation deteriorates. The solemnly pledged commitments of Henry Kissinger to Ian Smith will be discarded on the grounds that those agreements were never formally entered into, and that white bad faith invalidates them in any event. If, after a quarter century of financial support and bloodshed on a monumental scale in Vietnam, America could abandon its ally there to its fate, as a result of the new coalition of forces running American foreign policy then as now, there will be no problem at all in so doing with a non-ally in Rhodesia.

The extent to which the context and assumptions of American diplomacy have changed is suggested by the Namibian case. The American diplomats involved (with whom the writer has talked in extenso) were proud of their success in applying compelling pressure (in conjunction with four Western partners) on South Africa by implying the threat of sanctions. The specifics of UN Resolution 385 were bought in toto by the Western coalition: free elections under UN control; a release of all political prisoners; a repeal of all discriminatory laws; permission for all exiles to return; and a total withdrawal by South African troops. The quid pro quo, of course, was that SWAPO must not impede a political settlement: but, despite the absence of convincing proof that it would not do so, the Americans pursued their South African quarry anyway. Indeed, the Americans found Njuomo ubiquitous and impossible to find, as if this was a treatment meted out equally to all comers--rather than a shrewd strategem of a trained Marxist-Leninist who knows which side has the cards.

Even more interesting is the attitude prevalent in many parts of the State Department toward Walvis Bay, the enclave in Southwest Africa which is South African territory, period. One comment of a senior diplomat was

that it was hoped that through diplomacy "the legal problem could be separated from the political problem so that the former didn't impede the solution to the latter"--the assumption being that Namibia would obviously get Walvis Bay but not at once; it should not delay its own independence right now by insisting on something to which, it seems to have been forgotten, it has no right.

But the most interesting point of all is to note the literal impossibility of discussing, within the present administration, strategic issues that pertain to the sea lines or anything else relating to the Soviet presence in southern Africa. "You simply can't talk about the strategic issues," and FSO-1 told the writer. "You'd get laughed out of court. It isn't on." But the issues remain, irrespective of the ignorance some have of them--for example, the fact that the oil flow from the Persian Gulf to America and Europe has increased by 3600% in ten years.

In effect and in sum, the American administration is "on a high" in Southern Africa. Like-minded journalists praise the change of policy and help blind the administration to the irrelevance of its efforts in Rhodesia and the willfulness of its policy toward South Africa. Thus, according to an unimpeachable source in Bonn, Vice President Mondale shocked the German Chancellor with his boasts of "leaning on Vorster until apartheid collapses." "What will you put in its place when this happens?" Schmidt asked. "We will worry about that when the evil is gone," Mondale is said to have replied.

It is important to remember--in the Washington Post's words--that "Andrew Young is not the problem" (nor is Mondale). It is the

President: it was he who suggested (in Playboy) that he should do penance for his late arrival at the civil rights cause by resigning his candidacy "and start a crusade for black-majority rule in South Africa or Rhodesia..." He has said that it is to Andrew Young alone that he owes anything for his election. Carter's commitment to this cause should therefore not be underestimated.

What would induce Moscow and Havana to get off their present course? Only one thing: an abrupt change in American policy. When an inspired story dominates an international newspaper (the Christian Science Monitor, 17 May 1977) with a message of a "new US African policy" taking shape, and lists the two changes as "No more Angola-style intervention" (that is, by the US) and "Let's get tough with South Africa," the Soviets have an American green light to intervene. The onus is on us, in other words, for past interventions, and no matter what, we will not do so again.

This policy will change, simply because it is unresponsive to reality and to American interests. But when government policies are out of joint there is necessarily a lag before the shift in course. Carter is simply too far out on a limb with Andrew Young to come back in time to turn American policy around. At the very earliest, the turn-around will come following upon a massive duo intervention in Rhodesia. But as in Angola, the first party on the scene will have an enormous advantage: it will take ten times as much force to blow an interventionary force out as to keep them out in the first place.

What about the new French-led cabal--of Morocco, Egypt, Sudan and, most importantly, Saudi Arabia? They meet frequently and have deep consultations; but they cannot act together on this issue. The Saudi terms of

survival (amid the hostile Palestinians, et al.) are continued pressure on Israel, financing of the Arab war effort, and de facto, if marginal, support for such third world totems as radical African nationalism. This is not the Saudi family's preferred option, but it is their way of coping in a hostile environment.

The French would be disposed to act: they still have important naval assets in the Indian Ocean--but simply not sufficient for acting alone. Five years hence, the Iranians would be able to act with them, but by that time it would be prudent to anticipate little French naval power left in the Indian Ocean, now that Djibouti has gained its independence and that Malagasy has ended its military relationship with France.

With respect to Rhodesia it is thus evident that the Western act is not together. Those who would like to intervene cannot while those that could will not. For Jimmy Carter to do now what would be required to stop the Soviets in their track--namely a military mission to Salisbury and the deployment of a convoy outisde Mozambique--would require a greater conversion than Saul's on the road to Tarsus.

IV. SOME SCENARIOS

By way of making more precise the judgments rendered herein, comment follows on each of the scenarios proposed by the conference conveners.

1. Smith regime intransigence and black/white civil war (Protracted Conflict).

This is an unlikely course. As a DIA intelligence appraisal notes, "The influx of Soviet and Cuban arms and advisers has had a major impact on the military balance in southern Africa....The various guerrilla forces...are equipped with communist weapons, including small arms, mines, rockets, and SA-7/GRAIL antiaircraftmissiles. The level of combat activity has increased on all fronts and is straining Rhodesia's military capacity. The flow of military aid from communist sources...portends a major shift in the regional balance of power." Smith has many times outfoxed those holding their breath for his demise. But the military trend is now devastatingly against him. I would give him a 5% chance of surviving a year with this policy. In fact the August election tends to preclude this option.

2. Peaceful transition to moderate government (Protracted Power Struggle).

This is the course that will ensue (90% probability). The scenario depicted by Union Carbide (option 2) neglects the following factors, however. A Muzorewa government (for example) would from the start automatically elicit the hostility of the guerrilla groups, and only weak support from one or two front-line states. US support will be lukewarm at best because of the preference of many administration members for the more radical guerrillas. Moreover, South African support will be a diminishing

asset, as the Carter-Young-Mondale team begins to organize the sanctions required to whip Pretoria into line with its illusions of a parallel with the American south. Nor is Muzorewa's toughness and ability to govern, with the ruthlessness that will be necessary, self-evident.

3. Peaceful Nationalism.

This option would be feasible only with a turnaround in US policy. Guerrilla groups will under no circumstances dissolve themselves. Even if all manner of polls and elections show overwhelming voter preference for a moderate government, the guerrillas will struggle. Marxists know that it only takes 10% support to govern a country, given enough ruthlessness. The guerrillas can continue sufficient operations (with Soviet and Cuban logistical aid alone) to bring a moderate government down within several years. The government would be worn down. (An interesting parallet of sorts is Puerto Rico, where a small minority aided by Cuba is seeking to wear down Commonwealth supporters who, unable to cohere enough to defeat the tiny faction, and susceptible to the pressures of those against whom terrorist acts are committed, may finally throw in the towel--or so the conflict is developing).

4. Black Radicalism.

The parallel of sorts is Angola, absent the violent rise to power. But either ZANU or ZAPU would have enough violence in its experience for a "peaceful" <u>transition</u> not to make any difference. US support would slow down the process of Soviet gains, but not preclude them. It must be remembered at all times that the present US government considers even the

mention of the Soviet-Cuban connection as a "knee-jerk reaction" (to quote the US ambassador to the UN).

5. Peaceful Nationalism with Potential to Black Radicalism.

This is the standard African scenario. Governments become prisoner of their own marxist-leninist (or even fabian socialist) rhetoric; investment therefore doesn't flow in, the western powers are blamed for trying to destroy the government; CIA agents are then "discovered" plotting a coup, and a Treaty of Friendship is signed with Moscow. Ghana under Nkrumah followed this scenario as have others. But this possibility is precluded by the probabilities already described.

6. Black Radicalism with Potential to Peaceful Nationalism.

This is a real possiblity (15%?). The following would have to occur: Carter realizes the faults in his policy (or he is defeated in 1980 as a result of his failure) after ZAPU has been in office for 3 years. Meantime the conservative coalition in Africa (Ivory Coast, Zaire, Senegal, etc.) is strengthened by the economic recovery in Europe in 1979-80, and the French-Saudi cabal have had further successes in defeating Soviet-Cuban imperialism (specifically and most importantly in Somalia and Yemen). The Soviet Union has had to turn to domestic problems--its colonies in central Asia, for example, have become restless. South Africa is consequently saved from UN mandatory oil sanctions in the nick of time and begins an outward policy again. ' The Soviets, getting desperate, make mistakes (these do not matter when they have momentum. They do when the current flow the other way) and President Nkomo "remembers" correctly that he never was a marxist. After a secret visit from President Sadat

bearing a billion Saudi dollars, he "invites" the Soviets to leave. South African policemen, back to work in Zimbabwe, assist the Russians onto their planes. The nightmare is over.

That is a real possibility. But it remains a hope, not a trend, given the probabilities. The burden of this paper, alas, has been to disaggregate the one from the other.

Chapter VI

THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Introductory Note:

This paper proposes to explain United States policy toward southern Africa and what it is likely to be over the next five to ten years in response to a variety of contingencies. It is a relatively straightforward task to expound what those officials directly concerned with southern African affairs seek to do in that area; it is quite another task to assess what may be the final policy to emerge from the bureaucratic and political processes in darkest Washington as they react to a variety of relevant and irrelevant contingencies in southern Africa and the rest of the world.

The first three sections discuss how a general policy approach has been developed and the principal domestic and international contingencies likely to support or change it. The reader interested only in the most likely policy outcomes may wish to begin at the section starting page 18 .

The Background to United States Policy.

Conventional wisdom has long had it that Africa is the least important continent for the United States. In terms of American actions and official perceptions, this conventional wisdom has been right--until very recently. The United States has no long-standing tradition of policy toward Africa, and no symbolic anchor such as that provided by the Monroe Doctrine for its relations with Latin America. The American government has not developed a core of highly trained area specialists whose arcane linguistic and other skills are widely respected in the government, such as those who at various times have dominated policy toward Eastern Europe and China. Africa has had no strong Congressional constituency. Nor have strong domestic pressure groups arisen which have attempted systematically to shape or constrain policy on the model of the lobbies for Israel and Greece. Without such traditions and constraints, policy, as it emerges from the interplay of bureaucratic and political interests, is likely to change radically in response to a variety of seemingly peripheral considerations.

The bureaucratic basis for contemporary policy was set in July, 1958, when the State Department was first authorized to establish a full-fledged African Bureau under an Assistant Secretary. (The Soviet Union created a comparable structure the same week.) Prior to that, parts of Africa had been an adjunct of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, but most had been subsumed under the tutelage of the European Bureau. In 1961 the African Bureau was first able to assert any substantial degree of bureaucratic autonomy from the European Bureau, and this required White House intervention in the context of the acute debate over the Congo crisis. Since

those early years, the African Bureau has acquired independence of operation and doctrine largely at the expense of power and salience. It has had most control when nothing of interest was going on. Nevertheless, the comparative isolation and irrelevance of the Bureau has permitted it to develop something of a coherent view of African policy which has survived a succession of Secretaries of State who knew little and cared less about the continent.

Like the views of other geographic bureaus, this one is in part client-centered and protective of the Bureau's own corporate interests. Its principal elements are as follows:

1) Black nationalism is an important historical force and one which is, in the long run, congruent with American ideals and interests, however trying it may prove to be in the short run. This nationalism may take a variety of rhetorical and organizational forms across the continent, but the differences are less important that the similarities. While one regrets those cases where regimes discriminate against American businesses, one must accept that a certain degree of economic nationalism is likely to accompany political nationalism.

2) Stability of a regime is more important that its degree of democracy or its particular political form. Without stability, little else is likely to be accomplished. When a regime is manifestly unstable, one prepares to swing with the changes and establish good relations with whoever the successor may be. One avoids investing too much in any particular leader, since he may be gone tomorrow. Also, one may pressure a leader who seriously menaces his neighbors' stability (e.g., Nkrumah).

3) Territorial integrity, as enshrined in the OAU Charter, is a major good. However bizarre the old colonial borders, they should be respected. This may be the African Bureau's most strongly held principle. It was the cornerstone of its first bureaucratic victory in the Congo crisis, and the Bureau held to it despite formidable Congressional and public opposition in the Nigerian civil war. Territorial integrity is probably the one purely African issue for which the Bureau might contemplate suitably discreet military intervention.

4) Economic development is important, but is likely to take many different forms. It is more a matter of governmental competence than doctrine, but most competent leaders leave a major role for private enterprise.

5) Cold War competition is not of fundamental importance in Africa. One avoids getting drawn into competitive giving of aid just to keep up with the Russians. "Communist subversion" is not a major issue in Africa; most leaders know how to take care of themselves and to take the communists for a ride if it suits their purposes. The limiting case is the actual presence of Soviet forces in a country, though even in Guinea they have not yet posed a serious problem for American interests.

The African Bureau's view has been developed principally out of experience with Africa north of the Zambezi. Just as the southern part of Africa has retained European control longer than the rest, so southern African affairs within the State Department have been more thoroughly subordinated to European concerns than have the affairs of the rest of the continent. American policy toward southern Africa has recognized the

paramountcy of British interests, at first because of Britain's residual power and expertise, more recently because of Britain's weakness and the fear of the repercussions radical changes in southern Africa would have on the failing British economy. Similarly, although it has been less salient, Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique was not seriously challenged by the United States, because of Portugal's role in NATO and, above all, its provision of the Azores naval and air bases. During the Salazar period, this deference to Portugal included acquiescence in the virtual exclusion of American investment from Angola. British mis-handling of Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence and the collapse of the Portuguese regime, followed by the utter rout of Kissinger's personal Angolan policy, have allowed the Bureau to increase its control over policy toward southern Africa and to bring its particular Africa-centered viewpoint to bear on the formation of American policy in the area.

Nevertheless, the African bureau does not make American policy by itself. The more salient the issue, the less control it has. No simple extrapolation of past policy can be relied on as a guide to the future, particularly if the issue at hand becomes one of material or symbolic importance to higher officials. Cold War concerns bring new bureaucratic actors into policy making; these actors include the White House, the military and the CIA, as well as different geographical bureaus within the Department of State. As with the Byrd Amendment and some export licenses, particular economic interests may be able to derive ad hoc exceptions to established policy through adroit lobbying. Above all, the President and Congress may find in an ill-understood African situation, a marvelous opportunity to take a symbolic stand for domestic purposes.

In the absence of an informed public constituency for African issues, American political leaders have tended to react to southern African events by simple ideological projection, by denial of political reality, and by treating Africa as an adjunct of more pressing relationships. With a few individual exceptions, members of Congress have consistently projected their domestic American political ideology onto Africa. A Senator's votes on southern African issues can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy from his votes on domestic American economic, welfare, and racial issues. His southern African votes appear also to be quite independent of the particular corporate interests present in his constituency, though Representatives are less independent in their voting. Whatever substantive information on the African issues may be presented, the legislation is filtered through an ideological screen which renders it congruent with their domestic political philosophies. Nor do the majority of concerned constituents behave much differently. The greatest volume of congressional mail on a southern Africa issue has been generated by groups opposing the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. A very high percentage of these letters also include paragraphs on other authentic conservative causes having nothing to do with Africa, particularly the retention of the House Un-American Activities Committee and rejection of domestic gun-control legislation.

In analogous manner, recent presidents have treated Africa, on those occasions when they noticed it, as a low-cost area for symbolization of an ideological or domestic policy position. Thus, John Kennedy got America moving again by making his very first appointment that of the ebulliently liberal Soapy Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Lyndon

Johnson halted American naval visits to Simonstown, South Africa, at the time he was preoccupied with programs for racial equality at home. Richard Nixon's "southern strategy" was reinforced by his barely concealed support for the Byrd Amendment, his snubbing of Kenneth Kaunda, his punishing Tanzania for applauding China's entry into the UN, and by the 'tilt' toward white rule displayed in option two of NSSM 39. Jimmy Carter has been most explicit about the linkage of southern African issues with American civil rights issues.

Inconvenient political facts have at times simply been ignored by higher echelons in the State Department and the White House. Secretaries Rusk and Kissinger often neglected intelligence and policy assessments based on the Bureau's and the CIA's perception of African political realities and discouraged their further production. During the Nixon years the top echelons of the State Department repeatedly articulated the formal fiction that African leaders were so concerned with economic development that they took little interest in political issues like liberation of still-dependent territories and racial justice. In effect, this represented a wishful projection of official American thinking onto the Africans themselves.

America's disastrous semi-involvement in the Angolan civil war represented an extreme case of high-level wishful thinking and subordination of an African situation to an ill-informed policy-maker's global perspective. Against the advice of the Africa Bureau and much of the CIA, and against the corporate interests of the principal American investor in Angola (Gulf Oil), Kissinger backed South African and mercenary intervention and thereby provided the ultimate justification in most African eyes

for the introduction of Cuban troops. Nor did Congressional opponents of Kissinger's Angolan policies come to grips with the African dimension of the war. Instead of challenging the political premises of American policy, Congress cut off American intervention by invoking symbols of Congressional privilege, CIA dirty tricks, and American boys dying in Vietnam.

Some New Realities

The advent of the Carter administration has coincided with, and to some degree promoted, recognition of a series of major changes in the African, international and domestic American contests which will condition the development of American policy toward southern Africa in the next decade. These may be summarized as follows:

1) The decline in the relative importance to the United States of southern Africa as compared to black and north Africa. This trend is most emphatically symbolized by the relative roles of Nigeria and South Africa. In 1973 American trade with Nigeria passed that with South Africa, and as Secretary Vance made a point of noting in his July first speech to the NAACP, it is now double our South African trade. For all that white-controlled minerals remain important, their political weight is countered by the 38 percent of America's petroleum imports supplied by black and north Africa. Although manufacturing investment and sales of American products are still low, Nigeria, in particular, offers a domestic market with the potential of surpassing that of the areas dependent on South African manufacturing. Increasingly, multinational corporations with southern African investments are getting involved in Nigerian operations; as Nigeria plays a more emphatic political role with regard to southern

Africa, these firms may come under increased pressure to modify or drop their southern African operations.

2) The reassertion of black nationalism in the Republic of South Africa. This reinforces the first point, and furthermore enhances the bureaucratic weight of the African Bureau in southern African decisions. While black nationalism in South Africa raises the salience of southern Africa generally, it diminishes the willingness of the United States to rely on the South African government as a partner in accomplishing broader goals. The Angolan war and the Soweto uprising demonstrated that whatever the military strength of South Africa, it is a net political liability. The assumption of the Nixon Doctrine and of Option II of NSSM 39*, that South Africa was the "responsible power" to rely on to keep regional peace, looks more and more feeble.

3) The growth of Africa's effective power in multi-lateral institutions. While it is still fashionable to poke fun at the black African states' positions in the United Nations, the Group of 77, sea-bed treaty discussions, and similar venues for dialogue with the Third World, the Africans have nevertheless wielded their voting power effectively and overall in a manner consonant with their long-run interests. The Moynihan strategy of publicly mocking the Africans for their economic ignorance failed and is unlikely to be repeated. Because of their number and voting discipline, if for no other reasons, they can block action until their wants are attended to. The most recent attempts of the United States and others to split them from the Arabs in the Paris and Ottawa talks proved a failure, though the strategy has not been abandoned. As the U.S.

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*The 1969 National Security Council study on which President Nixon's African policy was based.

increases its attention to north-south issues, it will have to pay more attention to Black Africa.

4) The progressive spread and adaptation to African circumstances of neo-Marxism. At present, neo-Marxism has had greater impact on rhetoric than on action in most African states, but it is more than a trivial trend. Its doctrinal core is the acceptance of the "underdevelopment thesis" in which the industrial world, including sometimes the Soviet Union, is held responsible for the stagnation of African development efforts and the distortion of their societal structures. The present neo-Marxism can be distinguished both from the doctrinaire aping of Soviet or Maoist doctrine and from the romanticism of earlier African socialism theories. It provides a common ground for links with other Third World countries, and has attained a new respectability because it is independent of Soviet control. It combines easily with older purely nationalistic tendencies, and in actual practice is likely to produce a variant of state capitalism, more than any orthodox Marxist approach. It is likely to reinforce demands for substantial state participation in or control over large multinational investments, without completely abandoning market discipline. A sweeping socialist victory in the French elections would likely reinforce the trend.

5) The apparent increase in external military intervention. I say apparent, because Western military forces have intervened in Africa many times since 1960. Nevertheless, the Russo-Cuban intervention in Angola took place on an unprecedented scale, and was only symbolically matched by the Franco-Moroccan intervention in Zaire earlier this year. Either of these may, however, be used as a precedent for further extra-regional

military intervention. If Moroccans can turn up in Zaire, why not Libyans in Zimbabwe or Nigerians in Namibia? A few African countries have now acquired the military hardware and perhaps even the training to be able to do serious damage to one another. In southern Africa such capability is still limited to the whites in Rhodesia and South Africa and to the Cubans in Angola, but this is not eternal. An independent Zimbabwe might have quite an impressive military force. Even Angola or Mozambique might soon develop the capacity to make gunboat diplomacy and border raids an expensive proposition for the attacker.

6) The growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. Deployment of the Trident submarine and eventual deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles will increase the amount of attention paid to the Indian Ocean. Despite South African alarmist propaganda this need have little actual impact on the southern African portion of the continent, unless the Soviets establish a base in Mozambique--which seems unlikely. A base in Angola where the Soviets have more leverage would appear even more threatening to European and American naval and maritime activity. An increase in Soviet "southern ocean" activity will increase the bureaucratic weight of the American military in any decisions affecting southern Africa.

7) Changes in American domestic politics.

a) The growing role of blacks in national policy formation. The political impact of Lyndon Johnson's voter registration acts was made manifest by Carter's election and by the election of numerous Congressmen and lower officials. Carter has explicitly linked black America with a special interest in southern Africa, and even a Republican administration will have difficulty in uncoupling the linkage. Black Americans will not

function as effectively as the pro-Israel or even pro-Greece lobbies: Africa is not a single entity which gives a clear lead to follow, and black Americans have other problems to worry about. However, as black Americans increase their political power, the barely submerged racism which has suffused much Congressional discussion of African issues will decline.

b) A more sophisticated public for African issues. Equally important may be the secular trend toward an American elite public which is less hopelessly ignorant about Africa. Former African Peace Corps volunteers--and their relatives--are beginning to turn up in leadership positions, and many college graduates in their early thirties and younger have studied something about Africa in college. In a decade this age-group will dominate middle-range management in the public and private sector. This group is also familiar enough with neo-Marxist rhetoric and analysis to react more calmly than their elders to what are now interpreted as symbols of cold war confrontation.

c) Congressional and public anti-interventionism. The strongest immediate legacy of the Vietnam war is the popular revulsion at the thought of American military intervention anywhere in the Third World. Provision of military supplies, while less salient, is also generally unpopular. The CIA investigations have further diminished the acceptability of clandestine intervention. It will probably take another five years at least before overt or covert intervention becomes a minimally acceptable instrument of policy except in situations demonstrating an overwhelming and obvious threat to important American interests. With particular reference to southern Africa, the U.S. Army and the Marines are likely to have

second thoughts about testing their tenuous success at racial integration by intervening in a black-white conflict.

Such changes do not, of course, affect policy immediately. They, like previous informational inputs, will be filtered through the existing ideological screens of policy-makers and opinion-shapers and will be subject to the impact of events and attitudes which on the surface have nothing to do with Africa. Actions, as opposed to intentions, will be further constrained by limitations of resources, competing priorities, and uncooperative allies.

The General Policy Approach Toward Southern Africa.

Secretary of State Vance's July first speech can be taken as a reasonably accurate reflection of the present administration's interpretation of the southern African situation and an indication of what, on a very general level, it intends to do about it. A comparison with a similar Kissinger presentation of the previous year reveals just how much the present administration has become aware of the changes enumerated above, and also how much the African Bureau has reasserted influence on American policy.

Kissinger's testimony before the House International Relations Committee on 17 June 1976 revealed three points. First, American policy goals in Africa were dominated by the status quo. Three of the four goals cited were phrased negatively: "to avoid a race war"; "to prevent foreign intervention"; "to prevent radicalization." These were reactions to others' initiatives, particularly Soviet and Cuban. Second, nothing in the speech contradicted then current policy of the South African government. South Africa was not even mentioned by name, but presumably was to be a major beneficiary of the one positive policy goal: "to promote peaceful

cooperation among the communities in southern Africa." The inference is that the Republic of South Africa was not part of the problem, but part of the solution. Third, the presentation was dominated by a Manichean dichotomy between "moderates" and "radicals." Moderation was associated with peace, African aspirations, association with the West and maintenance of the existing international economic system, economic development, and a southern African solution brought about through negotiations. Radicalism was associated with violence, external intervention and domination, economic estrangement from the West, poverty, and a southern Africa race war. Africa was seen as an arena in which the West and its local allies must oppose the Soviets and their local allies.

Vance, in contrast, begins with the assertion that American policies must be affirmative and directed toward purely African situations, rather than reactive to non-African initiatives. The Soviets and Cubans receive little more than passing mention. America's interest lies in furthering long-run cooperation with a variety of African regimes, not in countering short-term problems. In that perspective economic and cultural ties between the United States and Africa will outweigh political differences and work to mutual advantage. South Africa is described explicitly as part of the problem, though it is hoped that in its own interest the South African government will seek to join in the solution. Far from being an ally against communism, white regimes promote external intervention; they are a liability. Negotiations are, of course, preferred to violence, but the single specific example of violence is a Rhodesian incursion into Mozambique. African nationalism is presented as intrinsically a positive force whose goals--including the search for "economic rights"--are

congruent with those of the United States. Instead of presenting a moderate-radical dichotomy (the words are never even mentioned), Vance argues that all the major powers should "join us in supporting African nationalism rather than in fragmenting it." The lesson of the Angolan experience is drawn here, and the opposition to nationalist fragmentation has clear application to the Rhodesian and Namibian cases. No more than Kissinger does Vance choose to speak of policy toward American corporate involvement in southern Africa. Andrew Young's early optimism that American business involvement in South Africa will bring about major changes in that country's racial order is not shared within the State Department's African Bureau, though the continuation of such involvement is taken as a practical political necessity.

Perhaps the greatest contrast between Kissinger's and Vance's approach to African policy is one of world view. Unlike Kissinger, Vance proceeds from the assumption that the United States has a tremendous long-term advantage over the Soviet Union in its relations with Africa. Time is on America's side; Soviet military adventures are frantic, if serious, short-term expedients to cover up for their lack of anything positive to offer.

The general policy approach articulated by Vance seems well-anchored in the Carter administration, and should not be viewed as little more than a sop to Andrew Young. Especially with the Vice-President taking formal responsibility for African policy, much high-level prestige is involved. More than contradictory evidence will be required to persuade the executive branch to modify the policy substantially or to abandon it. The most likely cause of reversal would be a combination of well-publicized external events which would stir up Congressional opposition and bring to the fore

of a collapse attaining dramatic proportions, much lower), and the renewal of large-scale civil war in Nigeria and/or a prolonged and bloody Nigerian military invasion of one or more of its neighbors (probability of either occurring on a large scale is quite low). Such violence would not have the same effect if it were to occur in a little-known country, such as Chad or Mauritania, or if it were purely domestic, like the Hutu massacres in Burundi, or if the United States had elaborately extricated itself and washed its hands of the whole affair, as in Ethiopia, whose violent collapse is quite likely. The return of large-scale starvation to parts of Africa and the spread of a popular image of black Africa as an international basket case may not only increase the possibility of large-scale violence, but make Congress more sensitive to any untoward events on the continent and less responsive to African wishes in political affairs.

3) Decline in salience of southern African issues for black African states. It is conceivable, though very doubtful, that a more or less peaceful transition of Rhodesia and South West Africa to black rule, together with preoccupying troubles in the major black African states to the north, might remove any incentive for Washington to put pressure on the South African regime. Only slightly more likely would be the installation of regimes with impeccable radical credentials in Windhoek and Salisbury (presumably renamed) which then relied heavily on South Africa for economic growth and agreed to damp down black African criticism. While the South African government has rosy visions of something like this occurring, their visions exclude the likelihood that blacks within South Africa will continue to make so much public trouble for the regime that the rest of black Africa will continue to care.

4) Dramatic changes within South Africa which divide the United States from major allies. Among the scenarios quietly discussed in South Africa is the abrogation of the constitution and the enforced unilateral partition of the country, in which Africans would receive substantially more land than the homelands now are allotted, together with limited rights for some within a few common areas. The African Bureau would almost certainly oppose such a policy, as would most of black Africa (while the Soviet Union cheered everyone on from the sidelines). France, Britain, West Germany, plus important lesser powers like Israel and Iran, might decide to go along with such an initiative out of a combination of weariness and short-term needs. The spectre of American isolation in the Western alliance in opposition to a policy whose backers claim it is needed to "prevent a racial bloodbath" would provide the strongest single challenge to the administration's general policy approach, and little more would be needed to force a reorientation toward assuring "white survival." The probability of such a dramatic change occurring in the next five years is very small, but it could appear more likely over the next ten years. The probability of America's allies siding with a new regime against the United States also is low.

With all of these eventualities put together, it still seems highly probable that the administration's general policy approach will survive Carter's present term in office. If it does, it should have entered firmly enough into the bureaucratic and political routine that it should be able to survive through the next presidential term, even if Carter is not the president. Even if the general approach is upset, two important changes are likely to have been brought about, at least in part through

The approaches in both the Rhodesian and the South West African cases are multi-lateral, and multi-level as well. The United States thus has comparatively little scope for dramatic initiatives in dealing with either situation, nor has any party the power unilaterally to impose a settlement, since United Nations acceptance of any permanent arrangement is required in both cases. The efforts are conducted in a low-key manner, which partially belies their breadth and complexity. In addition, in its relations with the populations directly to be affected by the eventual shape of the settlement agreements, the United States and its mediating partners must deal on a continuous basis with the leaders of the front line states on the one hand and the South African government on the other.

The front line states, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, have been allocated a difficult role of speaking for the nationalist movements, counseling and gently pressuring them toward a solution, informally guaranteeing their good behavior, and at the same time providing basic support for the movements. Understandably, they have diverged in their understanding of the role, in their emphasis on its different parts, and on their willingness and ability to play any part of it. Nevertheless, the United States sees them, all of them, as a necessary part of any settlement process. They are needed first to pressure the nationalistic movements as best they can to accept less than their leaders really want. (Angola here has a particularly important role to play in delivering SWAPO's assent to a South West African solution.) Second, their joint agreement is needed to bring about United Nations acceptance and to obviate obstruction within the Organization of African Unity, as well as to allow the wobbly states of Zimbabwe and Namibia to begin life in as supportive a

regional setting as can be contrived. Each of the five frontline governments has serious internal problems which make settlements highly desirable, but also make it that much harder for them to appear to pressure the nationalist movements to accept a compromise. Only Botswana and possibly Zambia could afford for domestic political reasons to back a settlement that could be interpreted as a sell-out to the whites.

South Africa. United States policy is involved in a complex relationship with South Africa. Although South Africa's domestic policy is perceived as very much part of the problem in southern Africa, it is a part which no one pretends is susceptible of solution in the short run. Meanwhile, South Africa is essential to a settlement in South West Africa and is capable of forcing, or alternatively of greatly complicating, a settlement in Rhodesia. Kissinger approached southern Africa by providing South Africa with quiet and effective support, punctuated with occasional ritual and non-specific denunciations of apartheid in the United Nations, usually in South Africa's absence. His policy was one of persuading South Africa, as one would a difficult old friend, to alter minor aspects of its behavior which distress others. The present administration's policy involves serious public confrontation and the threat of effective pressure. The public confrontation is designed in part to guarantee the United States' bona fides with the frontline states and those north of the Zambezi and to establish a basis for the long-term cooperation discussed above, but also to make it easier for the black African states to accept a compromise solution in Rhodesia and South West Africa. The confrontation and the threats of more quietly

effective pressure are also intended to prepare the way for long-term serious change within South Africa. It is calculated in Washington that without such external compulsion the South African government will not take effective action, particularly in South West Africa where Vorster has had to overcome a deep personal antipathy to any dealings with SWAPO. No one seriously expects any major domestic changes to result promptly from the confrontation; indeed it is expected that South African politicians will indulge in a fair amount of "kicking and screaming and doing silly things" (as one official put it), but that most of this will be short-term and rhetorical, and none of it will affect important external negotiations. Further, it is assumed that any short-term negative reactions would be outweighed by the positive benefits of allowing South African leaders to blame the United States for forcing them to do what they knew they would have to do anyway. Somewhat less confidently it is also calculated that public confrontation will in the longer term encourage more flexible and <u>verligte</u> politicians to emerge to replace the present generation. Although confrontation is used as an instrument of policy, it is also true that following the Soweto uprising and massacres of 1976 it would have been difficult for any American administration to avoid publicly disapproving the South African regime.*

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*A comparison of the statements made at the United Nations by the American representatives following the Sharpeville shooting of 1960 and the Soweto uprising of 1976 suggests how much rhetoric has changed. The 1960 statement cited precedents with regard to Tibet, a scattering of UN resolutions, the right of every nation to control its internal affairs, the existence of special circumstances, and almost in passing, regrets for "the tragic loss of life in South Africa." The July 19, 1976 statement simply blamed what happened on South Africa's policy of apartheid.

The most important form of confrontation behavior that the United States has undertaken is symbolic and rhetorical. Andrew Young, far from being the unguided missile portrayed in the American and particularly the South African press, has played an effective role in shocking the South Africans loose from their preconceptions about American policy and setting up the equally tough, though rhetorically more restrained, messages from Mondale and Vance. The most important symbolic changes are the explicit identification of South Africa as a liability in the West's opposition to the spread of communism, and less explicit suggestions that black nationalists within South Africa are seen as America's natural allies in the long run. In practical political terms the most important American initiative is its intransigent refusal to recognize the independence of any of the Bantu homelands. This has been a major blow to the cornerstone of South African domestic policy, and is very unlikely to be reversed, even if South Africa were substantially to modify the economic and political conditions of its independence.

American policy has changed little with regard to more tangible matters, though South Africa has been made aware that significant stiffening of policy cannot be excluded. The administration will probably adhere more firmly to its unilateral arms embargo by restricting more carefully the sale of "dual use" equipment, such as small arms and civilian aircraft. It is unlikely that the United States will alter its opposition to a formal United Nations arms embargo, but will seek to extract more concessions from Pretoria as annual payment for blocking such resolutions in the Security Council. As part of its overall international policy on nuclear matters, the Carter administration will

continue to be much less forthcoming than its predecessors in sharing nuclear information and technology with South Africa.

American economic policy is likely to remain much the same, with the administration resisting somewhat more firmly than its precedessors business attempts to obtain Eximbank financing in support of sales to South Africa. Although it has no sturdy strings to pull, the administration is likely not to encourage private bank lending to South Africa, and perhaps will move informally to discourage loans of the size made in 1975-76. (Until the South African economy improves substantially, banks are not likely to show much enthusiasm for that high volume of lending, anyway.) The threat of IMF gold sales may again be used as a quiet source of pressure against South Africa. Overall, the State Department's position that it "neither encourages nor discourages American investment in South Africa" is likely to remain in force. Informal pressures will be maintained on large American businesses in South Africa to subscribe to the code of good conduct, though there will be no direct penalties for those who do not. Only a concerted and firm stand by all credible shades of South African black opinion would persuade the United States government to restrict severely American trade and investment. Such a concerted stand is unlikely without such substantial changes in the South African political scene that business enthusiasm for further investment would decline on its own. It is of course evident to the South Africans that any expansion of sanctions against Rhodesia or South West Africa would have unpleasant consequences for the South African economy, either directly, or through the greater

organization will play a major role toward the end of the next decade in forcing structural changes; external organization will play a lesser role, though the existence of black-ruled Zimbabwe and Namibia on South Africa's borders will constitute a source of political reassurance for South African blacks and of political concern for whites. Guerrilla incursions from these territories and from Mozambique are not likely to pose a serious threat to South Africa. The South African army can defend its territory from the Orange and Limpopo River boundaries as well, if not better, than from the Cunene and Zambezi Rivers. Furthermore, Zimbabwe's dependence on South African communication links, and probably also on capital and technical assistance, are likely to be almost as great as Rhodesia's. Namibia will be not quite so dependent as is South West Africa, but it will hardly pose a military threat.

The United States wants to be in a position to influence future black South African leadership, and is prepared to risk alienating present white leadership on the reasonable grounds that they are going to have to change anyway, and that meanwhile they have nowhere else to turn for support. There is a confident assumption that the United States can establish good relations with South African blacks, and that America's black population, which through its black power theorists and other more direct contacts has already had a major influence on South African youth, will be an important element in these future relations. This assumption may be optimistic, but it seems a good gamble.

The South African government complains that the United States is not clear about what precisely it expects South Africa to do it its internal affairs. Their complaint is justified, but to little avail. It is highly

unlikely that the United States will spell out in any detail a practical series of steps for South Africa to take. The two governments' positions are much too far apart for that. What does seem reasonably clear is what is, and is likely to remain, unacceptable to the United States. The United States will refuse any expression of international identification with South Africa until that country has introduced very substantial changes which go considerably further than anything contemplated by the present leadership. While the removal of the daily humiliations of petty apartheid will be welcomed (even publicly), they will not suffice to reverse basic American policy. No variant of a homeland policy, even an objectively generous one, will be acceptable so long as it is unilaterally proclaimed. No other permanent arrangement which does not involve free and open black participation in its negotiation will be supported.

South West Africa/Namibia. United States policy in the South West African dispute has been to present itself as a broker between the South Africans on one side and SWAPO, the principal African nationalist group on the other. In this endeavor it has been in a curiously asymmetric position, however. It has had continuing contact with South Africa, but only very intermittent and not overly cordial contact with SWAPO; it has sought, nevertheless, to bring South Africa to accept most of SWAPO's demands. The United States has supported the United Nations' contention that the U.N. rather than South Africa, has legal responsibility for the territory, but in recent years has more often than not acted to keep the United Nations from involving itself directly in South West African issues, while using the threat of greater U.N. involvement as a goad to obtain South African concessions.

American brokerage has been carried out in concert with other Western powers; the United States joined with Britain and France in 1975 to pressure South Africa into making concessions that led to the Turnhalle talks (after twice jointly vetoing U.N. resolutions calling for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa). In 1977 the team was strengthened with the addition of Canada and West Germany (the other Western members of the Security Council), and obtained further concessions from South Africa that make it seem quite possible that an independent and internationally recognized Namibia will in fact emerge by the end of 1978. Nevertheless, formidable obstacles remain to be overcome.

The immediate goals sought by the United States and its Western allies are limited and relatively straightforward. Since the United States now has few investments in the territory (principally those of Newmont Mining and AMAX in the Tsumeb mining complex), its immediate concerns are to establish a politically stable regime which will provide the basis for long-term cooperation, including particularly access to the substantial mineral wealth as yet unexploited. Consistent with its general approach and with African and United Nations demands, the United States holds firmly to the principle that Namibia should become independent as a single state under the control of a central government. It would not oppose a substantial measure of local autonomy in social matters, nor political representation on a regional (read ethnic) basis, but would absolutely refuse a constitution guaranteeing separate sovereignty to any part of Namibia or constituting the country as a loose confederation of ethnic homelands. The United States will further insist that all political parties be allowed to campaign for election to the new government and that the United Nations have some role

in setting up elections. This means particularly that SWAPO, its external as well as internal wings, must be allowed to participate freely, but that SWAPO is not to be treated as if it were in fact "the sole authentic representative of the people of Namibia" as it has been declared by the United Nations Council on Namibia.

The five-power Western initiative has achieved considerable success in the last few months. South Africa took the better part of a year from the time it promised action on an independence constitution to reach the point of convening the Turnhalle talks on the basis of tame ethnic representation and with SWAPO excluded, and then allowed the talks to drag on for a year and a half before coming up with a proposal for independence which favored South African and white interests. Following the most recent demands, South Africa has now in effect repudiated Turnhalle and appointed a non-political judge as Administrator-General of the territory to speed on the transitional period. South Africa has agreed to the principle of "unitary independence" by the end of December 1978, with United Nations "involvement" in (though not necessarily supervision of) elections. SWAPO, in turn, has expressed cautious "appreciation" of the Western initiative, while the OAU, in a move that should be repeated in the United Nations, has symbolically demoted SWAPO to the status of the "sole active liberation movement" for Namibia.

Four major issues have yet to be resolved for the transitional period. South Africa seeks to maintain all symbolic representations of their administrative sovereignty during the transition, while SWAPO seeks to maximize the United Nations presence. Withdrawal of the 12,000-15,000 South African troops in the territory is the most acute issue, which will probably be resolved by reduction in their total number and restriction to base of the

rest, in exchange for a cessation of SWAPO armed incursions. Amnesty and release of political prisoners is another difficult point. South Africa accepts that it will have to release SWAPO prisoners, but insists that dissident SWAPO members held in Zambia and Tanzania be released at the same time and allowed to participate in the elections. South Africa will probably achieve at least a symbolic victory on this one. Finally, South Africa insists that Walvis Bay, the only important port in South West Africa, is legally a part of South Africa, since it was never part of the old German colony. Its legal position seems strong, and it will probably cling to Walvis Bay as an eventual tradeoff for later concessions from an independent Namibian government.

The West's principal lever is the creation of an international fund to aid the new state in getting on its feet; both sides accept the necessity for such aid and are at least dimly aware that the United States Congress is unlikely to contribute enthusiastically if either side shows extreme intransigence. Even more important is the feeling on both sides that they need a settlement soon. South Africa has conceded fully the principle of independence, and Angola, Tanzania and Zambia, backed by less immediately involved African states, want to get at least one group of freedom fighters out of their countries. SWAPO is not making the military progress it expected, and is having great difficulty in implanting itself in southern Angola, most of which is now controlled by UNITA forces which have been as successful in protecting their Ovimbundu base against SWAPO as against the Cuban and government forces.

Even with agreement, many things can go wrong during and immediately following the transition. The United Nations, which has only just begun planning for its role, is quite capable of mishandling the transition

and the elections. Electoral or ethnic violence might well bring South African security forces into action. A massive flight of whites is a remote possibility, but not one to be discounted absolutely.

None of this, however, is likely to change the long-term outcome. Namibia will be independent in a few years at most. It will be a tenuously integrated country, poor in human resources, and obliged to concentrate on working out a pattern of relationships between the half of the population that is Ovambo and everyone else. Some variant of SWAPO will be the dominant political force in the country, but any government will for years be heavily dependent on outsiders--probably a mixture of South Africans and United Nations advisers--to carry out central administration. The United Nations will continue for a short while to exercise some special concern for Namibia, but any new government will soon try to shake loose from a constraining tutelary relationship. SWAPO's vague socialist doctrine is unlikely to have a major effect on the organization of the economy for a considerable time, though for practical as well as doctrinal reasons the Namibian government is likely to proceed slowly in granting major mining concessions to foreign firms. In a decade, Namibia might resemble something between Botswana and Zambia in social and economic development.

This projection may turn out to be very wrong, but it is the one which guides United States policy in the short run. It has no specific policy toward Namibia in the long run. The American government may commit its prestige, a small amount of money, and much bureaucratic activity to facilitating a transition, but it has now no intention of

staking much of anything on developing a special relationship with or responsibility for Namibia over the long haul.

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. This is the most immediately difficult problem of them all for United States policy. The complications are enormous, but they are principally short-run and tactical complications. There is really very little doubt, in Washington at least, that white Rhodesia's string has about run out. Unlike South West Africa, where South Africa could hang on indefinitely if it were willing to pay the political price, Rhodesia is being brought to its knees by military action. Now, with Botswana joining Mozambique and Zambia as a staging ground for guerrilla operations, only the shortest of Rhodesia's borders is militarily secure. As in most guerrilla wars, the insurgent forces are unable to invade and hold territory, but they have succeeded in disrupting social and economic life, not least through forcing such a high level of white conscription as to make the continuation of ordinary economic activities difficult. Close to 1500 whites are reported to be emigrating each month, a large proportion of them being young families essential for the continuation of economic and military operations. Guerrilla forces, on the other hand, are increasing rapidly; arms are coming through as needed, and most important, the forces are beginning to get something more than the cursory military training with which they were earlier sent out into the field. Whatever factional fights may continue to plague the Zimbabwe liberation forces, their combined pressure on the white regime and on white society seems certain to increase.

Working in concert with Britain (under the legal fiction that Rhodesia is still a British colonial responsibility), United States policy is conceptually very simple. It seeks to obtain agreement of all the important contending groups on a constitutional outline with a "justiciable bill of rights" and to set up an interim, politically neutral administration, whose sole purpose would be to prepare and conduct elections on a one-man-one-vote basis before handing over power to the winners of the election. All factions, including whites and the guerrillas now outside the country, would be eligible to present candidates and vote in the elections. The United States would join with other Western countries to establish a substantial fund to allow the new government to make a stable transition to a new political order.

The principal problem all along in obtaining the necessary agreement has been the fragmentation of black nationalist leadership and organization. The splits continue--between the "internal" (Muzorewa and Sithole) factions and the "external (Popular Front) factions; between the Nkomo and Mugabe factions of the Popular Front; between the actual guerrilla fighters (led by Tongogara et al.) and all the politicians; and between different ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. (These problems will be discussed in the Rotberg paper.) The divisions among blacks are now finding an echo in the divisions among whites, whose magnitude will become clearer after the August 31 elections.

The constitution itself has not provided a major point of contention, although Smith will presumably maintain his opposition to universal suffrage until after the election. Opposition on this point is substantively irrational, since no matter what the formula whites will be massively

outvoted, and the rural Africans who would be excluded under a qualified franchise are likely to be the most conservative of the potential black voters. Although black spokesmen have objected publicly to the transitional fund as a reward to white racists for holding out, the fund should contain enough rewards for the new government to overcome these objections.

The transitional arrangement is the prime sticking point, particularly those parts which concern physical security and control of armed force. Whites fear that the "terrorists" will be allowed to run wild, and the Sithole and Muzorewa factions fear the "freedom fighters'" coercive influence on the electorate. The Popular Front politicians fear that their men will be disarmed, and that the whites will, in effect, stage a coup to re-establish themselves in power. All the fears are well-founded. Washington and London are seeking for a deus ex machina to "hold the ring," but are having difficulty in finding an appropriate set of divinely neutral and competent ring-holders. The United States has refused to play any direct administrative or military role in the transition, or even to provide logistic support, out of concern that this would provide the Soviets with an excuse to intervene, and out of certainty that Congress would refuse to go along. On July 13 the left and the right wings of the British cabinet combined to refuse to allow British forces or administrators to participate, despite the pleas of Foreign Secretary Owen. As of this writing Nigeria and Canada are being encouraged to spearhead a Commonwealth force, though neither country seems to be jumping at the chance.

problem the government will face. A food-exporting Zimbabwe will be a major regional asset; collapse of the rural economy will bring disastrous economic consequences to the country, whatever happens to the mining and industrial sectors of the economy. None of Zimbabwe's neighbors offers a very attractive agricultural model for a new government to follow, and none of the contending nationalist leaders has had time to give much serious thought to details of what he would like to do with the rural sector.

The most direct link between the American and Zimbabwean economies will, of course, be through the mining and industrial sectors, and the United States government can be expected routinely to encourage American corporations to pick up and extend their investments. If a new black government reacts against the Japanese and Germans for their past economic support of the Smith regime, the opportunities for American corporations may be very good, indeed. Over the longer haul, however, the United States government is likely to be more concerned with assuring access to Zimbabwe's minerals, chromite in particular, than in safeguarding the proprietary interest of any American multinational corporation. The nationalization arrangements worked out between the copper producers and Zambia are likely to provide a powerful precedent. Since this is an issue on which Congress is likely to get involved, the final shape of United States policy cannot be easily predicted.

The "Peaceful Nationalism" scenario is obviously what the United States government would prefer. Politically and bureaucratically a peaceful nationalist government would be the easiest to deal with; it might be marginally more technically competent than a government which

sought to portray itself as more radical. There is a fair chance that such a government would be more accommodating to American corporate interests (or at least that it would be pleasanter to do business with). It would be much easier to get aid appropriations out of Congress for a peaceful nationalist government than for a government which insisted on making Marxist noises. But in the longer haul, a solidly established nationalist government of almost any ideological coloration is quite as likely as another to be difficult on basic Third World commodity price issues if the whole pattern of North-South relations deteriorates. Since from the present perspective it is impossible to predict which of the contending leaders, if any, would be most conducive to leading a peaceful nationalist regime, the United States sees no incentive in getting involved in backing one or more over the others.

Despite the cautiously optimistic tone in the African Bureau, protracted, violent conflict between blacks and whites (scenario A) or between blacks and blacks (scenario B) are ominous possibilities. Of the two, the former potentially has the less serious consequences for Zimbabwean society and for United States policy. Despite the "racial bloodbath" fears, white Rhodesians are unlikely to be killed in larger numbers than the English were in Kenya or French civilians in Algeria if the present war grinds on for another three or four years before it is ended, probably by the Rhodesian army and police refusing to go on. The United States would be embarrassed and rightly worried, but unless massive Soviet military assistance came into play, Washington would probably merely step up its present policy of pressuring South Africa to make it difficult for white Rhodesia to fight on. Most whites would

probably leave, but a few would stay. From an economic point of view the rural sector would be most seriously affected. Foreigners, mostly Europeans, would be recruited to manage (or re-establish) industries and mines. Something resembling economic and political order, if not prosperity, could be established within two years of Zimbabwe's independence. The State Department would presumably be eager to provide funds for reconstruction, though Congress could rise in indignation against rewarding murderers and communists, and delay such funds for a year or two. South Africa, after some difficult moments, would probably open quiet talks with the new regime, which would most likely welcome regular economic relationships with the "racists" across Beit Bridge.

The most disruptive outcome would be protracted violent combat between rival black political groups. This would almost certainly take on an ethnic dimension and result in widespread loss of civilian life, with a high probability of physical destruction of white as well as black property. Whites would probably leave in nearly the same numbers as in the previously considered case, but it would take longer to establish a minimal level of economic and political order. State Department policy would be directed above all else to diminishing the great-power dimension of the conflict, at least initially by refusing to be drawn into backing exclusively any one faction. As seems to be the tendency now, there would be a slight tilt toward Joshua Nkomo, in part precisely because he has the strongest historic link with the Soviet Union and by supporting him the United States would remove one incentive for the Soviets to intervene directly. Again, this policy might be undercut by Congress, swayed in part by South African opinion which at present portrays Nkomo as a

cross between Lenin and Idi Amin. Overall, the general policy approach would suggest that the United States stay as uninvolved in the details of the fighting as possible, and that it resolutely support the winner--whoever he might be.

Two serious contingencies could badly complicate American policy if either form of protracted conflict occurs. If white civilians appear to be in serious danger, whatever the reality behind the appearance, South Africa might feel impelled for domestic political reasons to mount a military rescue mission. Although militarily feasible, in that South African forces could roam almost at will through the Rhodesian countryside even with a few thousand Cubans in the way, it would be a logistical nightmare to round up more than a few thousand of the dispersed white population and take them across the border. Black African states would interpret such a move as a white invasion. The United States would be in a serious bind. The State Department would presumably strongly deplore the action, but might have great difficulty from public and Congressional opinion in doing more. The result of any such action would be the embittering of black-white relations in southern Africa and the decisive lessening of the chances that Zimbabwe and South Africa would work out a mutually beneficial modus vivendi.

Even more serious for the United States would be heavy Cuban or Soviet overt military involvement in Zimbabwe, perhaps as a result of a South African rescue mission. A sudden involvement of external communist forces beyond the combat batallion level would signal the failure of the present general policy approach, and could inspire a wide range of American reactions, with the military gaining an increasing voice in policy

Conclusion

In sum, a newly optimistic spirit in Washington, product of changes in both America and Africa, has led the present administration to embrace a southern African general policy approach closely patterned on the preferences of the State Department's African Bureau. Underneath the new spirit and a few stylistic peculiarities lies what is basically a conservative policy derived from a respectably long tradition. The United States seeks to deal with whatever are the dominant powers in the area, only now the most immediate powers are black governments. Western European interest in the area is encouraged, and at times the European nations are enlisted to carry out tasks that the United States feels unable to do alone, or at all. While the United States will try to work with anyone in the area, it will seek to avoid close identification with any government or any contending faction. As before, it seeks economic advantage, but increasingly this advantage is sought over the long run. Prosperous black states and long-term access to mineral resources are considered more important than short-term corporate profits and private American ownership of the means of production.

This policy approach is not fully shared by Congress or other parts of the executive branch, but has a good chance of surviving at least through the next seven and a half years. While the election of a conservative Republican president would certainly change the spirit and style of American policy toward southern Africa, its broad outlines would likely survive a mere change of administration. What would most thoroughly undo the general policy approach would be a prolonged and direct Soviet-American military confrontation anywhere in the world or a sharp

and costly confrontation with the Third World over the provision of vital commodities. America does not seem willing to commit substantial public economic resources to Africa, and especially seeks to keep the military component of its foreign policy low. Unless it is very lucky, events in southern Africa may require Washington to reconsider these preferences, or to abandon some preferred outcomes.

United States policy toward any country in southern Africa is part of a continent-wide policy, indeed part of a larger policy toward the Third World and toward competition with the Soviet Union. What happens in southern Africa, and particularly in Rhodesia over the next few years, will affect and be affected by all of these wider areas.