

Scenarios for Thirty Important But Unpredictable Turning Points in World History: 1975-1995

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PAPER

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Future studies, and long-range policy analyses, typically rely mainly upon one or more "surprise-free projections," that is, future events which evolve from current trends with sufficient logic that their occurrence would not surprise the author. For instance, it would not surprise most economists if the U.S. economic growth rate were between two and four percent over the next ten years; one could state this either as a single "surprise-free projection" of a two to four percent growth rate, or, for more detailed analysis, as a set of alternative surprise-free projections: (a) two percent average growth rate; (b) three percent, and (c) four percent.

But nothing would be surprising than a future without surprises. Moreover, some of the surprises may be terribly important for the planner to consider, even if they are unlikely. For instance, Pearl Harbor was a military surprise, President Nixon's trip to China was a diplomatic surprise, and the Arab oil embargo was an economic surprise, in the sense that, several years before the events, most serious students of such issues would have regarded their likelihood as rather low. Planning of all kinds must hedge against such surprises; most serious military planning is concerned primarily with unlikely but extremely important events--such as, for example, a Soviet invasion of Germany. In addition to surprises, there are other turning points which can suddenly change the focus or direction of a region's history and therefore deserve disproportionate attention.

The following list of scenarios was prepared as an adjunct to a report whose basic purpose was to provide a surprise-free projection useful to planners concerned with the next twenty years. The original list of turning points was prepared in early 1972; additional scenarios and very limited updating were done in January of 1974. The version published here is substantially identical to the January 1974 paper except for minor typographical and grammatical corrections, excision of a potentially embarrassing reference to an individual, and provision of some substantive details which would have been familiar to the original audience of the paper but not to the general public.

The list was prepared under tremendous time pressure and under the expectation that it would be employed briefly by a few colleagues and then disappear forever. The possibility that the paper would ever be published for a broader audience never entered my mind; it is more surprising to me than any of the scenarios that follow. I hope that the reader will understand that, whereas a paper intended for publication goes through five to ten drafts, with careful attention to detail, to citations, to defense against critical review, and to style, what follows is close to raw dictation, intended to provoke rather than to persuade, directed to colleagues who shared a vast reservoir of unstated assumptions, and ripped from the context of a larger report.

Upon rereading, I find one of the most striking things about the list to be the number of "unlikely but important" scenarios which have to some degree approximated reality or become subjects of intense current policy concern, including: the rapidly changing Soviet-American strategic balance (Scenario 2); the rise of the Italian communist party (6C); the sudden--not so surprising--unification of Vietnam (7); the threats to NATO cohesion implied by simultaneous crises in Cyprus, Greek/Turkish relations, Italian politics, and post-Franco Spain (12B); the Indian bomb (19); and the crisis in southern Africa (23, 24). Scenario 12B makes eerie reading after the event.

Finally, although I believe it would be a disservice to my colleagues to implicate them too deeply in this exercise, it is only fair to note that the ideas for this paper, and many others like it, derive from constant discussion at Hudson Institute. Whatever is good or useful in this paper should be viewed as a corporate product.

SCENARIOS FOR THIRTY IMPORTANT BUT UNPREDICTABLE TURNING
POINTS IN WORLD HISTORY: 1975-1995

The following list of events and developments consists of possibilities which the analysts do not regard as having high probability but which do possess some non-zero probability of occurrence and are so important for the world's future or for American interests that they are worthy of note despite their low probability. They are all unpredictable as to time of fruition or occurrence as well as being of relatively low probability. Each turning point is followed by a brief scenario indicating one way in which the turning point could occur. We do not mean to imply that any of the scenarios is likely to occur. Indeed by including the event in this particular list we indicate that our estimate of the probability of occurrence is rather low. Nor do we believe on the other hand that the scenarios given are the only ways in which the given turning points could occur. In many cases one could identify a dozen or more different scenarios in which any given turning point would occur. Thus the probability that the turning point would occur is generally somewhat greater than the probability of the given scenario.

TURNING POINT 1: A major reversal of alliances

SCENARIO A: Perhaps the greatest reversal of alliances that could occur would be for China and the Soviet Union to settle their differences and once again become a tightly knit alliance. This could occur in various ways. Suppose that, following the death of Mao, a group of Chinese leaders rises to the top which includes few men with strong hatreds or negative experiences with the Russians and also includes a substantial number with very pro-Russian sympathies. Suppose further that the Chinese

government about this time goes through one of its periodic moves to the left and includes among its policies strong moral, material, and weapons support for a major insurgency in Thailand. Suppose that the United States reacts very strongly against the insurgency in Thailand and that American leaders and the American public become strongly aware of convincing evidence regarding Chinese sponsorship of the Thai insurgent movement. Under these circumstances China would need Soviet military supplies, economic support, and diplomatic backing. China's economy, military structure, and educational policies would need to be "rationalized" in ways which the Soviet Union would find more ideologically compatible, and Chinese leadership more palatable to Soviet tastes would rise to influence. One can imagine that China and the Soviet Union might patch up their differences and begin to cooperate very strongly, particularly if appropriate changes in the Russian leadership also occurred.

SCENARIO B: Suppose that the current extremely weak political leadership in Japan faces a number of crises simultaneously and unsuccessfully. Suppose, for instance, that there are domestic riots, an international energy shortage that cripples Japan's economy, and that--in an attempt to develop as many sources of oil supply as possible--Japan undertakes major drilling activities on the continental shelf in the area of the Senkaku Islands, near Sakhalin, and elsewhere. And suppose that conflicting territorial claims bring Japan into a strong confrontation with China or the Soviet Union in both. Suppose at this point that unsuccessful policies lead to a major change in the coalition governing Japan, and that socialist and perhaps some communist elements become a major part of the governing coalition. This, by the way, is not a low probability

scenario so far. The new coalition, having been formed out of groups with impeccable pacifist credentials, would be capable of dealing with the international aspects of Japan's problems through a major rearmament program, just as President Nixon, because his anticommunist credentials were impeccable, was able to lead a rapprochement with the PRC. The magnitude and scope of Japan's rearmament program could very well be so impressive that the Chinese and the Soviet Union would be terribly frightened and would respond by greater cooperation between themselves. This in turn would induce a situation in which greater cooperation between the PRC and U.S.S.R. would induce greater Japanese and U.S. defense efforts, which in turn would induce greater PRC/U.S.S.R. cooperation.

SCENARIO C: This is a variation on Scenario B. Suppose the events of scenario B occur up to the point where a new coalition government was formed. This new coalition government would in all probability be extremely anti-American. Suppose further that Japan got into an international confrontation which involved only the Soviet Union and not China, and suppose that China came to the support of Japan and that simultaneously China perceived an enormous Soviet threat to her own security. In such circumstances one might see an effective de facto or de jure alliance between Japan and the PRC.

TURNING POINT 2: Achievement of a first-strike capability by any major power.

SCENARIO: Continued erosion in the credibility of major American institutions, together with increasing and generalized acceptance by a majority of voters that increased defense budgets and in particular development of new kinds of weapons by the United States simply constituted

development of an unnecessary overkill capacity, could conceivably lead over a period of, say, a decade to substantial erosion of American ability to compete in development of new weapon systems. Simultaneously one can imagine that a continuing massive, perhaps partially covert, Soviet research and development effort developed guidance and intelligence systems sufficiently precise to eliminate American land-based air and missile deterrents. One can also imagine, even though it seems unlikely, that a major technological breakthrough could lead to Soviet capacity to locate and destroy American submarine-based missiles.

TURNING POINT 3: Revival of intense cold war.

Scenarios 1A and 1B above would both likely lead to revival of an intense cold war.

TURNING POINT 4: Dissolution of U.S.-Japanese alliance.

SCENARIO A: Continuation of the mutual shocks that have plagued the United States and Japan since the announcement of President Nixon's trip to China could conceivably lead to a climate of opinion in Japan which made continuation of the mutual defense treaty too unpopular to sustain, even if the current LDP leadership survives in Japan.

SCENARIO B: Almost any major change of government in Japan, including the ones postulated in Scenarios 1B and 1C above, would lead to dissolution of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. The governing Liberal Democratic Party's electoral base has declined steadily for many years.

TURNING POINT 5: Termination of the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty.

SCENARIO A: In 1976 a President with relatively neo-isolationist views is elected and the general trends begun by the Nixon Doctrine toward with-

drawal from overseas military commitments leads to American discontinuance of the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty.

SCENARIO B: A change of government in Japan brings to power a group extremely hostile to the United States. Military planners point out that the principal reason for the U.S. commitment to Korea is protection of Japan and that, in the absence of Japan as an ally, retention of the U.S.-ROK treaty is not credible. Moreover widespread U.S. public disillusionment creates a popular demand for dissolution of such treaties in general, and of this treaty in particular, because of events in Japan.

TURNING POINT 6: Successful revolution in China, U.S.S.R., Japan a major West European nation, or a communist East European nation.

SCENARIO A: If war broke out between China and the Soviet Union, the war would likely be prolonged. Probably neither power could win, and if negotiation were unsuccessful after a prolonged period of time both China and the Soviet Union would probably face regional revolts against the central authority--some of which could conceivably be successful enough against a very weakened government that an entirely new leadership with entirely new views would come to power. This would not necessarily bring in noncommunist government but would bring in major transformations of the elite and of major international and possibly social policies.

SCENARIO B: Current deterioration of the status of political leadership in Japan could lead to major changes in the coalitions governing Japan, but those coalitions might not be any more effective in solving Japan's basic problems and indeed might be a great deal less efficient. For instance, the fall of the Tanaka administration, and then the failure

of a Fukuda administration, could very well bring in a coalition government dominated by non-LDP leadership. The failure of one or two non-LDP dominated coalitions to solve major problems, including for instance pollution, social unrest, a prolonged energy crisis, a worldwide depression, and interdiction by the Soviet Union of Japanese supply lines, or some other set of crises, could very well bring on a demand for a change not only of coalitions but of the entire form of government in Japan. The new form of government would almost certainly have to bring with it new personnel, new social policies and a much stronger and more militarized international political position. In other words it would bring along a revolution.

SCENARIO C: Prolonged immobilism by the Italian government and a series of domestic or international crises could quite conceivably bring to power a coalition dominated by the communists and such a coalition might well transform Italy's political or social system.

SCENARIO D: Following the death of Tito, Yugoslavia might well suffer vast internal violence and a secession attempt by major parts of the country. Under such circumstances one can imagine domestic elements successfully forcing establishment of a much more open regime. One can also imagine their pressing for a much more tightly controlled Stalinist-style government to avoid future violence.

TURNING POINT 7: Establishment of a unified communist Korea or Vietnam.

SCENARIO A: Vietnam could be unified under DRV auspices by a massive surprise attack which caught the South Vietnamese off guard and which occurred at a time when U.S. domestic public opinion would not allow drastic American intervention.

SCENARIO B: Vietnam could be unified under DRV auspices through gradually escalating or gradually advancing seizure of territory at low levels of violence, under conditions in which South Vietnam faced internal political turmoil either because of political factionalism or because of economic troubles brought on by excessively rapid withdrawal of American economic aid. In such circumstances the United States might be unwilling to intervene because the only obvious modes of intervention would be direct attack upon the North--which would be regarded by most of the public as too risky--or massive American land involvement in the south--which much of the American public would regard as a return to the unsatisfactory conditions of the mid- and late-1960's.

SCENARIO C: Suppose that a McGovern-style government were to come to power in the United States and systematically abrogate American defense treaties in Asia, and suppose further that the South Korean government faces internal political trouble as a result of massive protests by students, professionals, and perhaps rural people. Suppose that the Japanese grow still more discontented with their relationship with the United States and that it proves more and more necessary for electoral reasons for the Japanese government to include groups which have become hostile to the United States. Under these circumstances (1) the legal basis for American involvement in Korea would have been eroded considerably, (2) the internal turmoil in South Korea would be regarded as indicating that the South Korean government was unworthy of American support, and (3) the hostility of the Japanese to supporting American defense of Korea could make intervention technically difficult. Under these circumstances one can imagine, although not firmly predict, that the North might succeed in capturing the South.

SCENARIO D: Under a situation in which Japan had become thoroughly alienated from the United States, and in which the United States had decided to withdraw its commitment to Korea because Japan's hostility eliminated the most overwhelming military and political reasons for American defense of South Korea, the Japanese could conceivably come to feel sufficiently threatened by Chinese or Soviet or joint Chinese-Soviet initiatives that they decided that a strong unified Korea was a vital necessity. Under such circumstances it would be likely that the Japanese government would be at least nominally a government of the left, and one can imagine it either supporting an offensive by the north or systematically undermining the economy of the south so that the south eventually became vulnerable to the north. Such a scenario may seem far fetched but it is not any more farfetched than, say, a scenario written in 1964 by a Japanese suggesting that someday Richard Nixon might come to power and successfully undertake secret preparations for a trip to Peking without informing the Japanese.

TURNING POINT 8: Ascension to power of a fanatical regime in the U.S.S.R. or China.

SCENARIO A: China has undergone several major leftist upheavals including the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. It is currently undergoing an anti-Confucian campaign which is probably an attack by the fanatical left on some of the senior figures in the Chinese regime. Given the ideological character of the anti-Confucianist movement it may even be an attack on Chairman Mao from the left. One may at least reasonably hypothesize the possibility that, following the death of Chairman Mao,

an extreme leftist group of this kind might rise to power for a shorter or longer period in Peking and attack first Quemoy and Matsu and then Taiwan and later involve itself militarily in Laos or elsewhere. Conceivably such a regime could frighten North Vietnam into an extreme pro-Soviet stance, and such a stance in turn could provoke Chinese intervention in North Vietnam.

SCENARIO B: Sino-Soviet war and particularly a prolonged Sino-Soviet war, could put great strain on the Soviet Union and on its Eastern European bloc. Revolts in various parts of the Soviet Union and perhaps also in Eastern European countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia could conceivably bring to power a fanatical regime in the Kremlin which would exploit all available weaponry and undertake any political/military strategy which seemed to offer some chance for survival of the Soviet regime--even at the cost of risking World War III or devastation of much of the world or both.

TURNING POINT 9: Disintegration of Indonesia or India or Canada.

SCENARIO A: India is a state rather weakly tied together by the Congress Party and suffering from rather strong regional and linguistic tensions. Suppose that the Congress Party proves consistently unable to solve the basic development and integration problems of Indian society and that, as a result, disillusionment sets in and the Congress Party gradually recedes toward a position of being just one party among many. The inevitable result of such a disintegration of the Congress Party, and of failure to solve basic problems, would be a dramatic increase in regional and linguistic tensions. At this point there might be a Bengali move to unite the Calcutta area with Bangladesh, and resistance to the Indian Army

prolonged successfully for even a short time might inspire similar separatist outbreaks in other areas of India. The result might well be the disintegration of India.

SCENARIO B: Continuation for many years of the current rather corrupt military regime in Indonesia could lead to a situation in which the army is stretched thinly over the entire country and discontents develop which are both regional in character and greatly exacerbated by annoyance over central corruption. Suppose at the same time that dissidence occurs in Papua New Guinea and that traditional Indonesian imperial dreams of control over Papua New Guinea are supported by the central leadership. A military adventure into Papua New Guinea at a time when fervent discontent was developing on a regional basis might easily spark a situation in which successful regional revolts would occur and the region of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea would fragment into three or more states.

SCENARIO C: Canada is a federation tied together much more loosely than the United States and thus susceptible to fragmentation in a way that has not been true for the United States since 1865. Separatist movements in Quebec are only the most visible and most contemporary of Canadian separatist tendencies. While it is not likely that some province will attempt to withdraw from the Canadian union, it is sufficiently within the bounds of imagination that Canadian senators frequently talk in a serious fashion about fragmentation of the Canadian federation. One can imagine Quebec nationalism leading to a major move toward succession. One can imagine national versus provincial quarrels over such issues as the use to be made of the Athabasca tar sands leading to a similar result. One can

also imagine an impatient, ideologically-oriented government arising in one of the Western provinces and deciding that it could not retain its ideological purity while remaining a member of the Canadian union. If one province were to break away or attempt to break away, others might well follow. One or more provinces might seek to join the United States; others might seek over the medium or long run to ensure their political independence from the United States by taking a more friendly posture toward the Soviet Union. One long-run result of the situation could be that what is now Canada would become a kind of Balkan region between the Soviet Union and the United States.

TURNING POINT 10: Major expansion of the EEC. Other parts of this report predict the emergence of a Western European trading and investment zone which would include substantial parts of Africa. It is conceivable that, since more than half of these countries' trade will be with one another, consciousness of substantial economic unity would develop within this trading and investment region. Moreover, the entire trading and investment region could come to feel that competition from Japan, other Northeast Asian states, and the United States, had become so intense as to warrant an attempt to put much higher barriers around the EEC, and to expand the EEC simultaneously so that the higher barriers would protect a much larger market. A related theme might be a European attempt to incorporate one or more large oil producing states into the EEC in an attempt to gain exclusive access to certain key sources of oil. A further variation on this theme could well be a Western European political/economic offensive to get one or more of the communist countries, probably starting with Yugoslavia, to join the EEC.

TURNING POINT 11: Creation of a European defense community.

SCENARIO: Continued rising European annoyance at what they regard as American unilateralism in foreign policy could well be supplemented in the coming years by a strong American feeling that the Europeans were sufficiently numerous and sufficiently wealthy to undertake most of their own defense and that almost total withdrawal of American troops was justified. Such steps would increase European annoyance. Under present conditions it seems most likely that in such a situation European morale would decline even lower than it is today and that the European defense posture would suffer. However the psychological low morale is not necessarily a permanent phenomenon and conceivably at least a few European countries would acquire a realistic understanding of their own prosperity and their own success and therefore undertake dynamic initiatives in favor of their own defense. Hudson Institute projections indicate that by the late 1980s Germany and France should have a combined GNP larger than that of the Soviet Union, which means that, if these two countries alone should agree to establish a common defense program, they would have the economic base and (French) nuclear knowledge to begin construction of a joint European defense. Such a European defense community could incorporate the British and might incorporate certain other countries but certainly would not need to incorporate the entire EEC.

TURNING POINT 12: Breakup of NATO.

SCENARIO A: Same as scenario above for Turning Point 11.

SCENARIO B: European annoyance over secretive American negotiation with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China continues to grow.

Guerrilla warfare in Angola and Mozambique becomes much stronger, and intense dissension develops within NATO over what stance should be taken toward Portuguese involvement in those wars. A crisis in Cyprus brings Turkey and Greece to the point of open warfare. Italy finds that it cannot form a stable government without including the communists in key government positions, and the communists insist on Italian withdrawal as a condition of their participation. At this point Franco dies and the situation in Spain deteriorates to the point where in effect a new Spanish civil war begins. NATO is simply torn apart by disagreements over its relation to events in Spain and the various other countries.

TURNING POINT 13: Establishment of a comprehensive arms control agreement among major powers.

SCENARIO: The Soviet Union and the United States successfully negotiate a series of SALT agreements. China attains a nuclear deterrent adequate to put her on a basis of sufficiency as regards the other nuclear powers and therefore feels that she can participate in arms control discussions because she will no longer be negotiating from severe inferiority. At this point the Japanese announce imminent deployment of a laser Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept (BAMBI) system unless other countries undertake drastic arms control measures. The U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China then face a choice of impotence or preemptive strikes on Japan or comprehensive arms control. They choose the latter.

TURNING POINT 14: Abrogation of any arms control agreement or treaty by a major power.

SCENARIO: A series of arms control agreements, including both ballistic missile and aircraft-carried nuclear weapons, is negotiated by the United States and the Soviet Union. After a period of several years the United States discovers that the Soviet Union has been undertaking a massive nuclear buildup using small aircraft-carried nuclear weapons designed to appear identical to some pre-existing conventional weapon. In consequence the United States announces its intelligence findings publicly, abrogates the treaty and undertakes a major arms program.

TURNING POINT 15: Establishment of a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement among major powers.

SCENARIO: A series of arms control agreements is negotiated and both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. believe that the others are honoring the agreement. An intense desire exists for further progress in arms control. However nuclear technologies become so diverse and the U.S. and the Soviet Union develop such incommensurable arsenals that arms controllers despair of coming up with any formulation that is clearly fair to both sides. The only clear possibility for further progress in such a situation is negotiation of an arbitrary across-the-board limitation like a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

TURNING POINT 16: Establishment of a comprehensive agreement on the use of the seabed by major powers.

SCENARIO: Several successive U.N. conferences on the law of the seas take place but are unsuccessful because certain small powers make what the great powers regard as exorbitant demands for exclusive rights to large parts of the seabed. The United States, Canada, Japan, the Soviet Union,

China and several important European countries find that they are jointly interested in certain kinds of seabed development but are terrified by the likelihood that competing claims will lead to excessive tension or warfare in the absence of some comprehensive mutually agreed upon formula for access rights. At this point Finland proposes a neat, simple, large unobjectionable formula for dividing claims to seabed, or for providing universal access to this seabed, and for adjudicating competing claims. The great powers jointly agree to uphold this formula despite the failure of many small powers to accept it.

TURNING POINT 17: Development and deployment of a practical laser ABM weapon system.

SCENARIO: A new generation of relatively nationalistic Japanese, who lack their elders' thoroughgoing pacifism, comes to power and finds itself in one or more situations threatened by the nuclear power of either the Chinese or the Soviet Union. Relations with the United States have deteriorated to the point where the Japanese no longer fully trust the American deterrent, and the rise of massive nuclear forces in parts of China and the Soviet Union adjacent to Japan simply erodes faith in the willingness of Americans to fulfill Japanese needs for a leak-proof nuclear umbrella. Despite their nationalism and thoroughgoing pacifism, Japanese leaders are restrained by a considerable carryover of horror of nuclear weaponry and are constrained by the very strong emotions of vocal parts of public opinion. In consequence they announce that their armament will be entirely defensive. Unwilling to develop their own offensive nuclear weapons, but fearful above all of nuclear threats by China and the Soviet Union, they investigate alternative means for defending themselves against nuclear weapons carried by

missiles and by aircraft and conclude that a satellite-carried laser ballistic missile boost intercept system would adequately protect their country. In great secrecy they undertake a Manhattan-type project, building upon the extensive laser research which was already going on in the early 1970s. In the late 1980s they suddenly announce that they have deployed, along with numerous scientific, meteorological and communications satellites, several dozen laser BAMBI systems and they announce that any missile or other satellite which appears intended to knock down any of the satellites or to deploy a comparable system will be shot down by their own satellites.

TURNING POINT 18: Development and deployment of an effective non-acoustic ASW sensor system for detection and tracking of submerged nuclear submarines.

SCENARIO: At present it seems extremely remote that nonacoustic properties will prove sufficiently magnifiable or detectable for exploitation in an ASW system. But use of magnetic or electrical phenomena for such detection is not beyond the reach of an overactive imagination. One can even envision discovery of a breeding and training program by which certain kinds of fish would prove capable of tracking nuclear submarines, If such a technical breakthrough occurred it would almost certainly be implemented immediately and would undermine the mutual assured destruction doctrine upon which most modern defense and arms control discussions depend.

TURNING POINT 19: Development of nuclear weapons by Japan, West Germany or India, or the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries lacking indigenous development capabilities.

SCENARIO: India nurtures an ambition to recover Pakistan and simultaneously comes to feel extremely threatened by Soviet-American competition

in the Indian Ocean and by intense arms races occurring in the Middle East area. She comes to feel herself a competitor of Iran or Saudi Arabia or both. Simultaneously India faces severe internal political problems and her leaders come to feel that a dramatic technical breakthrough would give them prestige. As a result they draw on knowledge, skills and facilities which they are already known to possess and explode their first nuclear weapon in 1977.

TURNING POINT 20: Withdrawal of U.S. forces from West Germany.

SCENARIO: Deteriorating U.S. economic competitiveness and rising European tariff barriers provoke severe political annoyance between Americans and Europeans. A continuing energy crisis makes Americans extremely conscious of economic issues. The post-Vietnam decline of morale and interest in international political/military involvement continues past the mid-1970s. Annoyed at unilateral U.S. diplomacy, Europeans cooperate less and less with the United States on policies toward the Middle East, toward the Soviet Union, and toward other important areas. As a consequence of all these trends a series of progressively strengthened Mansfield Amendments is passed, with the result that all American troops are withdrawn from Europe and in particular from the Federal Republic of Germany.

TURNING POINT 21: Acquisition by the U.S.S.R. of basing facilities for strategic weapon systems in Latin America.

SCENARIO: A rerun by the Soviet Union of a massive fully secretive attempt to deploy weapons in a Latin American country on the model of what was attempted in Cuba in 1963 is unlikely. However, gradual, semi-secret, incremental introduction of weapons into a present or future leftist regime

somewhere in Latin America is by no means inconceivable. The idea would be to build up gradually and let information leak out slowly, in ambiguous fashion, and to ensure that there was no obvious threshold against which an American president could take a strong stand until an overwhelmingly powerful set of bases became established. It might be far more difficult, particularly in the next few years, for an American president to take a stand against such a series of actions in the way that President Kennedy took a stand against the introduction of missiles into Cuba. President Kennedy received an absolutely automatic, strong, patriotic response from virtually the entire scholarly community and from virtually the entire American public. But part of the legacy of the Vietnam war is that numerous scholars now look back on the handling of the Cuban missile crisis as having been excessive, unnecessary and dangerous. The public could, depending on circumstances and personalities, conceivably react in much the same fashion. As an example of the kind of erosion of parts of the Monroe Doctrine that President Kennedy might have taken very seriously, one can point to the use in recent years of Cienfuegos by Soviet submarines. We do not regard this as a high-probability scenario but we also do not want to dismiss it out of hand.

TURNING POINT 22: Use of nuclear weapons by any nation.

SCENARIO A: China and the Soviet Union become involved in a major war and Soviet leaders find themselves with a choice of prolonged warfare, including resultant domestic strains and possible major revolts in Eastern Europe, or on the other hand of using nuclear weapons with at least some chance of rapid termination of the war. They choose nuclear weapons.

SCENARIO B: Same as Scenario A except that the war progresses to the point where Poland and Czechoslovakia revolt and signs of potential uprising begin in East Germany. Conventional fighting becomes widespread throughout Eastern Europe, and Western Europe gets dragged in. France decides to use her nuclear weapons against Soviet forces in order to avoid engulfment of substantial parts of her own forces and in an attempt to trigger American nuclear involvement.

TURNING POINT 23: Overthrow of white South African regime.

SCENARIO: In the mid-1980s insurgent groups in Mozambique and Angola become disciplined, well-organized, professional guerrilla troops and are on the verge of expelling Portugal from its colonies. Infiltration into Rhodesia increases quite dramatically and the Rhodesian government commits its forces fully to defense of Rhodesia itself and to defeating, under a kind of hot pursuit doctrine, the insurgencies in either Angola or Mozambique or both. The South African government, seeing that Rhodesia may collapse and perceiving clearly that it might be next in line, fully commits its forces, but no complete and easy victory is attained and thus the entire southern part of the African continent is engulfed in warfare. This warfare of whites associated with the West against blacks throughout a major part of a continent has the effect of radicalizing much of black Africa. The Soviet Union and China provide massive aid to the black side and the Soviet Union threatens to intervene. In order to avoid the massive spread of communist societies throughout Africa, the United States and a coalition of Western European governments intervene and expel Portugal from its colonies and facilitate the establishment of black governments in Rhodesia and South Africa.

TURNING POINT 24: Major hostilities between white and black African nations.

SCENARIO: Same as scenario for number 23.

TURNING POINT 25: Catastrophic nuclear accident.

SCENARIO A: The energy crisis intensifies and becomes extremely severe. As a result several nations rush headlong into construction of breeder reactors and modify some of what come to seem like excessively severe constraints on reactor construction. After one New York reactor is installed, but before construction of the entire plant is completed, a fire breaks out and a small explosion occurs. Small amounts of plutonium blow over nearby New York City inducing long-term crippling or fatal diseases in thousands of people. The reactor goes critical and explodes, killing a million people and spreading damage over a large area.

TURNING POINT 26: Successful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

SCENARIO: Following a war so damaging and unsatisfactory in outcome to both sides that motivations for long-term settlement become very strong on both sides, the Israelis and the Arabs negotiate a gradual series of compromises in which Israel gives back much of the Arab territory conquered in 1967 in return for which the Arabs agree to withdraw their armed forces from any area near Israel. Both sides agree to a very substantial disarmament program, and the great powers facilitate success of this part of the agreement by providing military guarantees in the area and by refusing to sell more than small volumes of arms to countries in the region.

TURNING POINT 27: A severe energy shortage.

SCENARIO: This turning point, raised in previous studies, has already occurred, at least in short-run form.

TURNING POINT 28: An environmental disaster or sudden recognition of impending disaster such as might be caused by pollution of the atmosphere or the oceans.

SCENARIO A: Successful industrialization in China and most of North-east and Southeast Asia is carried out in a way which releases massive volumes of dust. As a result the reflectivity of the atmosphere is increased and the world's climate becomes drastically colder.

SCENARIO B: Similar industrialization to that of Scenario A is carried out, with the result that massive amounts of carbon dioxide are released into the atmosphere. As the proportion of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere rises, more and more infrared light is absorbed. As a result the world heats up, the ice caps melt, and major cities like London, New York and Shanghai are permanently flooded.

SCENARIO C: Both massive amounts of carbon dioxide and massive amounts of dust are released into the atmosphere. The temperature balance remains relatively constant but far less light penetrates the atmosphere, with the result that the rate of photosynthesis on the earth's surface declines. The atmosphere become far less livable for human beings, and agricultural shortages induce famine in China, India and elsewhere.

SCENARIO D: Massive successful Chinese use of fertilizer to increase agricultural output ensures China of adequate grain supply to feed her population, but the massive drain of fertilizer and fertilizer byproducts into the Pacific Ocean so pollutes that ocean that most important varieties of fish die off and most coastal bird life disappears.

TURNING POINT 29: Achievement of practical means of producing controlled thermonuclear reactions, i.e., controlled fusion.

SCENARIO: Continually rising energy prices stimulate massive investment in research into new energy sources. Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union engage in joint research, and development of new, inexpensive ways of using extremely high-powered lasers to induce fusion leads to early achievement of an economical way of obtaining electricity from the fusion process. Use of the fusion techniques spreads rapidly and there is a collapse of world energy prices. Some energy companies save themselves by early moves into fusion, but world industrial structures shift dramatically as a result of the bankruptcy of many of the big oil companies. Petroleum comes to be used exclusively for petrochemicals, and nuclear reactors, including breeder reactors, are rapidly phased out.

TURNING POINT 30: Deliberate destruction of the satellite of one nation by another nation.

SCENARIO A: Same as the scenario for Turning Point 17 except that the Soviet Union responds to Japan's deployment of a laser BAMBI system by an attempt to deploy its own similar system. Every time the Soviet Union launches a satellite which could contain a laser ABM system Japanese satellites shoot it down.

SCENARIO B: The United States uses a satellite to beam television propaganda programs down to the Soviet Union. The result is considerable exacerbation of discontent and unrest among certain Soviet minorities. The Soviet Union responds by shooting down the American satellite.