

**Symposium on
China after Mao:
The Global Implications**

A Summary Report by
William H. Overholt

**SEVEN
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THE GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

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Seven Springs Center
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A Report of the Proceedings

by

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Preface

Seven Springs Center's aim is to promote scholarship, creativity, and understanding in matters of major intellectual, cultural, and public significance. To this end it sponsors symposia that bring together persons in academia, the professions, business, and government, to seek mutual enlightenment and to stimulate dialogue about where America is on particular issues, where we are heading and why, and what the processes and priorities should be. A search for consensus is avoided; the diversity which characterizes most discussions at Seven Springs is a reflection of the way the American body politic actually functions.

To encourage candor and ensure privacy, there is no "live" reporting of the formal proceedings. An account that maintains the privacy of the original dialogue can, however, serve to enlighten a wider audience of both scholars and decision-makers in the world of affairs, and to stimulate further study and action-oriented discussion.

The Center expresses its thanks to Dr. Overholt for a highly readable and useful summary of the discussion of a topic whose complexities are equalled only by the imponderables lurking throughout its structure. A significant variety of perceptions and perspectives was expressed, as was the aim: the difficulty of coming by hard, dependable "facts" about China today and tomorrow--and about what the Soviet Union's and the United States' initiatives and responses are or should be--was a feature, both of the formal sessions and of the continuing, informal dialogues that the setting inspires and

encourages.

Seven Springs is also indebted to Ambassador Joseph Palmer 2nd, Associate of the Center for International Programs, for his patient and perceptive preparation of the agenda and assembling of the group.

Finally, the Center acknowledges with gratitude the support of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Charles F. Kettering Foundation. Their grants made possible the enterprise, including this report.

Joseph N. Greene, Jr.

President

Seven Springs Center

Mount Kisco, New York

May 1977

RAPPORTEUR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This paper is an Executive Summary of the Seven Springs Conference on China after Mao. I have made no attempt to follow the original chronology of remarks or to structure the paper after the structure of the conference. I have taken a very active view of the rapporteur's role, reorganizing arguments, filling in gaps, and occasionally making observations not made at the conference itself. But I have also made a determined effort to identify the major controversies and to state all sides of each crucial argument with a force at least equal to that of its original propounder.

-- William H. Overholt

Seven Springs Center

Symposium on

China After Mao: The Global Implications

February 24-26, 1977

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CHINA AFTER MAO: THE GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

After the death of Mao Tse-tung, China must face a crisis of succession to a charismatic leader whose national role was at least as large in China as that of Lenin and Stalin combined in the Soviet Union. The succession crisis is greatly complicated by the decade-old legacy of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a legacy that includes political factionalism, the disintegration of the Communist Party, the rise of disorder and disobedience, and an economy plagued by political disorder and a policy discontinuity.

The combined problems of succession crisis and Cultural Revolution legacy are most evident in the contrast between the continued use of Maoism as the basis of political legitimacy and the un-Maoist policies being pursued in several areas. Quotation from the Thoughts of Chairman Mao remains a preferred method of supporting any given policy, but concrete policies frequently ignore Mao's specific prescriptions. Military modernization is emphasizing technological effectiveness and conventional professional skill rather than political mobilization and mass will. Under one of China's senior scientists, the educational system appears likely to move toward a higher emphasis on professionalism at the cost of Maoist egalitarian ideals. Even at the level of abstract ideology, there appears to be some effort to deemphasize the exclusive role of Mao. For the first time Mao is paired with Chou En-lai on a basis near equality, and Mao is now treated in much of the media as just one of a chain of Marxist thinkers including Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin as well as himself. Lin Piao's theory of genius, which most explicitly treated

Mao as a unique historical figure, has come under explicit criticism. Nonetheless, some of Mao's most controversial concrete policies, such as sending urban youth to the countryside and forming provincial revolutionary committees according to the so-called three-in-one combination, continue to be implemented. And the egalitarian ideals of Mao continue to command respect among much of the Chinese population.

China confronts its problems with certain basic strengths. Despite the weakening of Mao's authority in specific fields, the near-universal acceptance of his thought as the basis of legitimacy constitutes an important strength. Despite the instability of the top leadership, much of the society is stable and there are no challenges to the established order such as those Hungary and other Eastern European countries faced in 1956. With the fall of the Gang of Four, and the apparent revelation that the power of the radical leadership depended critically, although not exclusively, upon the personal support Chairman Mao, there seems a real possibility that China can move gradually away from the extreme factional strife that has been the chief legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Enough people have served in the party organization and the government, and in trade and other foreign-oriented roles, to create a critical mass of people who understand modern organization and modern technology and advocate modern economic rationality. A basic pattern of decision-making has been institutionalized for specific issues such as agricultural and energy development: the Chinese convene conferences and exchange views, then issue directives, implement the directives, and as necessary engage in criticism and repeat the cycle.

These accomplishments provide foundation stones upon which China's polity and economy can develop, but problems remain so numerous and so large that major failures remain possible and major leaders remain vulnerable. The procedures by which the largest scale resource allocations are made remain more obscure, more controversial, and less institutionalized than the process of making decisions within sectors. China's senior leadership has become a gerontocracy facing a generational struggle; a majority of Politburo members died of old age in the 18 months after April 1975. The inevitable diminution of central authority caused by Mao's passing has been greatly exacerbated by the instability and pettiness of the leadership factions during 1976, and this diminution of the center has magnified the other rifts in Chinese society. The relationship of the military to the civilian leadership remains ambiguous and conflictful--as it has since the military intervened to suppress Cultural Revolution disorders in 1967. The provinces and regions of China, always propelled by powerful centrifugal forces, now move even more strongly in orbits that appear aberrant from Peking; moreover, they represent a major constituency for Teng Hsiao-p'ing in his struggle with Hua Kuo-feng. The pinnacle of radical leadership has been banished with the Gang of Four, but Chinese radicalism has deep historic roots that are impossible to eliminate, and the Gang of Four had followers so numerous that they cannot be totally removed from power. The radicalism of the egalitarian idealists, the radicalism of youth who resent being sent to the countryside, and the potential radicalism of lower class reactions to more pragmatic and less egalitarian social policies, will remain a quasi-permanent threat to any Chinese leadership.

Hua Kuo-feng faces these problems on the one hand as the man who must hold the line against decisive de-Maoization of Chinese society and on the other hand as a man who personally symbolizes no doctrine, as a man who must run his country's government and security forces but who possesses no major power base in either the government or the military. To these dilemmas he brings a history of formidable political talent (epitomized by success at eliminating his opponents above and below him), together with authoritative skills in the areas of agriculture, birth control, security, and finance. He retains control of the police in his continuing position as Minister of Public Security. He can capitalize upon the military's intense desire to create a consensus in the provinces and to suppress factionalism in the interest of national security. He has jailed his opponents on the Left (the Gang of Four) after ousting his superior on the Right (Teng Hsiao-p'ing). Nonetheless, both political flanks remain vulnerable, and in Mao's absence Hua is particularly vulnerable to the organizational power which Teng Hsiao-p'ing can mobilize in the Party, in the army, and in the government.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing has the support of military advocates of military modernization, of economic advocates of technological rationality and rapid development, and of officials damaged by the Cultural Revolution and fearful of radical egalitarianism. He can draw upon the support of much of the provincial leadership, which he installed during the period when he ran the government. Hua's ascent to power at Teng's expense, and Hua's role as the defender of remaining egalitarian ideals against Teng's pragmatism, make the two leaders irreconcilable adversaries.

Hua has sought to rehabilitate Teng but to keep him in subordinate roles. Teng rejected an offer, soon after the fall of the Gang of Four, of rehabilitation as a plain party member with a clean slate. Then in December 1976 he rejected an offer from Hua to be Vice Premier. A mass movement in January 1977 to offer him a higher position was squelched at the end of January, but Teng remained insistent upon obtaining a senior government position paired with a senior Communist Party position. But Teng also possesses crucial weaknesses, namely a reputation for vindictive personal relationships and a collection of powerful enemies acquired over many decades, which lead many Chinese to fear the controversy and infighting which would accompany the rise to power of Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Until the struggle between Hua and Teng is resolved, there can be no plenum and thus no firm legitimacy for the highest level policies by which China is governed.

From this combination of societal and personal cleavages and problems arise three great dangers for Chinese society. The first and perhaps least serious of these is social disintegration caused by the waning of central authority and the rise of provincial power. It has become popular in Taipei and Hong Kong to theorize that China is simply too large and too diverse to be governable and that some form of disintegration must sooner or later occur. Such an outcome is not totally impossible, but the inevitabilism that accompanies this theory fails to consider that, along with the scale of its problems, China has also improved its level of economic development, its communications, and its political organization to an extent that makes cohesion possible.

The other two great dangers go together. Historically, China's governments have experienced bureaucratic ossification and decay after an initial period of creative development, and the scale and complexity of today's China make great bureaucracies an even more omnipresent social problem than they were in the past. Whether the Party can maintain a separate identity and an ability to keep the bureaucracy doing society's work rather than vice versa remains to be seen. And the rational bureaucratic social policies so applauded in the West carry with them a third danger, namely that the inegalitarian consequences of technical rationality might drive much of the population to support the radicals. China's radical egalitarianism has been irrational only in a very narrow sense. Narrow professionalism and simple growth-maximizing policies would have opened great social rifts, such as those which were developing in pre-1949 China, and the people whose interests were abandoned proved sufficiently numerous to take their vengeance. Radical egalitarianism mobilized China into political coherence and pointed the Chinese poor in the direction of modernity. Whatever flaws the Maoist vision had, and it had many, it provided the political base in whose absence technical rationality would have been swept aside in political disorder, and it directed the peasantry away from a cyclical world view toward a vision of an ever-improving, rationally directed future. Any wholesale abandonment of the ideals which mobilized these people in the past and constitute their immediate interests in the present would risk social upheaval. Chinese leaders can channel these political forces but not reverse them.

Chinese leaders' latitude in channeling political forces is sharply constrained by the requirements of the economy, which desperately needs capital, technology, increased agricultural production, higher living standards, and a reduction of population growth. These economic requirements compete with the political imperatives of egalitarianism and of local and national self-reliance. China addresses these problems against a background that includes continuation of the political uncertainty that contributed to the poor 1976 showing. (In 1976 GNP grew 3 percent and industrial output grew 5 percent, halving China's recent average growth. Agricultural production remained constant in 1976 while population continued to grow.) The new Five Year Plan, intended originally to begin in 1976, was still being debated in early 1977. The prospect is for 1977 to be a year of fixing problems and forming plans, followed by what Chinese planners hope will be some economic resurgence in 1978, leading gradually toward a development take-off by 1980.

The Shape of Chinese Foreign Policies After Mao

The above domestic political and economic imperatives are principal determinants of Chinese foreign policy. Domestic politics continues to dominate foreign policy. Trade is constrained by the imperatives of egalitarianism and self-reliance, but also rises or decreases in accordance with the interpretations different leaders put upon these restraints. China's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the West can vary enormously depending upon the leadership faction which rules China. Moreover, many of the most crucial characteristics of Chinese domestic politics are projected into the

international sphere. The Chinese bring to the negotiating table a long time-perspective and its accompanying patience, thereby putting at a disadvantage an impatient West which seeks to resolve issues like Taiwan in very short periods of time. They also bring to international affairs a psychological conception of power, quite different from the U.S. emphasis on the concrete and quantifiable (megatons, population, gross national product...), and with it an ability to succeed occasionally despite some forms of quantitative inferiority; witness their triumph over the numerically superior Kuomintang, their steadfast facing down of the Soviet Union with its superior nuclear power, and their apparent confidence throughout the Vietnam war. (On the other hand, the Korean war and various economic ventures have taught the utility of modern technology.) The most basic tactics of international competition are also borrowed from revolutionary domestic experience, most notably the united front policy in which the Chinese identify a principal enemy and then seek to mobilize those friends and other opponents in common cause against that single enemy.

China's foreign policies under Hua Kuo-feng will apparently be implemented by a strong and highly competent organization. Huang Hua, the new Foreign Minister, earned widespread respect during his term at the United Nations, and strong subordinates back him up. By early 1977 they were already bringing crucial innovations to Chinese foreign policy, sending Madam Chou En-lai to Burma, indicating some willingness to discuss American economic claims, improving relations with India, and dealing effectively with the European Economic Community.

Behind the Foreign Ministry is a technologically weak but modernizing military. As an official policy, technological modernization of the Chinese military has remained controversial, with 1975 directives on modernization withdrawn during 1976, but in fact the 1975 directives merely certified three previous years of technological improvement, and withdrawal of the directives has not halted modernization. The acquisition from abroad of computers, jet engines, and other militarily useful technology has proceeded rapidly. Policy statements and model military units increasingly stress military effectiveness rather than ideological soundness as the criterion of success. The militia, which came to be widely regarded as a tool that the radicals were sharpening for competition with the army, appears to be disintegrating. None of this means that Chinese devotion to political control of the military, or to higher priorities for the industrial base and to agriculture, have vanished. They do imply that China's military after Mao is becoming militarily stronger rather than weaker.

These foreign policy strengths could conceivably mean a more active foreign policy for China. On the other hand, China has huge domestic problems which will not be solved early, and these domestic problems will command resources to an extent that will leave little surplus for adventuresome foreign policies. This shortage of resources creates pressures for a Chinese foreign policy which, as in the past, relies heavily on rhetoric and employs money and guns sparingly. Moreover, China's technological and economic weakness could combine with the

political vulnerabilities of her leaders to yield a foreign policy which, in many areas, would be loud, inflexible, and extremely defensive.

Such policies are particularly likely and particularly visible in the Third World, where China traditionally speaks very loudly and acts very little. For instance, in Angola, the Chinese provided very limited aid to one faction, and objected violently when the Soviet Union and Cuba successfully supported another faction, but withdrew in all but rhetoric from the competition when the stakes became high. Similarly, China has been quite cautious in its search for leadership of the Third World movement and in its pursuit of its own political goals in nearby Southeast Asia. Only when Third World issues affect strategic or adjacent regions is China willing to take risks, to expend significant resources, or even to allow Third World issues to affect relationships with the United States or the Soviet Union. In short, China has avoided the foreign policy excesses of many other revolutionary regimes and has kept its actions modest and prudent in order to give priority to domestic self-strengthening.

On the other hand, China's foreign policy self-reliance has gradually become more flexible, and China's relationship with the world economy has become less diffident. In various partially disguised ways China now accepts foreign credit. China's trade with the European Economic Community has risen to about \$3 billion per year--approaching Japan's trade with the EEC.

Along with the domestic constraints, China's post-Mao foreign policy faces a particularly uncertain international environment. In America the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger Administration, which undertook the rapprochement with

China, has been replaced by the Carter Administration, whose leader is an enigma to the Chinese and whose devotion to the principles of human rights reverses the previous administration's pragmatism. In the Soviet Union, a generational change of leadership is imminent, and the policies toward China have shifted rapidly between hostility and blandishment. In Japan, the replacement of the Miki government by the Fukuda government is just a ripple on the surface of a sea-change, as the Liberal-Democratic Party moves gradually from a majority to a minority.

In this peculiar domestic and international environment, China is steadfastly pursuing its hostility toward the Soviet Union as the primary thrust of its foreign policy. Second, it is giving high priority to cooperation with Europe on both Soviet and economic matters. Third, it is feeling out the new American administration in a continuing effort to resolve the Taiwan issue in its favor.

Given the uncertainties of the Chinese political scene, it is crucial to speculate on the possible foreign policy consequences of a comeback by Teng Hsiao-P'ing. Whereas Hua has dedicated himself to preserving much of the Maoist legacy, Teng and his followers are thorough-going pragmatists who might make much more rapid changes. They would promote internal self-reliance, emphasize domestic economic construction, and pursue the development of high-technology conventional military forces. Teng perceives the United States as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, and some key Chinese backers of Teng have in the past been more favorable to the United States than Hua. On the other

hand, Teng is believed to have opposed the opening to the United States, and he might well make concessions to the Soviet Union (in order to gain time and to shift resources to the domestic arena) as well as to the United States (in order to gain the economic benefits of trade). Many believe that Teng's personality is so abrasive that it would bring intense political strife within the Chinese leadership, perhaps raising further uncertainties in Chinese foreign policies, and perhaps introducing personality conflicts into Sino-American relations.

Sino-Soviet Relations

Along with the division between communist and democratic philosophies of government, the Sino-Soviet split has come to be one of the principal defining characteristics of the contemporary international system. The split between the two great communist powers is rooted in great power rivalries and in ideological differences, and has been institutionalized through military deployments, bureaucratic structures, and policy competition throughout the world.

The great rivalries date back to the years when Stalin insisted that the Chinese Communist Party pursue a policy of union with the Kuomintang to an extent that frequently meant subordinating Communist interests to the interests of Stalin's cooperation with the Kuomintang. So long as China was too weak to challenge Soviet power effectively, the alliance between them held, but, as China's power grew, differences of national interest led inexorably toward independent policies. For China, a crucial turning point was Soviet failure to provide a nuclear shield for the 1958 offensive against Quemoy and Matsu. For the Soviet Union,

the most frightening symbol of Chinese independence was the latter's acquisition of nuclear weapons. The end of effective alliance was most appropriately symbolized by the sudden Soviet withdrawal of aid and technicians from China. Since that time, the energies of great power rivalry have been focused upon the border dispute between the two great Communist powers.

The principal disputes concern numerous river islands on the border, together with 20,000 square kilometers of the Pamirs. These areas have been the object of enormous military buildups and of numerous military clashes, most notably the 1969 battle over Damansky/Chenpao Island. The Chinese legal claims to the disputed territories are firmly grounded in international law; for instance, the Soviet Union claims that, where a river is the boundary between the two countries, the boundary runs down the Chinese shore, whereas the Chinese claim (in accordance with international law) that the boundary should run through the center of the main channel. However, in addition to the specific territorial demands, the Chinese also insist upon Soviet recognition that the boundary treaties are so-called "unequal treaties," negotiated by an imperialist power unfairly trampling upon the rights of a weak country and therefore illegitimate. Although the Chinese express willingness to accept the boundaries defined by these agreements once they are acknowledged to be illegitimate, the Soviets regard the Chinese principle as utterly unacceptable. On the Soviet side, acceptance of the specific Chinese territorial claims would involve relatively minor boundary alterations, but the Soviet Union fears making any boundary concessions anywhere in its realm--because so many of the boundaries

of the Soviet Union have been expanded in ways which infringe international law that accommodation on one frontier might bring a host of pressures on other frontiers. There are particularly strong links between the Chinese claims on the Soviet Union and Japanese claims to the four northern Japanese islands (Kuriles) seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, since the Chinese have strongly supported the Japanese claim. In addition to this linkage with other boundaries, the Soviet Union is particularly wary about its border with China because the principal Soviet communications link with Eastern Siberia is the trans-Siberian railroad, which runs extremely close to the Chinese border. Concern for the security of the trans-Siberian railroad is the heart of Soviet unwillingness to take the most dramatic and important step toward solution of the border dispute, namely thinning out of its extraordinary military forces on the Chinese border. Thus the border dispute goes on, mired in distrust so deep as to obscure the particular issues at stake.

The great power rivalry and territorial disputes fade into the two powers' intense ideological differences. One of the crucial tenets of Marxism was that communist societies would no longer need to engage in national rivalries and would automatically live at peace with one another. This doctrine of "proletarian internationalism" has been used by the Soviet Union to justify Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and Soviet intervention in such places as Angola (intercontinental proletarian internationalism). Although such policies and their rationales date back to the immediate post-World War II Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe, and to the suppression of the 1956 Eastern European uprisings, the concept

of the Soviet right to intervene in other communist countries was codified at the time of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia in the so-called Brezhnev doctrine. The Chinese naturally fear this Soviet view of Soviet rights in the communist world, particularly since it has justified both Stalin's interventions in Chinese affairs and Khrushchev's nuclear threats to the Chinese.

This ideological/sovereignty dispute is supplemented by other major ideological rifts. The Chinese developed from their own experience a distinctively Chinese theory of socialist development toward communism, which contradicted the Russian theory and set China up as an alternative source of guidance for communists in third countries. This threatened the principal basis of Soviet foreign policy, namely Soviet guidance of communist movements throughout the globe. Over the years this has led to a fragmenting of communist parties throughout the non-communist world into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese fractions and also to Chinese efforts, which have met with some success, to mobilize the leftists of the Third World in opposition to the industrialized superpowers.

These principal aspects of Sino-Soviet antagonism are exacerbated by other differences. Asians generally perceive the Soviet Union as racist, and Russians generally have difficulty in developing close personal relationships with Asians. Soviet policies have magnified the racism felt by some parts of the Soviet population, especially those living near the Chinese frontier. The ungenerous policies of the Soviet Union even in the period of close alliance continue to rankle the Chinese, who speak frequently of the failure of Soviet support over Quemoy, of the low quality of Soviet aid, of the economic consequences of the sudden

Soviet withdrawal of aid, and even of Soviet insistence on full payment for supplies used by the Chinese during the Korean war.

In addition to the worldwide competition, these disputes have led the Soviet Union to pursue, for nearly a decade and a half, a specific policy of containing China. The containment policy has included: military pressure on the common border; unsuccessful promotion of an Asian Security System which would combine all the countries on China's border into a Soviet-led alliance; expansion of Soviet military power in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean; promotion of close political ties in Southeast Asia (principally in Vietnam and Laos but also in Thailand and elsewhere); competition for influence in Korea; and pursuit of close ties to Japan. Most countries have refused to join the Asian Security System, and recently the name has been abandoned and the effort toned down. The competition in Korea has become a stalemate, and China has attempted to match Soviet influence in Southeast Asia by close ties to Cambodia and by an expanded diplomatic presence in the region. Soviet efforts to tie Japan through mutual investments, especially an oil pipeline, have been stymied by failure to resolve the conflict over the Japanese northern islands and by heavy-handed Soviet pressure on Japan's fishing industry. China has countered with support for Japan on the Kuriles, with trade and particularly promises of assured oil supplies to Japan, and with a demand that in any peace treaty Japan sign an anti-Soviet clause opposing any power's efforts to attain hegemony in the region. Thus, throughout the Third World, but particularly in Asia, the Sino-Soviet dispute has been institutionalized in military installations, in propaganda institutions, in rival communist parties, and in large inventories of interrelated diplomatic positions.

The Soviet Union has long recognized the disadvantages it incurs from the hostile relationship with China, disadvantages that have become particularly acute since the Nixon trip to Peking in 1972. Soviet political leaders developed the theory that the dispute was largely the consequence of the personal and ideological aberrations of Mao Tse-tung. They expected that after Mao died his wife, Chiang Ching, would become the ruler of China, but that she would quickly be replaced by more "responsible" organization men who would act in accord with China's true interest of reconciliation with the Soviet Union. Thus, following Mao's death, the Soviet Union offered condolences, suspended press hostility, and sent its chief border negotiator back to Peking. But Victor Louis, a Soviet correspondent, threatened the Chinese, the Soviets failed to halt their military buildup on the Chinese border, and the border negotiations recessed in early March of 1976. The Chinese rejected the condolence messages, persisted in their extreme press hostility, and were not receptive to the mediation efforts of Rumanian President Ceausescu. The Chinese reassured Americans that there were no changes in their Soviet policy, accused the Gang of Four of being soft on the Soviets, and demanded that the Soviet Union return to the troop levels of 1965.

Despite the Chinese rebuffs, the resumption of press hostilities, and the border stalemate, there remain substantial incentives for both sides to moderate the dispute at some point in the future. Rapprochement, or a moderation of the dispute, would reduce the danger of war for both powers and would enable the shifting of resources from military use into domestic development. Such considerations must appear particularly

important to the Chinese, since they increasingly perceive the United States as a weak and unreliable partner in facing the Soviet Union and perhaps as a dangerous manipulator of Sino-Soviet tensions. Diminution of Sino-Soviet conflict would increase the PRC's leverage over Taiwan, and by diminishing Chinese cooperation with the United States would provide the Soviet Union with greater leverage relative to Europe, the Middle East, and the arms limitation talks. It would satisfy the sense of ideologues in both countries that it is criminal for communist powers to confront one another to the advantage of capitalist states. It would greatly enhance the unity of communist movements in the Third World and give the Soviet Union improved access to the Third World. With Mao dead and Maoism in trouble, the Soviet Union can without loss of face promote accommodation; with somewhat greater embarrassment, the Chinese could begin enlarging their sometime view that improvement of state-to-state relations with the Soviet Union would be beneficial even though party-to-party relations are currently anathema.

Accommodation would not necessarily be an all-or-nothing step. It could include the most mild relaxation of tension, for instance reduced press hostilities and moderately increased trade. It could go further to include border agreement, thinned military forces on the borders, reduced competition in the Third World, and establishment of party-to-party relations. Or, although this is currently quite unlikely, it could even progress to the extent of substantial foreign policy cooperation. A return to the military alliance of the 1950s seems extremely unlikely because of the tension between Soviet insistence upon

leadership of the Communist world and Chinese insistence upon equality, as well as the burdens of sharing each other's risks (for instance the risks of future invasions of Taiwan or of future Soviet interference in Yugoslavia). None of these alternatives short of systematic foreign policy cooperation would necessarily damage China's relations with the West (and in particular with the United States) irretrievably, although there would be substantial risk, especially in a rapid accommodation, that the West might be frightened.

It is not difficult to imagine strategies and exchanges by which various degrees of accommodation could be achieved. The Soviet Union could signal its sincerity by going beyond reduction of press hostility and the sending of a border negotiator to some concrete measure such as a small unilateral reduction of its forces along the border. It could persuade the Chinese that the West has betrayed China by pursuing a "galloping detente" with the West in which strategic arms limitations, mutual force reductions, and limited agreements in the Middle East were achieved with such rapidity that the Chinese could only believe the superpowers were colluding against China. One can imagine the Soviet Union trading real territorial concessions for implicit Chinese abandonment of insistence upon Soviet acknowledgment of the unequal treaties. Similarly, it might be to the advantage of the Soviet Union to abandon its Asian Security System in return for being allowed a free hand in areas distant from Chinese interests such as Africa. Given the fervor with which each side has stated its positions, and the depth of the emotions displayed over many years on both sides, it is at first difficult to believe that either side would become party to such strategies. But

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It is not difficult to imagine strategies and exchanges by which various degrees of accommodation could be achieved. The Soviet Union could signal its sincerity by going beyond reduction of press hostility and the sending of a border negotiator to some concrete measure such as a small unilateral reduction of its forces along the border. It could persuade the Chinese that the West has betrayed China by pursuing a "galloping detente" with the West in which strategic arms limitations, mutual force reductions, and limited agreements in the Middle East were achieved with such rapidity that the Chinese could only believe the superpowers were colluding against China. One can imagine the Soviet Union trading real territorial concessions for implicit Chinese abandonment of insistence upon Soviet acknowledgment of the unequal treaties. Similarly, it might be to the advantage of the Soviet Union to abandon its Asian Security System in return for being allowed a free hand in areas distant from Chinese interests such as Africa. Given the fervor with which each side has stated its positions, and the depth of the emotions displayed over many years on both sides, it is at first difficult to believe that either side would become party to such strategies. But

the Stalin-Ribbentrop Pact overcame problems at least equally serious, as did the 1972 Nixon trip to China.

On the other hand, there are strong motivations for perpetuating the status quo. The dynamics of great power rivalry are difficult to escape, and they are inextricably connected to the weakness of both countries along the mutual frontier because of minority groups that transcend the borders. The border rivalries are inextricably connected to other border rivalries with third countries. China's weakness and her need to respond to the Soviet economic, military, and diplomatic buildup in Asia will persist for a very long time. No matter how sincere the negotiators on both sides, China must always fear the Brezhnev Doctrine and the objective superiority of Soviet forces in the region. On the Soviet side, the buildup in Siberia is perceived as crucial to the economic future of the Soviet Union, and the military expansion in the region is seen as crucial to the global rivalry with the United States. Moreover, the weight of Soviet history supports the need for large troop concentrations to protect the trans-Siberian railroad, and the weight of economics presses for refusal to abandon the enormous investment in airfields, depots, fortifications, missiles and garrisons. Thus China will need American support if America is willing and able to help. China must fear that rapprochement with the Soviet Union would frighten the U.S. and Japan and thereby hurt the prospects of Chinese access to Western trade, credit, oil equipment, and other technology, as well as loss of the ability to play upon Western fears of Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the negotiations over Taiwan. The Soviet Union similarly fears a combination against her of the United States, China and Japan, and appears

more concerned about having the military capability to cope with such an informal alliance than about the danger of precipitating that alliance. The two nations' rivalries in the Third World are institutionalized, perhaps beyond dissolution, and racial antipathies may be difficult to turn off. Moreover, both sides require a powerful enemy in order to justify firm domestic political controls and the Soviet military needs such an enemy to justify its hegemony over the national budget.

The Soviet military interest in resource allocation is one of many domestic political obstacles in the way of both Chinese and Soviet moves toward accommodation. The powerful Soviet military interests are backed up by pressures from provincial party secretaries, especially those located near the PRC border. Soviet China specialists, who have been trained in great numbers since the initiation of the Sino-Soviet split, have a vested interest in continuing hostilities. On the other hand, Brezhnev and his immediate circle--which does not include Kosygin--perceive an interest in better relations with China, and some analysts feel that the post-Brezhnev leadership could prove to be tougher in its relations with the West and more forthcoming in relations with China.

Chinese interest groups line up somewhat differently. Perhaps most important, Sino-Soviet rapprochement would be a radical break with Maoism and therefore would bring into question the legitimacy of a government which is currently quite vulnerable to its opponents. The military is divided: Teng Hsiao-p'ing brought into the military many officers favorable to the Soviet Union and with experience of Soviet training. Some advocates of military modernization and of more active policies regarding Southeast Asia have in the past favored better relations

with the Soviet Union. But the senior division commanders are mostly northerners who tend to be hostile to the Soviet Union. Some units have shed blood in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Many Chinese Party and government leaders have advocated better Sino-Soviet relations, including Lin Piao, Liu Shao-ch'i, and P'eng Teh-huai; in fact all of the greatest internal party struggles have brought Mao into conflict with someone who advocated closer relation with the Soviet Union. Mao is now gone and his ideologists are rapidly disappearing.

There is intense disagreement among American analysts as to whether China's current strong anti-Soviet polemics originate primarily with the top leadership or primarily with low-level press organizations, and the evidence is mixed regarding tendencies among the leaders. On the one hand it seems logical that if a Sino-Soviet rapprochement were conceivable, then even the low-level officials would keep quiet rather than continuing to issue high-decible statements. On the other hand, while Hua Kuo-feng himself has not deviated from orthodoxy, it is striking that he has said very little that is anti-Soviet during his career. On balance, there appears very little prospect for the rise of a coalition devoted to rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the near future. But China's top leadership has always included powerful advocates of reduced hostilities. In the event of severe Chinese internal divisions or rapid leadership changes, it would be quite possible for a group of military modernizers, economic growth promoters, communist solidarity advocates, and promoters of activism regarding Taiwan and Southeast Asia, to coalesce and revise China's policies.

If rapprochement seems likely to wait at least awhile, escalation of the Sino-Soviet dispute into warfare seems far less likely, but it is a possibility which can never be completely ruled out. The Soviet military buildup continues, and there is a substantial history of Soviet nuclear threats to China and of minor border clashes as well. The threats by Victor Louis in 1976 were sufficiently explicit to stimulate a rejoinder from Henry Kissinger. China has less to gain than the Soviet Union from any potential war. Its conventional forces are poorly equipped and its nuclear power both far less and far more vulnerable than the Soviet Union. Whereas the territorial risks to the Soviet Union would consist of relatively undeveloped areas of Siberia, China would face immediate loss of its Manchurian industrial base. Thus, a war resulting from a Chinese initiative would almost certainly be a miscalculated escalation rather than a conscious decision to go to war.

Any conscious decision to go to war would thus come from a Soviet Union angered by the rise of an intransigent new leadership in China. The Soviet Union possesses a nuclear arsenal far greater than the Chinese and also possesses the conventional forces for a blitzkrieg far more overwhelming than anything the Soviet Union could have mounted in the 1960s. The goals of such a Soviet decision could include destruction of China's nuclear armaments, annexation of portions of the border, installation of a number of friendly small regimes on the Chinese side of the border, or an effort to spoil China's development by creating economic and political havoc. But the dangers of such a strike appear overwhelming. A conventional war could become a protracted conflict, bleeding the Soviet

Union for a generation and creating permanent, unified hostility from a society of a billion people. Although Soviet nuclear superiority is now far greater than in the 1960s, the PRC nuclear program has progressed to the point where the Soviet Union could probably never be sure of completely eliminating China's nuclear retaliatory capacity. Moreover, the U.S. might well support China, Japan would probably rearm and become a major military power hostile to the Soviet Union, and much of the rest of the world would turn hostile to the Soviet Union. Thus war seems the least likely outcome of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The United States possesses an enormous stake in the evolution of the Sino-Soviet split. Sino-Soviet war would draw in other powers and quite possibly lead to global nuclear warfare. A thoroughgoing rapprochement would also greatly affect America's international position. On the one hand, rapprochement would reduce the danger of Sino-Soviet war and might make possible the engagement of China in strategic arms limitation talks and in joint big-power pressure for peace in Korea. A moderate rapprochement would not necessarily increase Chinese hostility to the United States. But the U.S. would lose leverage over both China and the Soviet Union. Revolutionary movements would no longer be divided.

East Europe would lose a major source of support for movement toward independence. Thailand and Malaysia might be endangered by Chinese-sponsored movements, and one can even imagine Sino-Soviet collaboration in supporting a North Korean invasion of a South Korea from which U.S. forces had been withdrawn. The U.S. would be greatly weakened in negotiating on arms limitations, on the Middle East, and on various European issues. (The 1972 Moscow summit meeting and the Berlin agreement would

not have been possible in the absence of Sino-American rapprochement.) Thus any substantial Sino-Soviet accommodation would severely damage the interests of America and the West.

Although U.S. has an enormous stake in perpetuation of the Sino-Soviet split, it has only indirect leverage over it. Conceivably the U.S. might reduce the extent of any potential rapprochement by quickly improving relations with China. Conceivably the linkage between Sino-American and Sino-Soviet relations could be attenuated by an American policy of being evenhanded rather than one of playing the two off against one another. Alternatively, it is likely that, since the improvement in Sino-American relations was premised by the Chinese on a belief that the U.S. would be a useful counterweight to the Soviet Union, U.S. global weakness could hasten any Sino-Soviet rapprochement and make it more far reaching. The Chinese have been vigorous in denouncing American concessions to the Soviet Union and in advocating greater unity within NATO, within ASEAN, and between the United States and Japan. Similarly, since the Chinese greatly fear Soviet-American collusion against them, continuation and acceleration of the trend (beginning with the Vladivostok meeting) of greater U.S. attention to Soviet-American than to Sino-American issues could anger the Chinese and turn them back toward the Soviet Union. But the Sino-Soviet split has a dynamic of its own, and it depends so heavily upon the state of Chinese and Soviet domestic politics that only the most extreme actions by outside powers could be expected to have any noticeable effect. Above all, there is little possibility of the U.S. fine-tuning its policies toward either China or the Soviet Union according

to its relations with the other, or of influencing the details of the Sino-Soviet relationship through finely calibrated American initiatives.

Sino-American Relations

After Chinese relations with the Soviet Union, the relationship with America is China's most important relationship. After China's dispute with the Soviet Union, the dispute over Taiwan is China's most important conflict. After relations with its allies and the Soviet Union, America's relationship with China is its most important relationship.

Historically, America's perceptions of China have been peculiarly obsessive, and American diplomatic relations with China have relied to an extraordinary degree on diplomatic fictions. During the Open Door period in American policy, America perceived herself as the protector of China while demanding privileges at least equal to those of the overtly imperial powers. During World War II it was considered important to treat defeated and divided China as a unified great power. After the Communist victory in 1949, it was considered essential to sustain the diplomatic fiction that the Kuomintang ruled China. Now the search is on for a diplomatic formula or a diplomatic fiction which will permit normalization of diplomatic relations while resolving--or covering over--disagreements regarding the status of Taiwan.

The sudden Sino-American rapprochement symbolized by President Nixon's trip to Peking in February of 1972 has provided major gains for both China and the United States. The Chinese broke out of their post-Cultural Revolution diplomatic isolation. The Paris Accords on Vietnam

and the agreement on Berlin were negotiated, and the May 1972 Soviet-American summit conference, which would otherwise have been cancelled after the Haiphong bombings achieved progress on strategic arms limitations. Tensions between China and various Southeast Asian countries relaxed considerably. A dialogue began between Chinese and American leaders. So far, trade has been diminutive, and cultural exchanges have been relatively one-sided in Peking's favor, but even modest advances in these areas are useful and the groundwork has been laid for post-normalization extension of these ties. The Chinese have acquired consular services and substantial freedom in Washington, D.C., but have not reciprocated fully in Peking. The United States and China have both gained a continuing leverage over the Soviet Union.

Immediately after the Nixon trip, there was a sense of euphoria and a strong momentum toward normalization. The American public applauded the rapprochement, the opposition was fragmented, and thus there was a real possibility of further major concessions and of rapid progress toward normalization. Conservatives believed that normalization would be achieved without substantive sacrifices regarding Taiwan, and liberals became convinced that whatever sacrifices were necessary would be made. The mood of the times was best expressed by the fad among the fashionable New York stores for Chinese (and Chinese-inspired) clothing and furniture.

Further gains could reasonably be expected from full normalization. Trade might rise. Cultural exchanges might well remain one-sided but could expand greatly in scale. Humanitarian agreements, for instance on

reuniting families, could become possible. And, although there is disagreement on this, full normalization could conceivably affect future Chinese attitudes toward some aspects of Sino-Soviet confrontation. However, in the intervening years the atmosphere has changed. The immediate post-1972 American romanticism has disappeared, as has the pervasive sense of crisis of the Closed Door period. Watergate displaced the Nixon Administration. America became focused on domestic problems. Then the election intervened and a new Administration came to power needing some time to formulate its Asia policy. Rapid political changes in China created similar uncertainties as to the future, and the vulnerability of the Chinese leadership may have reduced its flexibility.

A survey of the American political scene reveals obstacles to normalization, but also sufficient fluidity for future progress. Although the sense of crisis has disappeared, public opinion polls show that Americans perceive China's importance as rising rapidly. The polls show that 55 percent of the public have a favorable impression of Taiwan, while only 20 percent have a favorable impression of the People's Republic of China--making China the most unfavorably perceived country in the world except for Cuba. The polls show overwhelming opposition to breaking relations with Taiwan, but also indicate a majority desire for normal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The obstacles in the way of major concessions are indicated by the vehemence with which the 1976 Republican platform slapped down the Ford/Kissinger policies, but on the other hand the historical record indicates that the President can lead public opinion to a considerable extent--as indicated most dramatically by the changes in public opinion after the announcement of

the Nixon visit to Peking. Organized business groups divide about the same way public opinion does. There are major economic interests in future trade with the People's Republic and major interests in current economic relations with Taiwan; the ROC/U.S. Trade Council supporting continued good relations with Taiwan has its counterpart in the National Council for U.S.-China Trade. Here again the balance provides room for leadership within certain limits.

Although leadership will have to come from the President, the increasingly important role of Congress in the conduct of foreign policy makes opinion there crucial. Fortunately for advocates of normalization, Congress has been deeply engaged in the rapprochement from the beginning and has responded favorably to it. Senators Mansfield and Scott were the next high-ranking visitors to the People's Republic after President Nixon, and many other Congressmen have followed them, with almost all returning favorably impressed. The support for normalization is bipartisan, based on high expectations of trade, balance of power considerations, and favorable impressions regarding China's domestic progress. On the other hand, the core of resistance to change has regrouped, based on such considerations as human rights, sympathy for free enterprise, and business interests in Taiwan. The President has the constitutional right to the decision on diplomatic relations with any country, and the division in Congress means that nothing will change without Presidential leadership, but the structure of Congressional opinion is such that a well-stage-managed Presidential initiative would evoke substantial support.

In addition to domestic opinion and interests, the background of Sino-American relations includes economic relations and political relations with third countries. It is appropriate to sketch in this background before focusing upon the issue at center stage, namely Taiwan. After a generation of hostility, the degree to which many American and Chinese policies and interests have become synchronized is remarkable. The United States supports a stronger China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, and China seeks not only a stronger American role in the world, but also greater unity for NATO, for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and for the U.S.-Japanese alliance. China supports the maintenance of most American overseas bases, while continuing to insist that America remove its forces from Korea and to pay lip service elsewhere to a principled opposition to foreign bases. In South Asia, China and America have jointly opposed--quite successfully--the rapid expansion of Soviet influence. Virtually all of America's allies except Taiwan have welcomed the Sino-American rapprochement.

Substantial Sino-American differences nonetheless remain. China supports North Korea. China contemptuously dismisses efforts at nuclear arms control, labeling them phony and expressing fear that they can provide a cover for collusion between the superpowers. Above all, China deplores what it perceives as American weakness after Vietnam, believing that low American defense budgets, diminished American military presence overseas, disunity within NATO, anomalous American failure to support ASEAN vigorously, withdrawal under fire in Africa, and American willingness to sign arms control agreements more advantageous to the Soviet

Union than to the United States, all indicate that America has become a rather light counterweight to use against the Soviet Union. Beyond that, China perceives a sinister American policy of American appeasement of the Soviet Union, designed to mollify the Soviet Union in Europe so as to turn Soviet aggressiveness back against China. Herein lies a danger to good relations that is perhaps even more important than the dispute over Taiwan.

On the horizon lie further opportunities for both exploitation of common interests and clashes of interest. For instance, the human rights issue has so far (in Chinese eyes) helpfully introduced discord into Soviet-American relations, but could spread discord into Sino-American relations in the future.

The above political problems, together with Taiwan, dominate Sino-American political relations. Sino-American economic relations consist of a few conspicuous and (in themselves) simple problems, but these few problems have deep political roots that proliferate and become hopelessly tangled in the muck of unresolved national political purpose.

Sino-American trade was an early beneficiary of rapprochement but is now a casualty of politics. It reached approximately \$1 billion a year at its height, but has declined to \$350 million per year. China has a positive balance of trade with the United States and needs certain American goods, but says that substantial trade expansion must wait upon normalization of relations. China buys grain from Canada and Argentina, soy beans from Brazil, and cotton from Mexico, rather than turning to the U.S. Even Mexican cotton which happened to have been stored in San

Diego was rejected by the Chinese. They turn to France, Germany, and Japan to help with the Wuhan Steel industry and with Manchurian petrochemicals. Some Americans believe that the Chinese might not even have contracted to buy Boeing jets if they had realized that normalization was not imminent. While there are some prospects for improved trade, as indicated for instance by the Chinese invitations to mining, construction, and petroleum equipment groups, the Chinese point to the rise in Sino-Japanese trade from \$1 billion to \$4 billion per year after Sino-Japanese normalization as an indicator of the possible economic benefits of normalization.

Closely tied to the normalization problem are the failure so far to resolve disputes over Chinese assets frozen by the United States in support of American claims against China, and also the failure of the U.S. so far to grant most-favored-nation (MFN) status to China. Some businessmen believe that the Chinese would be willing to settle the assets/claims problem prior to normalization, but State Department policy so far has been to deal with the issue as part of the normalization negotiations. Similarly, American policy has been to combine negotiation of the bilateral trade agreement required for most-favored-nation status with the normalization negotiations, whereas many businessmen wish to deal with the easier trade issues first. In addition, the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which has inhibited provision of MFN status to the Soviet Union pending Soviet willingness to liberalize emigration rules, also hampers provision of MFN status to China. Whether the Jackson-Vanik amendment should be eliminated, amended, or applied only to the Soviet Union is a matter of intense dispute, as are estimates of the political likelihood that such efforts might succeed.

Provision of credits to China is also a politically difficult issue. Foreign policy leaders in the United States have grave doubts about the wisdom of subsidizing credit for one's adversaries, whereas businessmen feel that such attitudes reflect a simple failure to understand the realities of Western competition for the communist markets.

Export controls also impede Sino-American trade relations. American law, administered by national security officials, restricts sale of militarily useful technology to communist countries. On its face such a law should impose minimal restrictions on trade between economies with such diverse complementarities as China and the United States. However, implementation of the law has, according to businessmen, managed to stymie much non-military trade. In the view of many businessmen, the law has been interpreted in such a way as to hinder export of such simple non-military equipment as Hunter Engineering machinery for aluminum leveling, which happens to contain an unsophisticated computer. On the other hand, when the President intervenes for policy reasons, it is permissible to sell sophisticated Boeing aircraft, Cyber computers, and satellite communication equipment. Perhaps even more important than inconsistency and inappropriate application of the law has been simple failure to make timely decisions: businessmen provide anecdotes of straightforward projects, some of which involve two to three million dollars in advance expenditures, being held up for eighteen months to two years without a decision. This has, according to the businessmen, frustrated progress toward meeting Chinese needs for petroleum equipment, mining technology, non-military computers, and basic research. Businessmen feel, with considerable justification, that a large part of the problem is the vesting of the right to make

decisions in the national security officials rather than in agencies primarily concerned with commerce, pointing out that, when Germans or French sell technologies and Americans don't, the foreign countries get locked in to supplying spare parts and similar equipment for the long-term future and America gets locked out. On the other hand, security specialists respond with some exasperation to business pressures for sale of equipment easily diverted to military use and for competition with other Western countries in providing subsidized credit for purchases of U.S. goods.

One of the causes of bureaucratic complications is the lack of firm policies and criteria for deciding which sales are permissible. For instance, although there is a general, albeit vague, sense that the United States should favor some strengthening of China relative to the Soviet Union, current policy requires assessing the military utility of a proposed sale relative to the existing industrial base. Such a rule denies to China, with its less-developed industrial base, many items that are sold to the Soviet Union. Such policy inconsistencies are complicated by the sponginess of specific criteria for decision; the combination of ambiguities and ambivalences leads inevitably to bureaucratic delays. Given the inescapable complexities of the problem, some people prefer having clearcut policies combined with very flexible criteria, but others point out that bureaucratic processes simply are not constructed to cope with unclear criteria.

On the Chinese side, the decision to import is highly centralized and based upon detailed plans. Centralization enables the Chinese to exploit Western competition with dismaying effectiveness. Having chosen what they want, the Chinese are usually successful at getting it (and

at getting it for low prices). On the other hand, the rigidity of the planning system makes it difficult for Chinese bureaus to respond to initiatives from Western businessmen or scientists. There is some feeling, though, that this rigidity of the Chinese system can be partially circumvented. The Japanese have successfully pursued numerous initiatives with China, and it is possible that, through contact at middle and lower levels (for instance between plant biology specialists, between computer software technicians, and between management specialists), relationships might develop through which initiatives could be pursued independently of the top-level plans. For this purpose it has been proposed that more scientists and businessmen be used in developing initiatives and in making political decisions.

To all these substantive problems has recently been added the political sensitivity of the PRC to the recent formation, by former Secretary of Treasury David Kennedy, of the Republic of China/United States Trade Council. This Council was created to maintain trade discussions after Sino-American normalization. Its name is an irritant to the PRC because of the reference to "China." Moreover, because PRC policy does not object to post-normalization American trade with Taiwan, the PRC believes such an organization to be commercially unnecessary and to reflect a political stand by the member companies in favor of a two-China policy.

Stepping back from all these detailed problems, one must query the role of economic relations in overall American national purpose. What values are to be served through trade and perhaps other economic relations with the People's Republic of China? It is clear, first of all,

that there is a possibility of quite substantial economic return from trade. The volume of PRC trade with the EEC is shockingly high to specialists schooled in the stricter traditions of Chinese self-reliance. But relations with China are so important to the global political structure and to the security of the United States that strictly economic purposes are likely to remain subordinated to political purposes. Moves to enhance the prospects of mutually beneficial trade provide a useful signal of American desire for better political relationships. Conceivably substantial moves could even ameliorate some of the adverse political consequences of delays in normalization, particularly if the regime in China comes to emphasize economic development as its highest priority. Substantial trade could strengthen China vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, thus reducing the danger that China might become vulnerable to manipulation. Such strengthening would also ameliorate Chinese fears that the opening to the United States had not added to Chinese strength in facing the Soviet Union. Although the United States remains apprehensive regarding the long-run uses to which heightened Chinese power could be put, the immediate problem is that Soviet power is rising so much faster than Chinese.

Ultimately, the most crucial question in economic relations is whether the United States can acquire policy leverage with the Chinese through careful use of its ability to fulfill or deny Chinese technological needs. The United States possesses enormous bargaining power regarding specifically economic issues, because there are numerous things which China really needs from America and very few that America really needs from China. But the real questions arise with regard to political

leverage. On the one hand, the Chinese desperately need a few American technologies, especially computers, petroleum equipment, and other mining technologies, if they are to achieve the ambitious goals of many Chinese leaders. Put more positively, American could make a very substantial contribution to China's economic prospects. On the other hand, China can obtain most technology elsewhere and has been little hindered by American controls. The technologies over which America maintains a near monopoly are few and, while they would be extremely helpful to China's economic development, they represent useful means for speeding up growth rates rather than vital necessities for avoiding economic disaster. Given the firmness with which the Chinese have guarded their political integrity from the encroachments of economic opportunism, most specialists are skeptical that major political concessions can be acquired through American economic leverage.

Finally, over the longer run, there is the hope that higher standards of living and greater complexity, together with greater Sino-American contacts, will eventually induce Chinese society to open up gradually, as Soviet society has begun to do, thereby improving the life of the Chinese people and enhancing the integration of China into a stable world order.

Taiwan

Such is the political and economic context of the most important Sino-American dispute, namely Taiwan. This dispute, which China regards as second only to its conflict with the Soviet Union, is presented by the PRC as an absolute bar to normalization. It is feared by some Americans

as a danger to the future of Sino-American rapprochement. At stake is the fate of 17 million people who, protected from being overwhelmed by the communists as a result of an American response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea, have developed a lively society, an extraordinary economic dynamo that now yields an annual per capita income of about \$900 from an equitably distributed gross national product, and who have become a significant economic and military power.

The Taiwan dispute affects trade, military cooperation, and the overall tone of Sino-American relationships. Although the Chinese leadership apparently feels that Sino-American cooperation against the Soviet Union is far more important than the Taiwan issue, all Chinese officials are careful to emphasize that they regard Taiwan as an essential province of China and American relationships with Taiwan as interference in Chinese domestic affairs. The immediate Chinese goal is American disengagement from political and military ties with Taiwan as a prelude to normalization of Sino-American diplomatic relations, to be followed at some later--perhaps historically later--date by full unification of Taiwan with the mainland. The American goals consist of diplomatic normalization and cooperative relationships with Peking, together with an autonomous Taiwan (representing no threat to Peking), to which the U.S. retains economic access. The United States would be quite willing to accept reunification of Taiwan with the mainland provided the majority of the Taiwanese freely accepted reunification; however, differences in social structure, combined with differences in per capita income (Taiwan's \$900 per capita is at least three times higher than the mainland's), militate against such voluntary acceptance.

After the Kuomintang's loss of the mainland to the Communists, American policy decided to let the civil war take its course, with the expectation that before long the Communists would overrun Taiwan. However, when North Korea invaded the South, the U.S. feared a global offensive by the Soviet Union in which China would function as a Soviet pawn. The United States therefore sealed the Taiwan Strait in conjunction with the engagement in Korea. The United States maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan and later signed a military alliance with it. Communist China's entry into the Korean war, possibly on the assumption that the U.S. intended to invade China after finishing North Korea, ensured that Sino-American hostility would endure for a considerable period. This state of affairs persisted until the rapprochement symbolized by Nixon's February 1972 visit to Peking. In the Shanghai communique, which was the principal diplomatic product of that visit, the two sides glossed over their differences regarding Taiwan through a U.S. acknowledgement that the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits maintain that there is only one China, together with a statement that the U.S. does not challenge such an assertion.

The case for acceding to Peking's claims regarding to Taiwan rests first of all upon the argument that the original American commitment to Taiwan was based upon an historical error of the first order, and that continued American political and military involvement constitute interference in an ongoing Chinese civil war. Parallel to this historical logic is a set of powerful Realpolitik considerations, including the simple fact that the PRC is far more important to the world balance of

power than Taiwan, together with concern that the alliance could lead to a U.S./PRC war and that future antagonism over Taiwan could encourage Sino-Soviet rapprochement. PRC military and economic power are rising, the Soviet threat is increasing, and it is therefore crucial to maintain momentum toward improved Sino-American relations. Moreover, some proponents of this position argue that the alliance is worthless anyway since the U.S. public would refuse to fulfill the alliance and Congress would block military operations. In addition, Taiwan is now so strong that it might be able to defend itself, especially since a bloody PRC intervention would involve great risks for the PRC, including possible Japanese rearmament, possible major Soviet gains elsewhere in Asia, and a high probability of a hostile American reaction even in the absence of a treaty. To these arguments are sometimes added, first, that the Taiwan government is authoritarian and therefore undeserving of American support and, second, that the PRC maintains America secretly promised to give up Taiwan.

Advocates of continuing protection of Taiwan argue that the correction of an historical error would be a sticky business. For instance, had the United States intervened earlier against Japan's depredations in China, the Communists might not have come to power; there is thus some question as to which historical error should be corrected. Moreover, the Chinese intervention in North Korea was also an historical error which they should perhaps be required to correct. And, it is argued, the United States should not abandon 17 million people to loss of their current relative freedom (compared with the PRC), loss of their current prosperity, and loss of their right to determine their own future. Even if the Kuomintang government

has lost its legitimacy, presumably the people of Taiwan nonetheless should be allowed to determine their own destiny. Continuing on grounds of Realpolitik, this case would argue that, whereas protecting Taiwan involves a risk of war, abandoning Taiwan implies a certainty of PRC-Taiwan war, with dangerous consequences for regional peace. Divided Korea would see in the fate of divided China a foreshadowing of its own future if South Korea continues to depend upon American support. Japan, whose Foreign Minister has recently expressed fear that the U.S. would too hastily cut its ties to Taiwan, might be frightened into rearmament and into a more distant diplomatic posture toward the United States. Some scholars even think that China would be more impressed by the resulting loss of American credibility than by its acquisition of Taiwan. (On the other hand, others feel the Korean case could be persuasively separated from Taiwan's situations, that the Japanese would rationalize the situation, and that China's views of American credibility would not be affected.)

Taiwan's response to the anxiety of being partially or completely cut off from the United States could also produce dangerous consequences. Taiwan might ally itself with the Soviet Union. This would jeopardize any future American support, and would be hard for the fervently anti-Communist Kuomintang government to explain, but the situation would be desperate. (The likelihood of such a desperation move might be enhanced by the fact that Chiang Ching-kuo was educated in the Soviet Union.) A second Taiwanese response might be to acquire nuclear weapons--a possibility which that country could achieve quite quickly. Taiwan might also declare itself independent, a desperate act which would require

major changes in constitutional structure, but which might become acceptable to a badly frightened government. Such a declaration of independence would probably engender a violent PRC reaction, likely including an immediate blockade of the offshore islands. Although such a declaration would formally relieve the United States of legal obligation to defend Taiwan, informally the U.S. problem would increase from the difficulty of abandoning a province to the difficulty of abandoning an independent nation. The combination of strong American public support for such a move and violent PRC reactions would almost certainly destroy whatever remained of Sino-American rapprochement. (Also, while many Americans find it attractive to apply the principle of self-determination of peoples to Taiwan, advocates of this principle must ask whether it must not also apply to all kinds of other groups throughout the world, including the Kurds, the Ukrainians, and for that matter the Scotch and the American Indians.)

Finally, advocates of defending Taiwan note that even a somewhat dubious alliance probably has some deterrent effect and is therefore not useless. Moreover, Taiwan's military strength is somewhat undermined by the economic vulnerability resulting from its dependence on trade.

Given the effective arguments both for and against the alliance, most American efforts have been devoted to the search for a middle road, to the search, that is, for a policy which would achieve America's principal objectives regarding both the PRC and Taiwan. The common element in virtually all proposed middle ways is a willingness to abandon diplomatic relations and alliance with Taiwan in order to achieve normalization with

the PRC, together with an effort to construct functional substitutes for both the alliance and the embassy in Taiwan. The PRC is willing to facilitate this search temporarily by separating normalization of diplomatic relations from effective unification and by deferring the latter until some time in the future. Legally, the middle way is built upon the possibility of normalizing relations with the PRC without formally acknowledging Taiwan to be a part of China. Economically and militarily, the middle way depends upon ensuring the ability of Taiwan to trade with the rest of the world so that its extraordinary economic dynamo can continue to generate the popular cohesion and military strength necessary to defend itself.

The first proposed functional substitute is a PRC pledge not to use force against Taiwan. The Chinese foreign ministry has said that "The Chinese government has always stood for a settlement through negotiations without resorting to force." However, this statement is interpreted by the PRC as referring only to international force, not to what they would maintain to be a purely domestic use of force against Taiwan. It remains controversial whether the PRC could ever be persuaded to give firm private or public assurances that it would not use force against Taiwan.

If the PRC refused to give such a pledge, the U.S. could respond with unilateral insistence that force not be used. This could take the form of a statement that U.S. interprets the normalization agreement to include a mutual commitment to non-use of force, supported by Chinese silence. Or it could take the form of a simple unilateral statement of commitment. Neither of these would necessarily be credible to the PRC

or to Taiwan or to Japan. However, a President supported by Congressional resolution under the War Powers Act could quite credibly make such a declaration. Such a unilateral position could, if challenged by the PRC, lead to conflict.

Another functional substitute would be to rely on Taiwan's own considerable strength. Taiwan, after all, is a modern industrial power which has achieved one of the highest sustained economic growth rates in world history and acquired one of the world's stronger military forces. Its economic growth and equity made it one of Asia's more cohesive societies, despite mainlander/Taiwanese differences which are often exaggerated. On the other hand, China's naval and air forces are becoming stronger quite rapidly, and Taiwan's economy is vulnerable to harassment of her lines of communication. Hasty or badly executed American policies could cause a psychological collapse against which the objective strength of Taiwan would avail little. Moreover, the absence of American forces would compel any PRC regime to be more forceful and more unilateral. While there is a theoretical possibility of overcoming this latter problem through adjustment of Soviet-American relationships, it is unlikely in practice that the relationships could be fine-tuned sufficiently to deter the PRC regarding Taiwan without endangering Sino-American rapprochement.

A final option, in addition to the status quo, abandonment of Taiwan, functional substitution, and Taiwan independence, is to push Taiwan to accommodate with the mainland by itself. The goal would be a Taiwan/PRC relationship more like the Hong Kong/PRC relationship than like the Tibet/PRC one. The problem here is that it is difficult to ensure such an outcome.

If the United States actively participates in the negotiation, then there may be little to gain through the direct contacts. If, on the other hand, the U.S. disclaims interest in the outcome, then Taiwan loses its bargaining position. Another problem is the domestic Taiwanese reaction; some observers fear that the native Taiwanese would revolt at the first sign of contacts between the Kuomintang government and Peking. However it is not impossible that there is some policy which could cope with most of these problems, for instance beginning with abandonment of Taiwan's claim to rule all of China, adoption of Burmese-style neutralism rather than anti-communism, and so on, with each step being informal but unmistakable in intent.

Options For American Policy

American policy regarding Taiwan and the other political and economic background issues faces a number of critical choices, most of which provoke intense controversy. There are, however, a few points of near-consensus. First, most specialists are willing to abandon alliance and diplomatic relations with Taiwan, although they disagree intensely over the price that should be exacted from Peking and over the likelihood that Peking might pay the desired price. Second, most but not all agree that the U.S. retains a substantial responsibility for ensuring that any change in Taiwan's status occurs peacefully. Third, the changes of leadership in China come so quickly and in accordance with political dynamics which are so vaguely understood, that the United States cannot afford to have its policies tied to any particular leader or leadership group. That is, the U.S. can afford neither to try to influence the succession process in Peking nor to allow

the success of its policies to become tied to personal relationships with a current leadership. Fourth, although the Sino-American relationship will continue to provide the United States with substantial benefits in its relations with both the Soviet Union and China, and although the state of the triangle can be affected somewhat by high-level meetings, by changed military deployments, and possibly by exchange of defense attaches and eventually intelligence, it is not possible to fine-tune American relations with either China or the Soviet Union in order to obtain short-run tactical advantages; the instrument of policy are simply too blunt and too clumsy for most such uses. Finally, all of these points of agreement exist within a general approval of the past five years' movement toward improved relations and a general hope for additional improvements.

There is also substantial agreement regarding key parts of the substance of which the Sino-Soviet-American triangle should be woven. The Sino-American part of the triangle must include at least the following conceptual strands. The United States feels strongly about improving relations with China and will not ignore China. The United States is not just using China to obtain a better deal with the Soviet Union in SALT, MBFR and other issues, and will not use SALT to divert the Soviet energies away from Europe toward China. Above all, there will be no hint of Soviet-American collusion against Chinese interests. The Soviet-American link should be based upon understanding that the Sino-American relationship is strong enough to survive domestic difficulties on either side, that there is, in effect, a floor under Sino-American relations.

Active Sino-American military cooperation to constrain the Soviet Union need not be greater than now, but an institutional framework should gradually be created which could provide the basis for greater future cooperation if Soviet initiatives make that necessary. The United States seeks to constrain the Soviet Union, not to incite retaliation, and thus cooperation with China in constraining Soviet initiatives will not be hasty or take ominous leaps, and would, in fact, be constrained in the normal course of events by Sino-American differences over such important issues as Taiwan. However, Sino-American moderation can be undone by Soviet excesses.

Along with these areas of basic agreement come intense controversies. The most fundamental concerns whether there is in fact a middle ground for resolution of the crucial Sino-American differences surrounding Taiwan, or whether the Chinese are forcing the U.S. to choose between extremes. Must the U.S. choose either to abandon Taiwan to eventual military seizure or economic strangulation by the PRC, or else face an inevitable war at some time in the future? Or does the combination of U.S. firmness, Taiwan strength, Chinese historical perspective, concern about Japanese reactions, and desire for American cooperation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, lead the Chinese regime or major elements of it to be willing to compromise? Chinese rhetoric is very firm, saying that the U.S. principles of protecting human rights and preserving peace are simply a continued interference in China's domestic politics and therefore unthinkable as objects of negotiation. On the other hand, China would face extraordinary costs in conquering even a Taiwan abandoned by

the United States, and it would have to incur those costs in a context of rising Soviet power that makes Sino-Soviet rapprochement unlikely. Moreover, China faces a crucial period in her economic history, a period which will not be short, and a return to confrontation with the United States would have serious consequences for China's access to Western technology. One conceivable outcome could be a controlled but gradually escalating conflict in which China would attempt to retain economic advantages and Western foreign policy cooperation against the Soviet Union, while gradually escalating harassment of Taiwan's lines of supply with rapidly rising naval and air forces.

American liberals are inclined to believe that a middle ground can be found, although some believe the Chinese will be rigid and that the U.S. should therefore withdraw in order to avoid a war. American conservatives tend to be very skeptical of the possibility of finding a middle ground and draw the conclusion that the U.S. should stand firmer regarding its alliance with Taiwan. For the moment American strategy will emphasize a vigorous search for a middle ground that will satisfy both nations' minimal requirements.

Assuming that some middle ground exists, there is a parallel disagreement over whether that ground should be constructed around ambiguity or around precision. The Shanghai Communique is basically an exercise in ambiguity, especially in the crucial passage where the United States acknowledges that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is but one China and goes on to say that the United States does not challenge that agreement. The passage gives a nod in the direction

of China's insistence on the reality of a single China, but does not rule out the possibility, for instance, that the agreement among Chinese might change. Many of the people who have participated directly in negotiations with the Chinese believe that any attempt to substitute precise language for ambiguity would simply sabotage the negotiations. But other specialists perceive ambiguity as a time bomb which would explode at a later date when Chinese power is greater relative to both Taiwan and the United States. The advocates of continued ambiguity believe that an ambiguous resolution could succeed under the following conditions: the Western position would have to be firmly underwritten by Western ability to conduct economic and military trade with Taiwan, and PRC ties to the U.S. would have to be greatly strengthened by MFN status for the PRC and by strong U.S. cooperation with the PRC against Soviet pressures.

An essentially identical disagreement of Americans concerns whether the resolution of the Taiwan problem must rest on mutual agreement, or whether it could be allowed to rest on American unilateral statement of intent to defend Taiwan followed by PRC silence but not necessarily explicit PRC agreement. The ambiguity implicit in the unilateral statement approach frightens some observers.

Disagreement also arises as to whether the United States should first deal with Taiwan and normalization, and treat all of the smaller issues (frozen assets, MFN...) as minor appendages, or whether on the contrary the U.S. should seek resolution of the smaller issues as quickly as possible, even though the normalization negotiations may take some time. Businessmen are particularly anxious to have the incremental,

small-steps approach implemented, because normalization could be delayed for years and they wish to improve trade relations immediately. The government, which has chosen the synoptic approach, believes that the PRC might balk at a small-steps policy, that indeed it might feel the U.S. was reneging on a commitment to China while pursuing major negotiations with the Soviet Union. If the push for normalization does not bring fruit at some reasonably early date, the government feels that it can retreat to a small-steps approach. This leaves businessmen frustrated regarding specific deals that would otherwise be possible in the interim, but government spokesmen point out that the overall level of trade is affected mainly by lack of normalization and not by specific small issues. Moreover, some scholars feel that insisting on resolution of the normalization issue first provides the U.S. with economic leverage that would be lost through the small-steps approach.

Regarding the substance of the normalization negotiations, there is a quite fundamental disagreement between the belief that the most important aspect of the normalization negotiations is China's substantive claims to Taiwan and the contrary belief that U.S. abandonment of Taiwan would so damage U.S. credibility in Chinese eyes as to do more harm than good to Sino-American relations. Those who emphasize the importance of credibility point out that the most important aspect of Sino-American relations currently concerns cooperation against the Soviet Union, whereas Taiwan is only a secondary issue. They further emphasize that U.S. credibility is at stake not only in PRC eyes but also in Japanese, Korean, Southeast Asian, and NATO eyes. At the opposite pole on this

issue are those who believe that concessions to the PRC regarding Taiwan need have no effect on U.S. credibility in China's eyes, and that moreover credibility is not particularly transferable from one issue to another; in support of the latter argument one can observe that U.S. failure to intervene in Hungary in 1956 and U.S. down-playing of SEATO have done little to damage U.S. credibility. Moreover, one can reaffirm ties elsewhere simultaneously with making concessions on Taiwan, and one can work closely with the PRC on Soviet problems in order to minimize any credibility issues which might arise. There is a middle ground between these two positions which would hold that concessions on Taiwan would not affect the Chinese views of American credibility to any important extent, but could drastically affect the degree to which Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asian countries trusted the United States unless firm precautions were taken to separate the various other issues from Taiwan. After all, Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa did warn of major consequences from an American abandonment of Taiwan. But presumably one could strengthen Korea, take demonstrably strong positions on other issues, and attempt to isolate Taiwan conceptually by, for instance, pointing out to the great disparity in size between the Chinese successor states which does not exist in the case of Korea.

Differences also arise regarding the urgency of resolving Sino-American issues. Many people perceive no particular urgency in resolving the Taiwan issue and urge that a greater priority be given to such immediately pressing issues as halting new technological developments in the strategic arms race. Others point out, however, that the PRC's

military and economic power is rising rapidly, that there is a serious danger that the Taiwan issue will become entangled with the increasingly important Chinese territorial waters claims, and that very soon we will face the possibility of PRC military attempts to assert control of the Straits of Taiwan and perhaps to isolate the offshore islands. In the short run, some people also perceive an urgency because the Carter Administration has, during the campaign as well as since the Inauguration, avoided saying very much about China and has managed to irritate the Chinese in a series of small ways. In particular, there were campaign references to an independent Taiwan, a paper by a Carter advisor emphasizing how China could be manipulated against the Soviet Union, a statement by the new United Nations ambassador that we needed diplomatic relations with Vietnam in order to contain China, a statement by Secretary Vance that the United States would move slowly regarding China, and a big push for arms control with the Soviet Union which the Chinese find collusive and threatening. As against these minor irritations only a meeting between Secretary Vance and Ambassador Huang Chen moved publicly toward improvement of relations. Those who fear this trend point out that the Kennedy Administration's relations with China remained ossified because of Chinese impressions formed even before inauguration. They fear that the same thing could happen to the Carter Administration. But others believe that such problems are overstated and that the U.S. disputes with the Soviet Union are sufficiently gratifying to the Chinese to neutralize any irritation over the focusing of American policy on Soviet issues at the expense of Chinese issues.

The Larger Strategic Picture

All these bilateral issues rest in a context of global and regional relationships to which each of the bilateral issues is inextricably connected. It is appropriate to conclude this survey of Sino-American relations with an emphasis on these larger concerns. One larger concern, the need to work closely with Japan, has been a lesson painfully learned through a series of Japanese-American difficulties beginning with the Nixon shocks. Many of the current dangers focus on the triangle of Sino-American-Soviet relationships.

The most pressing concern of many China scholars, aside from the possibility that the Sino-Soviet split might heal somewhat, is the possibility that the United States would focus on relationships with the Soviet Union while allowing Sino-American relations to stagnate. An American tendency to focus on Soviet-American relations to the exclusion of Sino-American emerged at the time of the Vladivostok Summit meeting where SALT II was negotiated. Even the location of that meeting reflected a willingness of the Ford Administration to trample upon Chinese sensitivities in the promotion of strategic arms limitation. Chinese sensitivities are triple. First, the Chinese fear Soviet-American collusion, of which the arms control negotiations constitute the most substantial single example. Second, they fear that the American rapprochement with China is being used simply as a tool for wringing extra concessions out of the Soviet Union and that American power will never effectively be brought to bear to help China. Third, the Chinese fear American appeasement of the Soviet Union and attribute sinister motives

to American concessions which they regard as appeasement. In Chinese eyes Kissinger allowed American policy to evolve toward a strategy of making concessions to the Soviet Union on Europe and on strategic issues in order to deflect Soviet aggressiveness away from Europe onto the Chinese. Moreover, quite aside from such sinister motives, the Chinese fear that American willingness to reduce military forces in Asia and elsewhere at a time when the Soviet Union is engaged in a major military buildup reflects an American societal weakness so profound as to make America a useless counterweight to Soviet power. Thus American weakness and obsession with Soviet issues imperils rapprochement.

A second major strategic concern is that the triangle remain flexible. In particular the U.S. should, along with avoiding the danger of focusing excessively on relations with the Soviet Union, ensure that its relations with China do not develop into a permanent, rigid commitment to China in opposition to the Soviet Union. The principal way in which such a danger could arise would be through excessively great or excessively sudden entrance into military arrangements with China that were disproportionate to the Soviet threat they counter.

Third, there is the issue of balance in the triangle. Some people have argued that the issues in Soviet-American relations are extremely pressing, whereas those in Chinese-American relations are not. In particular, the strategic arms race is entering a major new spiral of cruise missiles, new strategic bombers, and particle beam systems which could be enormously costly. Potential trade with the Soviet Union is far greater than with China, and the U.S. is being beaten by its Western

competitors in obtaining access to that market at a time of great U.S. budget difficulties. The conclusion is that at least for a short period the United States should tilt toward the Soviet Union. The much more common argument is that the United States should tilt toward the People's Republic of China because the Soviet Union is America's greatest strategic problem; PRC weakness in the face of the Soviet Union is a potential source of global disaster, and the PRC is not yet in a position to challenge the U.S. directly. Still others argue for a rigidly evenhanded policy. Where all are agreed is that the eventual choice should be consciously made and systematically implemented rather than muddled through.

Finally, in addition to synchronization with Japan and careful attention to the health of the Sino-Soviet-American triangle, the U.S. must be careful to pursue a regional strategy in Asia as opposed to a series of bilateral strategies. The dangers of bilateral strategies are dramatically exhibited by the shocked reaction of Japan to the way the original Sino-American rapprochement was handled. Although most Asian countries approved the concept of Sino-American rapprochement, the Japanese were badly frightened, the Indians were precipitated into an alliance with the Soviet Union, Korea panicked (with unfortunate consequences for its domestic politics), and various panicky reactions occurred in Southeast Asia. Various Asian commentators and various American specialists on Asia have expressed particular concern that the newer Carter Administration's emphasis on trilateralism and upon human rights could lead unconsciously to an enclave approach to Asia, in which bilateral Japanese-American relations are given great attention, Sino-

American relations are kept in mind but neglected relative to Japanese and Soviet issues, and Southeast Asia is ignored altogether. Already ASEAN officials have complained about being ignored, and journalists have expressed wonderment that China is outspoken in its support of ASEAN while the United States remains silent and confines its Southeast Asian interests to mending of relations with Vietnam. It is entirely premature to perceive a trend here, but it is also clear that a Japan increasingly conscious of its ties to Asia would not tolerate such a policy and that China's worst fears regarding the United States would be affirmed in Chinese eyes by an American failure to press its own interests in Southeast Asia.

Despite all the pitfalls noted throughout this paper, Sino-American relations seem currently to be on a sound footing and the state of the triangle is healthy. However, Sino-American relations have been in limbo for several years and cannot indefinitely remain so. Either initiatives will be taken in the reasonably near future or Chinese fears about American weakness in the face of Soviet initiatives will grow to the point where relations begin to deteriorate. The new Administration in America and the new Administration in China must deal with one another soon.