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Martial Law, Revolution and Democracy in the Philippines¹

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IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL law in a small Asian country is a commonplace event. Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, and South Korea have recently sought order through domestic use of military power, and even the People's Republic of China needed to impose military authority on most domestic institutions in 1967 and has subsequently experienced difficulty in reimposing civilian authority. But in the Philippines declaration of martial law is an extraordinary event. Suddenly the most stable country in Southeast Asia (except Australia and New Zealand) faces political upheaval. Suddenly the only developing country in Southeast Asia which has consistently maintained a democratic system in which opposing parties regularly defeat one another in elections and peacefully replace each other in power encounters doubts about whether the 1973 election will be held. Suddenly the country where political opposition and freedom of the press have been more vigorous than anywhere else in the developing world, and indeed more vigorous than in the United States, arrests opposition politicians and imprisons its most distinguished editors.

At this time nobody—including in all probability Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, who declared martial law—can accurately foretell whether Filipino democracy will survive its current crisis. If it does not survive, the case for democracy in developing nations will be much harder to make in the future because the Philippines have until now constituted the most vigorous, stable and successful example of democracy in the third world. Informed opinion on the possibility of democracy in developing nations fluctuates violently with intellectual fads in the west, but as long as there are examples of democracy hope remains that the ideal of political equality can coexist with the ideals of prosperity and economic justice. Euphoria in the 1950s that the new nations would succeed in their almost un-

de la nécessité d'organiser un plébiscite sur une Constitution élaborée et proposée dans les conditions prescrites par la loi martiale.

Les conséquences de la loi martiale et l'avenir de la démocratie philippine dépendent pour une large part des caprices et du bon plaisir d'un seul homme, le Président Marcos.

animous aspirations to liberal democracy changed in the 1960s to pessimism about the possibility for democracy anywhere in the third world, because rule passed from elected leaders to military officers in most new nations and because American misadventures in Southeast Asia exacerbated an ideological climate predisposed to denigration of non-military as well as military influences of the west on the third world. The early seventies have brought with them the recognition that developing countries which allowed more political freedom have outperformed those with harsher (communist or non-communist) regimes in terms of economic growth and that the most democratic countries have also been among the most stable. But full democracy was nurtured carefully in only a few of the third world countries, and it is a delicate system until it becomes institutionalized, so threats to the survival of a few democracies like the Philippines and Chile threaten to render third world democracies extinct.

The flaws in Philippine society and politics have long been obvious and have been well reported. The society distributes its wealth in a grossly unequal fashion. Linguistic and religious groups divide popular loyalties. The governmental process is suffused with corruption. Ingrown elites dominate politics at the upper levels. Poverty is omnipresent. These problems are as serious as their counterparts in any other Southeast Asian country.

At the same time the Philippines defeated in the 1950s a communist insurgency which once seemed overwhelmingly powerful and have gone on to become the only developing nation in Southeast Asia to remain stable since World War II. They have maintained the most democratic electoral process in the third world, and they have maintained freedom of the press as carefully as has the United States. Furthermore they have done this while performing quite respectably, although not spectacularly, in economic growth. What is hard to explain is the successes, not the failures. The present threat of failure, and the ominous depth of that failure should it occur, can be understood only against the background of careful analysis of previous success. The roots of prior success have been the strength of the central government, the broad base of the political party system, and the organizational and strategic difficulties facing a revolutionary insurgency.

The Philippine government has been strong and effective by Asian standards, although its inefficiency and corruption relative to Western standards have always annoyed Western tourists. The basic competence of the governmental institutions results from the high literacy

and extensive experience gained under American rule. Americans devoted an extremely high proportion of government revenues to education, and Filipinos continued this tradition, so the government draws its personnel from a literate society, indeed from an over-educated society. Because Americans decided at an early date to train Filipinos for self-government, and because insufficient Americans were available to staff the Philippine bureaucracies, Filipino experience in administration dates back to the early years of the century, and virtually total Filipinization of the bureaucracies was achieved well before World War II. Moreover, civil service principles were introduced more rapidly into the colonial Philippine system than was possible (because of politics) in the United States. This system was destroyed by the Japanese but was in large part reconstituted after the war. As a result the government has been effective in defeating the communist threat posed by the Huks in the early 1950s, effective in constructing public works (schools, roads, stimulation of rice production),² effective in overriding strong regional antagonisms which elsewhere would have led to civil war or immobilism,³ and effective in controlling its military forces. (The latter remains true even today; martial law was declared by the civilian President, not imposed or forced upon the President by the military. But continued civilian control cannot be predicted in the absence of legitimate, democratic institutions.)

Philippine government corruption might appear to belie this effectiveness, but it does not. Corruption does exist, does reduce bureaucratic effectiveness, and does alienate the middle class, but corruption appears greater in the Philippines than in other developing nations largely because the free Philippine press exposes and even exaggerates the corruption in ways that are impossible elsewhere. (The total corruption "exposed" by the press has on occasion exceeded the total government budget.) Much of the corruption results from the conflict of values which occurs in every developing nation: the villager who does not help his relatives is corrupt beyond redemption in the eyes of his fellow villager, but when he goes to work in the town and does help his relatives he is called nepotistic by his American-trained superiors.

In addition, corruption is in large part the price paid for more important things. Corruption resulted from rapid assimilation of partly trained Filipinos into the bureaucracies after the 1916 Jones Act, from Japanese destruction of relatively competent bureaucracies,⁴ from postwar economic difficulties, from the great power of political leaders,⁵ from the political patronage system, and from the value con-

flict between the mutual aid responsibilities of the villager and the achievement norms applied to the villager-turned-bureaucrat. But Filipinization of the bureaucracies provided valuable experience in self-government. The war with Japan consolidated Filipino nationalism. The great powers of political leaders provide the flexibility and authority necessary to meet the challenges of development.⁶ The patronage system maintains popular interest in, and support for, a democratic party system which reaches into every barrio and draws information and political support to the government.⁷ And penetration of the bureaucracies by the ascriptive values of the village makes governmental processes comprehensible to the people and minimizes popular alienation from what would otherwise be cold bureaucrats. A Philippine government free of corruption would be less like Chicago, which is a corrupt system that works, and more like New York, which is a less corrupt system that doesn't work nearly so well.

The party system is relatively even more effective than the central government institutions. Whereas politics in most colonies was highly centralized and spread only gradually from the capital to remote areas, American rulers held village-level elections early in the century and gradually expended political competition to higher and higher levels. Thus politics, and political party competition, became rooted in the villages. The issues and personalities were important to the villagers. The role of politician became diffuse (like that of village elder), and the political leader became important because he was arbiter of family feuds as well as dispenser of patronage.⁸ Elections are fiercely contested and well-publicized; Marcos sought to visit every barrio in the country. Villages which support a winner can expect to be repaid by feeder roads, irrigation ditches, schools, and other public works vital to their welfare; the existence of only two parties and a healthy tradition of voting the incumbents out to make room for new faces assure that these benefits are broadly distributed. Filipino peasants have become what is probably the non-communist world's most politicized peasantry. The party and patronage system gives most people a feeling that they understand politics, can obtain their just demands through the political system, and have a representative whom they know personally and who is personally interested in them.

In a paper read at the Association for Asian Studies annual meeting in March 1972, I summarized this situation as follows:

In short, the Philippine government is effective in its slow and inefficient way, and the party system roots the government in the people. This government will not disintegrate for internal reasons

unless the President or the Constitutional Convention acts in extremely foolish and unlikely ways.⁹ Revolution will come—if at all—through homicide rather than suicide. Moreover, if the government did disintegrate in the absence of a disciplined revolutionary organization, provincial rivalries would assert themselves and the political parties and the army would dissolve into feuding groups of families. The result would be Burmese musical chairs, not revolution.

President Marcos may—but may not—have embarked on a course of the kind which I then held unlikely. The crucial point is that Philippine democracy has been a strong political structure by the standards of developing nations and particularly by the standards of Southeast Asian developing nations. Other Southeast Asian governments are like Volkswagens—easily crushed by other vehicles set on collision. By Southeast Asian standards the Philippine government has been a heavy limousine—relatively impervious to hostile vehicles but vulnerable to the follies of its own drivers.

The government was strong. On the other side of the coin, the potential oppositions were weak.

One obvious potential opposition was the military, which had the organization and weapons necessary to overthrow the government. But the military was small, fragmented, effectively controlled by Congressional budgetary limitations, and limited in its political role by the personal dependence of military officers on politicians (including opposition politicians), by the democratic values of some high-ranking military officers, and by its own lack of revolutionary ideology and political skills. Military takeover was unlikely and would have led to chaos rather than revolution. Since the Philippines faced no strong external threat, this small, loyal and fragmented military was exactly what the country needed. But President Marcos has installed key officers whose highest loyalties were to him personally, has increased the military budget, and has deployed or developed weapons which carry prestige but have no military relevance to the Philippine situation—including a rocket, the Bong-Bong, named after his son. And now he has called in this army to exercise substantial political and administrative responsibility.

Various urban groups have been capable of relatively minor disruption, including demonstrations and more recently some assassinations and bombings, but they lack the organization, weapons and strategic position to overthrow the government or carry through a revolution. Students indulge in revolutionary rhetoric, and more frequently express discontent than their peers in other nations, but even students

basically accept democratic processes and therefore seek reform rather than revolution.¹⁰ The Communist Party has been for much of its postwar history isolated and corrupt, a group led by intellectuals who once could sit in their limousines and order peasants to their deaths but who have squandered their legitimacy and their funds. Financial support from foreigners was often spent on luxuries. Peasants abhorred the cold ruthlessness of urban intellectual Jesus Lava and others like him. And the rural Huks stopped subsidizing the urban Party after a 1965 dispute over the election of Macapagal to the presidency. (Characteristically, the Huks supported Macapagal because he came from Pampanga province, the home province of most of the Huks, and because they thought Macapagal would alleviate rural suffering; the Communist Party supported Macapagal's opponent in hopes of aggravating rural misery to the point of uprising.)¹¹ Because of these inadequacies of urban groups, and because of the example of peasant revolution in China, Filipino revolutionaries have generally depended on the rural areas.

Creation of an effective revolutionary organization and military machine in the rural Philippines would be difficult even with popular support and with guerrilla tactics. Creation of the Red Army in China was possible only because, as Mao Tse-tung pointed out,¹² the central government was divided and large areas between provinces were not under unified control. Even under these favorable conditions the Red Army was in continual danger of extinction until the Japanese destroyed the Kuomintang's urban base and provided a screen behind which the Red Army could operate without fear of Chiang Kai-shek's troops. But in the Philippines, because of the small size and island character of the country, and because of the relative effectiveness of the government, prospective revolutionaries have hitherto found no sanctuaries and few power vacuums. The principal exception to this generalization was, of course, the period immediately after World War II when the previous Japanese destruction of the government and party system, and the exit of the Japanese, turned the whole country into a power vacuum. Peace returned as soon as minimally effective government was restored. Power vacuums remain only in isolated, non-strategic areas and in a few more significant places like Isabela Province.

Supposing that these strategic difficulties were overcome, revolution would require creation of a highly disciplined organization based on the rural poor.¹³ Creation and maintenance of a highly disciplined organization, and destruction of the opponent's organiza-

tions, constitute the central theme of revolution and the central preoccupation of revolutionaries. Discontent without organization is a school of guppies in an Establishment sea, and military strategy not implemented by disciplined organization is just so many squirts of strategic ink. Where the government's organization falls apart essentially by itself, as in the French and Cuban revolutions, the organizational requirements of the revolutionaries are reduced. But where the government is not likely to fall apart by itself, as in the Philippines and as in China during the period of the Long March, survival depends upon superior organization.

The army and professional party members represent only the visible peak of a revolutionary organization. Below them are organized mass groups. Control over such organized mass groups constitutes the goal of revolution and the principal means of waging revolution. Mass organizations serve as reservoirs of personnel and funds and as an intelligence net. The Chinese Communists relied upon an extraordinary network of local organizations, including Young Communists, Young Vanguards, Children's Brigades, Young Communist Leagues (for women), anti-Japanese societies, nursing schools, weaving schools, tilling brigades, Poor People's Societies, Peasant Guards, and committees for education, cooperatives, military training, political training, land, public health, partisan training, revolutionary defense, enlargement of the Red Army, agrarian mutual aid, and Red Army land tilling, as well as the Communist Party itself and even the older Elder Brothers Society.¹⁴

As Philip Selznick has argued, the central "party cannot be related to an *amorphous* mass. Its articulation must be to something definite so that clear lines of access and command may be established."¹⁵ More organized, and more useful to the party than less organized, and more formally and hierarchically organized groups are more useful than less formally hierarchically organized ones. But not all social groups are equally organizable and therefore all groups are not equally useful as a mass base. The insurgency which rests itself on a base of lumpen-proletarians or scattered and leaderless peasants or anarchistic students will merely expend resources and weaken its central party without corresponding advantages. The crucial question thus becomes: What groups are capable of organization, or susceptible to it? Marx believed that French peasants were incapable of organization, and many Marxists have long decried reliance on the peasants because they extended their mentor's argument to all peasantries. On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung's success has inclined observers ranging from

Lin Piao to high American officials to believe in the possibility of peasant revolutions throughout the developing world. Can Filipino peasants organize adequately for revolution?

First, one must discover whether they *want* to organize for revolution, and then one must ask how effective they would be if they did want to organize.

Frustration resulting from poverty and inequality is the cliché diagnosis of any rural revolt, and this explanation has been considered adequate by most studies of Philippine problems. Ignoring for the moment that the current troubles have been largely urban, one must note that history's most stable societies have been extremely poor and unequal. In the Philippines, the rural insurgency has for decades remained confined to the relatively well-to-do plains of Central Luzon, and intense agitation in poorer areas has met with indifference. So poverty or rising expectations cannot explain revolutionary rural discontent.

Land inequality is a terribly serious problem in the Philippines, a worse problem than its counterpart in pre-revolutionary China. Failure to deal with this problem is a serious debit on the ledger of Philippine society and polity, as serious a debit as political democracy is a credit. But land inequality has proved to be a much more complicated and much less direct stimulant of revolutionary discontent than is generally believed. Popular opinion among American conservatives, American radicals, and the American middle ascribes rural revolt almost exclusively to such inequality. Statistical analyses of individual countries more often show contradictory or negative relationships between land inequality and support for revolution.¹⁶ On the other hand, global studies indicate a weak positive relationship between land inequality and violence.¹⁷ Both the public and the professors are wrong: inequality does cause discontent, but the statistics fail to disclose this because scholars ignore the fact that other things besides discontent are necessary for revolutionary organization;¹⁸ on the other side, the public usually does not understand how completely frustration due to land inequality can be mitigated by other social ties.

In the Philippines, land inequality is a source of discontent—despite statistical analyses purporting to demonstrate the opposite—as one can learn by talking with enough peasants and by observing the support the peasants give to politicians and revolutionaries who promise to alleviate inequality. But the effects of inequality are also greatly muted by a complex set of mutual obligations and exchanges of favors between rich and poor, and by an extraordinary network

of familial ties between rich and poor.¹⁹ The landlord is usually an uncle who lives nearby, and who can be trusted to find a job for one's son and to open his doors in a typhoon.

Frustrated nationalism has enjoyed a major role in virtually every revolution,²⁰ and nationalism frustrated by the Japanese legitimated the formation of a Huk organization and army during World War II. Had Americans in the Philippines behaved like the French in Vietnam after the war, nationalism might have become the Huks' fuel supply, but rapid independence precluded such a possibility. Nationalist anti-Americanism is a strong force among urban students and other middle class groups, but peasant attitudes are better represented by the reported 5.2 million people who seek American statehood for the Philippines. In the 1950's the Huks had to abandon anti-American slogans because such slogans proved anathema to the peasantry.

Other social tensions can also provide frustration to motivate political organization. In China the unjustly lauded Confucian family system oppressed women and children, and Mao exploited family tensions to develop organizations of youth and women that became dependable supporters of the revolution.²¹ But Filipino families are permissive toward children and more than generous in allotting power to women.²² Women's Lib has no future in the Philippines and offers no significant support to revolutionaries.

Anomie visits peasant villages as frequently as frustration. Characteristically, economic modernization breaks up extended peasant families, education erodes peasant beliefs, and mobility erodes traditional social controls and subjects the peasant to banditry. But Filipino families are informal and flexible, and therefore are not shattered like their Chinese counterparts. Philippine Catholicism has provided a belief system which adapts passably well to both the modern world and the Filipino peasant's understanding of the world. Whereas declining Confucianism undermined the morale of the old order in China, Catholicism legitimates the Philippine social order, explaining problems and assuring man of salvation if he will just believe and behave.²³ Likewise, the Filipino politician provides the peasant with a link to government through an endless series of favors ranging from a piece of road to mediation of family spats.²⁴ By contrast, the gentry in China were discredited by the abolition of the examination system, and the political jobs which were supposed to replace the gentry as links between government and village were regarded as disgraceful positions.²⁵ The Filipino peasant is tied to his society, and these ties reduce both his desire and his ability to organize for revolution.

Exceptions to this broad picture arise from the social disruption

of World War II, which was particularly intense in Central Luzon. During the war landlords were the most visible of rural groups and they tended to flee to the greater anonymity of Manila or to collaborate rather than die. In their absence, new social patterns coalesced, and the Huks exploited the collaboration issue; inequality reinforced by collaboration and general social dislocation proved politically potent. Fearful landlords returned with hired thugs and further aggravated class strife.

Another consequence of wartime social dislocation was banditry, a relatively negligible prewar problem²⁶ which has become intense in Manila and Central Luzon since the war. Filipino peasants, like most peasants, see law and order as the primary responsibility of government and regard as evil any government which cannot cope with bandits and guerrillas.²⁷ The government usually cannot catch bandits and guerrillas, and when it does catch them justice is obtained only after a democratic court procedure which peasants find incomprehensible. Complex American-style court procedures work well except for people who are poor and ignorant. Most rural Filipinos are poor and ignorant—at least ignorant of law. The Huks have successfully exploited these breakdowns in Central Luzon social structure, just as Marcos is now exploiting the intense desire of Manila residents for law and order.

In sum, the rural Philippines are in some ways model of social injustice, and some discontent does arise from economic injustice and disorder, but most peasants are tied into the system and acknowledge the system's legitimacy—except in certain areas of Central Luzon. Rural people who have sufficient education to understand the difference dislike the connotations of the term "peasant" and use the word "farmer", a word which applies to landlord and tenant alike. The farmers want roads, irrigation ditches, and schools, and these they can obtain by campaigning for a winner in the election. The "Tweedle-dum, Tweedle-dee" character of the political parties, often denounced by visiting Americans as exclusively the product of elite collaboration, derives more from the universality of these unrevolutionary demands and from the overwhelming electoral strength of the farmers, who form a single interest group constituting far more than a majority of the population.

Even if the rural poor²⁸ were extremely discontented, and even if they faced a weak government, and even if they faced no decisive strategic disadvantages, the Filipino peasants would have a hard time putting together a revolutionary organization as tough and disciplined as their Chinese counterpart. The Chinese peasant was familiar with the demands of tight, formal organization, whereas his Filipino

counterpart is not. Chinese villagers lived within a maze of recreation clubs, Brothers' Societies, self-defense organizations, crop protection organizations, landlords' associations, temple associations, secret societies, rainmaking groups, and the like.²⁹ They came from clans which taught the Five Relationships and sometimes had written constitutions. They learned a religion which stressed careful observance of rules of correct form.³⁰ By contrast, the Filipino village has virtually no formal organizations within the village.³¹ Filipino family structure is informal and flexible.³² Relationships with landlords and politicians consist of informal exchanges of favors.³³ And even Catholic ritual is interpreted as doing a favor for a saint, who in turn does a favor for someone higher up, in the expectation that favors will be reciprocated. Rural Philippine organizations are typically informal, personalized, and extremely ephemeral, and the rural Filipino lacks experience in roles other than exchange of favors. As a direct consequence, rural revolutionary organizations have been informal, dependent on individual personalities, and faction-ridden.

The experience of the Huks confirms this argument.³⁴ Like the Chinese Communists, the Huks created mass organizations of peasants, workers, women, youth and professionals and intellectuals. But the Huk organizations, unlike their Chinese counterparts, proved ephemeral. Supposed to meet once a week, they often met only once a month when an officer from outside the barrio showed up to supervise. Meetings often degenerated into moderately formalized gossip sessions in which the familiar problems of the village were discussed. Real problems were discussed, and real solutions were sometimes found, but the effect on village life was often that of a New England Town Meeting, not a social revolution.

When the Chinese held such meetings, group consciousness developed. Peasants participated in "Woe pouring" sessions and at least some became fervent in their hatred of landlords. Women and youth became conscious of the injustices of the traditional family system, and learned to link these injustices with tenancy and imperialism. But in discussion of the analogous Philippine meetings, not a single informant reported any major changes in attitudes resulting from the meetings, and all informants said that the meetings were typically rather relaxed. Luis Taruc told me that the professionals and intellectuals were "too Individualistic" to form effective organizations. Systematic struggle between peasants and landlords occurred only rarely, in a few barrios in Pampanga. The talents and money of landlords were considered more useful to the Huks than struggle sessions. Landlords were made to understand that they had to cooperate, but official policy was usually to "pamper them." (Taruc's phrase.) In

the absence of developing group consciousness, and use of that consciousness in building tough, revolutionary organizations, the creation of mass groups along these lines were a sterile imitation of Chinese practices without practical revolutionary rationale. The mass organizations apparently provided an effective intelligence net, and they did influence elections (because elections turn on numbers rather than discipline), but did not contribute to a permanent transformation of social structure or political power.

Huk judicial practices were similarly relaxed and un-revolutionary, providing another example of the influence of Filipino rural culture on insurgent organizations. No formal laws were employed and Taruc said he could think of no case which was so complicated that formal laws were necessary. Such a statement suggests that revolutionary ideals deviated very little from traditional ideals. Barrio courts encouraged opponents to sit together and seek mutual agreement. Lacking mutual agreement, a decision by a court to impose the death penalty was supposed to be unanimous. Landlords were forced to improve the conditions of their tenants, but tenants were forced to stop the common practice of stealing the landlord's grain. A point was made of never humiliating landlords in public—quite a contrast to Chinese "Speak Bitterness" meetings.

Above the village level the Huks were constantly plagued by factionalism. Horizontal factionalism interfered with coordination among regional leaders. In the 1950s Taruc, although officially Supreme, appears never to have had effective control over many units. In the late 1960s, three major Huk factions contended violently for supremacy. Vertical factionalism divided Taruc and the rural insurgents from the urban leaders of the Communist Party. But this vertical factionalism was based on important issues as well as personal factions. Urban leaders called for militarization of the villages along Chinese lines, and Taruc resisted, knowing that this would alienate his peasant support. By evasion, appearing to acquiesce in Party orders and then not carrying them out, Taruc maintained his position for years but eventually was relieved. Increasing use of terror, in accordance with the wishes of central Party leaders, corresponded with the decline of the Huks. The cold, intellectual, struggle-oriented Maoism of Taruc's successor, Jesus Lava, alienated rural groups and the Huks declined rapidly under his leadership. (They would have declined somewhat regardless of their leader—given their military straits—but all close observers credited Lava with accelerating the decline.) The Huks have subsequently split into several competing factions.

An important consequence of the Huks' organizational inadequacies

has been their inability to expand outside regions inhabited by Pampanguenos. Effective confinement to one linguistic group spells death for aspirants to national power, and the Huks have tried to expand but have failed. Their failure cannot be ascribed purely to the admittedly strong regional-linguistic tensions of the Philippines. China confronted tensions which were at least as strong. But the Chinese genius for formal organization enabled them to surmount local sentiments and create a national organization. The Huk's necessary reliance on personal ties confines them to members who can trust one another on the basis of exchange-of-favors rather than a formal relationship to an institution. Thus Philippine society exercises an effective containment policy, a policy broken principally when the army chases the Huks into other regions or clears regions in order to isolate guerillas, and thereby creates the same kind of social disruption which nurtured the Huks—a strategy which the army has regrettably followed in recent times. In addition, as noted below, some successors of the Huks (the NPA or New People's Army) have occasionally found ways of employing local ties to spread their movement.

Finally, the informality of Philippine social structure inhibits permanent transformation by revolutionary force. Formal village structures are visible to an outsider and easily dismantled. The Chinese Communists could simply prevent the landlords' associations and other organizations from meeting, and they could then create mass organizations which could institutionalize a new power balance. But informal lines of power are less visible, and it is difficult to cut the vertical Philippine social ties. Permanent social transformation of Philippine villages requires either: (a) redistribution of wealth, including land reform; or (b) change imposed through elections—which require little formal organization of peasants but which engage the organizational power of the government; or (c) application of more force, over a greater period of time, than was necessary in China—a policy the Huks have never been willing or able to implement. These alternatives are not of course mutually exclusive.

The Huks have been too woven into the social structure to revolutionize that structure and too woven into it to be excised. They have even performed more or less useful functions for Central Luzon society: catching bandits, maintaining reformist pressure on the government, transporting American soldiers from their homes to Clark Air Base, providing bars and brothels for the U.S. Air Force, running the best American-brand gas station in Angeles, and maintaining monopolies for large American corporations which pay them

for this service.⁸⁵ A wag has suggested that the Americans are the best supporters of the Huks and that the Huks are the best capitalists in the Philippines.

The Huks were defeated, and the remnants of the Huks have, since their defeat, split this way and that into factions which have often resembled the Mafia more than the Chinese communist Party. The real political action has been in the cities, and current difficulties in the countryside reflect urban trends.

American reports on the Philippines, both the scholars and by journalists, originate primarily from Manila. But, like other Asian capital cities, Manila does not reflect the country; unlike other Asian capital cities, Manila does not ultimately dominate Philippine politics. The highly politicized rural areas make or break Presidential candidates in elections, and they will eventually wear down any non-electoral government which replaces democracy without replacing democracy's legitimacy and benefits. On the other hand, Manila seethes with discontent. Inequality and land reform are far larger issues in Manila than in the countryside—because Manila's vast student, intellectual and middle class population responds to the intellectual attitudes of the west rather than to Filipino society. Corruption is a big issue in Manila but not in the countryside. (A partial exception to this, and one which is very important under present circumstances, is resentment of Philippine constabulary and army exactions. For instance exactions from those manning checkpoints in Central Luzon have in the past generated great resentment.) Law and order is important to Manila, but only in Central Luzon and the Moslem areas do the rural poor worry greatly about it. Politics in the Philippines is a mirror image of the standard western picture of a revolutionary peasantry and a complacent middle class: In the Philippines the peasantry demands gradual reform whereas much of the middle class leans toward revolution.

The revolutionary leaning of parts of the middle class reflect an enormous student and intellectual population. They also reflect the reflex opposition to the government of every capital city in every developing nation. (Hanoi could conceivably be an exception to this generalization—which I believe was originally made by Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard—but even Peking is no exception.) In addition the legitimacy of the political system has been undermined by real social concern and by the false middle class belief, inherited from the West, that land inequality automatically created the conditions for a rural revolution.

Ethnocentric Western beliefs have also undermined the legitimacy

of Philippine democracy through the opinions of American intellectuals whose theories of democracy got stuck with a peculiar interpretation of James Madison. The Philippine President has far more power than his American counterpart, and for good reason. The Philippines face far more divisive social issues (e.g. land reform) than America faces. They are a country with far more intense regional and ethnic tensions than the U.S. And they possess far fewer resources to cope with these problems.³⁶ But a peculiar Madisonianism, instilled by Americans, argues not only that a strong President will inevitably become a dictator but also that a strong President is inherently a dictator and therefore that a Filipino President who can declare martial law (even if he does not) and who has an item veto over legislation is not a democratic president. To be sure, increasing the powers of a president increases the risks if he misuses his powers, but increased risk is very different from inevitable disaster. A quarter century of executive restraint had made the Philippines a model of political freedom and free elections in a developing nation.³⁷ Moreover, prior to the Marcos administration the trends were in the direction of greater executive restraint rather than less. The juxtaposition of President Marcos and the situation of the last few years no more testifies to the inevitable evolution of a strong President into a dictator than the untimely death of Magsaysay before his reforms became institutionalized testifies to the impossibility of reform in a democracy.

What is the situation that precipitated the declaration of martial law? Crime remained high in Manila and generated intense concern for law and order. Violent student protests were frequent. Talk of revolution had increased among intellectuals—but there has always been plenty of talk of revolution among intellectuals. Overspending in the last presidential campaign had to be followed by two years of drastic cutbacks in even the most basic infrastructure projects, and discontent therefore soared. The reelection of Marcos short-circuited the usual renewal of hope that came each election as the old “scoundrels” were fired by the electorate. The Constitutional Convention faced a credible charge of corruption among some members. In the south, Christian-Moslem conflict intensified.

A number of particularly ruthless young communists and others from the Manila social elite managed to join forces with, and seize control of, the most dynamic of the old Huk factions. The combination of urban intellectual ruthlessness, canny leadership from Indonesian-trained communist leader Jose Maria Sison, military knowledge from a Philippine Military Academy defector (Victor Corpuz), and a relatively dynamic rural insurgent group, together with a military strategy that chased guerrillas into new territories

instead of confining them in old areas, allowed rural guerrilla activity to spread.³⁸ The New People's Army managed to secure control of the center of Panay Island and to succeed in extending at least a few tentacles into regions of Luzon previously completely beyond reach of communist insurgents. For instance, in one case two Igorots who had migrated to Central Luzon were indoctrinated and made leaders of a 40-man NPA detachment. Because of family and tribal ties that precluded fellow Igorots from betraying these leaders to the government, the unit gained considerable freedom of action in the Mountain Province until outfoxed by a Constabulary unit also led by an Igorot.³⁹

Given time, this renewed combination of urban elite intellectuals and peasants probably would have proved unstable; as in the 1950s the interests of the two groups are just too far apart. Just as in the 1950s communist guerrilla leaders regularly tripped themselves up by mechanical use of inappropriate Chinese tactics,⁴⁰ Marcos could consolidate and expand the alliance if he moves too harshly against his urban opposition. The alliance has so far held, with disquieting consequences that include some government loss of control over territory, the first attack on an American military post, assassinations of government officials, communist establishment and infiltration of of a wide variety of organizations, a dramatic battle over a ship which the government alleges to have been delivering weapons from foreign communists,⁴¹ a wave of bombing at Manila, and an alleged attempted ambush of the secretary of National Defense. Perhaps most important of all, the ponderous bureaucracies of Manila seemed to be strangling themselves in red tape and becoming more corrupt—heading downward toward the Southeast Asian norm despite continued impressive results in public works.

President Marcos has found himself under considerable pressure. He has been denounced ever since he was a Senator as an excessively ambitious politician who might become a dictator. Middle class Filipino observers have attributed corruption of historic dimensions to Marcos personally, and this image of Marcos is widely accepted. He is viewed by peasants as "one of these rich ones", but he has pushed just enough reforms to antagonize much of the *illustrado* elite of Manila. He won the last election, becoming the first President to be reelected, not because of extraordinary charisma and not because of corruption, but because his opponent was so weak. Marcos has regularly overreacted to events. He reacted to an astrologer's prediction of assassination by sequestering himself. (Such a reaction would

be typical in other Southeast Asian countries, but not in the Philippines.) He reacted to the bombing of an opposition party rally by suspending habeas corpus. And now he has reacted to the overall situation by declaring martial law and imprisoning many of his opponents. It is difficult to know how much weight to ascribe to jumpy nerves, to personal ambition, and to the feeling that the country was sinking into anarchy or being led by opponents into a trap whose significance would become clear only when it was too late. At any rate contingency plans for martial law date back at least one year, careful attention to the loyalty and expansion of the armed forces has marked the past year, and consideration of fundamental political and social change clearly predate the publication of Marcos's 1971 book.⁴³

Although events required action they clearly did not force Marcos into such drastic action. Far more serious threats were defeated in the 1950s without recourse to such measures. Imprisonment of newspapermen like Max Soliven and Joaquin P. Roces, and censorship of the press, necessarily strike foreign observers as out of proportion to the threat—despite the true charge that many of the most prominent reporters and publishers were simply employees of opposition and incumbent, domestic and foreign, politicians. Charges that opposition Senators have been in contact with the insurgents might be true, but given many of the individuals involved the implication of revolutionary conspiracy seems dubious.⁴⁴ Such contacts are not unusual and they have sometimes been useful; Marcos himself has on occasion corresponded with guerrilla leaders. Benigno Aquino, who has been the target of the most dramatic accusations, is so popular that one could hardly imagine his failing to become President of the Philippines eventually if democratic political processes proceeded normally.

The Philippine polity was thus strong by Southeast Asian standards, but weak by western standards and becoming weaker and more venal at a time when greater strength and foresight were required to meet renewed revolutionary challenges and legitimate (even if primarily urban) demands for rapid progress toward social justice. The system needed a shock, a shock which would awaken a complacent elite as the Huk threat did twenty years ago. But the omens would have been far more auspicious if the most dramatic shock had come from the insurgents rather than from the President, if the President were a new face with broad popular support, and if it were not so easy to trace so many of the problems which precipitated martial law to the previous actions of the President. Marcos may aspire to

the role of Magsaysay facing the Huks, or of Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor, but could find himself in the role of Lyndon Johnson after the Vietnam escalation of 1965.

The implementation of martial law has been relatively benign.⁴⁵ Although imprisonments have far outrun the publicly available justification, and although freedom of organization has been drastically curtailed, imprisonments have been relatively few in number and by all accounts the conditions of imprisonment have been humane. One report, in a governmentally censored newspaper, indicated that 8,281 people were taken into custody after martial law was declared, and that 2,123 of these had been released by Christmas.⁴⁶ Some of these were notorious criminals, some were men with private armies and weapons whom the government wanted out of action until they could be disarmed, and some were simply men or women whose normal and often legal activities appeared to the government to pose some threat to the success of martial law policies. There is widespread knowledge of the conditions of imprisonment, from prison visitors and from those who have been released, and there are no reports whatsoever of torture or intense interrogation. Informants who have been jailed report minimal inconvenience; indeed they frequently report being able to send out for Blue Seal (smuggled American) cigarettes. A Davao official who was jailed spent much of his time playing golf with his captors. Having been in the stockade is something of a status symbol in Manila. There are stories of Manilans who deliberately violated curfew, taking with them their own grass cutters for the standard punishment of a half day cutting grass. Whether such stories as the latter are true is less important than the lighthearted spirit to which the stories attest.

None of this is to say that normal or democratic procedures are being followed. The opposition has been defused by jailing top leaders. Men "invited" to the stockade are not given benefit of legal counsel. Legal decisions are rendered by untrained military officials. An American in Cebu was held without charges for thirty days, despite a treaty limiting such incarceration to four days, but he was released without being questioned and returned to an ovation and a place at the head table of the Rotary Club. Martial law is very real, but at least for the time being it is martial law in a form that is perhaps the least harsh imaginable.

Law and order, in the sense of absence of criminal activity, have improved since martial law was declared. Many large scale criminal activities have been suppressed, and many have been transformed

from direct attacks to more subtle and less frightening forms of swindling. Reports that petty crime has been eliminated are probably exaggerated, but such reports have been good for the tourist industry. One of the great achievements of martial law has been the collection of a vast quantity of firearms. It is probably impossible to disarm the Philippine population in any thorough manner, and Moslems whose firearms represent an enormous investment and source of personal pride have resisted surrender of their guns, but the most important aspect of firearms collection is disarmament of the so-called "private armies" of the elite and this task has been accomplished to a substantial extent. Such "private armies" (or, more precisely, squads or platoons) represented a tremendous threat to democratic procedures and were almost impossible to eliminate under normal conditions.

Military campaigns against insurgents appear to have achieved mixed results against the New People's Army; the government has captured or killed a number of leaders and men, and has reportedly uncovered a variety of arms caches. It has terminated some of the activities of groups supporting the NPA. In at least a few cases martial law has been an essential element of military success. For example, a Constabulary team in Mountain Province reported chasing NPA men fruitlessly for lack of intelligence because two of the NPA were relatives of local villagers. After martial law the Lieutenant Colonel in charge of the squad imprisoned all the local barrio captains until they agreed to cooperate, and their cooperation led to some military successes. The long run balance between such successes and the political costs associated with them is not yet discernible. Those costs may be very high given the policy of clearing areas in order to isolate guerillas which has uprooted up to 100,000 people in Isabela.⁴⁷

Against Moslem dissidents reports are more clearly negative. Newspaper reports⁴⁸ indicate that up to half a million people have been displaced by the military's policy of clearing areas to ensure free use of artillery. (Military men confirm the policy, but are vague on numbers.) Other reports indicate terrific resistance to such policies despite drastic rice rationing and use of artillery. The armed forces have taken substantial casualties and have lost at least one jet to hostile fire and one C-47 to mistakes made during operations. The unfortunate consequences of uprooting rural population from the disruption of social structure that followed Japanese campaigns in World War II.

The economic consequences of martial law have so far been painful. Some of the biggest businessmen are enthusiastic over improved law and order and governmental decisiveness, but most businesses report declining volume and profits. Price controls, declining volume,

and a government ban on firing of employees without central government permission, put businesses in a squeeze. Exceptions include tourism, barbers, and a fishing industry profiting from prosecution of pirates and dynamite fishers. Most businessmen see one-man rule as inherently a source of uncertainty because policies can be changed on a whim and because something might happen to the President. Businessmen also wonder about the President's commitment to a free enterprise economy and note the view of many officials that businesses are largely composed of Chinese who are systematically conspiring to defeat administration policies. Some of these fears may, however, be temporary, and some reflect the loss of excessive privileges. In any case the stock market heads inexorably downward.

The long run offers at least some hope for economic improvement. The economy is beginning to recover from the disastrous floods of July and August and from the hangover that followed the last election. Land reform will undoubtedly exacerbate production problems in the always-troubled agricultural sector, but the gains in justice promise to outweigh the costs in production if the President's momentum here is sustained. Reduction of corruption, and improved governmental ability to make decisions and to make those decisions stick, should encourage businesses and particularly foreign businesses. Economic plans which emphasize dispersion of industry and emphasis on export industries and labor intensive industries are sensible and will boost the economy if implemented firmly. Ambitious plans to transfer land titles, provide generous pensions to landlords, and accelerate infrastructure development, will prove costly, but the government plans to finance these by increasing taxes, improving collection of taxes, and obtaining foreign assistance. Many experts think these plans feasible, and officials of international lending institutions praise the implementation of reforms.

Within the government President Marcos has planned a drastic reorganization and has already fired many employees in a campaign against incompetence, disloyalty, and corruption. All observers find the effects dramatic and positive. But the problems of overcentralization, bloated staffing, and corruption run so deep that the reforms could afford to go much further. Personnel cuts have occasionally affected senior people, but they have been disproportionately directed at lower levels. The credibility and permanence of the Marcos reforms will over the long run be determined by the willingness of the President to fire senior men who have reputations both for being corrupt and for being close to the President. In addition they will depend on the sheer size of the cuts, since the bloated bureaucracies cost too much, inhibit local initiative, and are excessively hard to control.

The political mood of the Philippines is lighthearted regarding the relative painlessness of martial law, disrespectful as always, but increasingly sullen regarding the widely perceived prospects for indefinite rule by Marcos. Perhaps the ultimate comment on this situation was a response to the observation that Christmas carols were strikingly absent from the media this year: "Well, Christmas carols are joyous, and the mood of the people is depressed this year."

A crucial variable affecting responses to martial law is the universal assumption that the United States must be behind martial law. The top of the social elite assumes that the imperialistic U.S. must be supporting martial law and that resistance is therefore difficult. Much of the rest of the educated, urban Filipino public assumes that "Mother America" will make sure everything works out not too badly. Senior American officials provide the strongest assurances that the U.S. role is strictly neutral, but opinion counts more than reality and concessions to big American companies together with frequent, large, color photographs of visiting Americans on the front pages of the papers do nothing of dispel the impression of American involvement.

In larger perspective martial law is a revolt of the city against the countryside, a revolt of efficiency against stability, a revolt of foreign training against local customs, a revolt of synoptic planners against incrementalists, a revolt of the modernizer against the democrat.

Under the political system that has predominated since 1946 politicians have utterly dominated bureaucrats—the opposite of the situation that has been attributed to many other Southeast Asian countries. Appointments reflected political needs of elected officials, as did decisions. The military was rigidly subordinated to civilians, because budgets were under tight control of civilian politicians whose reelection depended on doing favors for a rural civilian constituency and who therefore skimmed on military expenditures, and also because individual military men depended upon personal relationships with individual politicians for advancement. This system was unprofessional and corrupt, but effective in maintaining civilian control and relatively harmless given the low level of military threats to Philippine security.

The politicians who dominated the bureaucracies were in turn beholden to rural constituencies. Politics at the upper levels was indeed a game played within an elite, but the rules of the game were decisively determined by the character of the rural constituencies which constituted a majority of the electorate. The loose, ephemeral alliances which constituted parties reflected rural social structure. The bargain-

ing and exchange of favors which constituted the political process, and which infected the bureaucracies, reflected the characteristic social processes of the village. The non-ideological character of the political parties reflected the demands of a stable rural society which cared little for ideology but which understood its own need for roads, irrigation ditches, small reforms, and the like, and which by force of numbers used democratic political processes to put the stamp of rural society on parties and hence on government.

The result was a society which was a failure by standards of bureaucratic efficiency, a failure by comparison with a democratic ideal, and a failure at development by comparison with its Sinic culture neighbors (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore). Intellectuals resented the "stupidity" of rural politicians, from Magsaysay to numerous lowly Representatives, who wielded so much more power than they did. Bureaucrats resented being dominated by politicians. People educated to think of politics in European terms felt that the Tweedle Dum-Tweedle Dee character of the political parties reflected a failure of democratic politics because the issues did not reflect systematic policy differences; in fact the parties were successfully representing the society. (Social scientists criticize both American and Filipino parties for lack of discipline by comparison with European parties, but the lack of discipline derives from the origin of American parties in a highly differentiated society and of Filipino parties in a relatively undifferentiated one. European parties typically reflect a peculiar intermediate stage of differentiation. In this light the criticisms must be dismissed as largely ethnocentric and oriented to the interests of intellectuals in neat distinctions.)

The failures of efficiency embodied in this political system, and the failure to incorporate the efficiency-oriented elites were real and crucial failures of the first Philippine Republic, as were the failures of social justice. On the other hand the first Philippine Republic was a resounding success by comparison with its peers—that is with other Southeast Asian countries with similar problems and a similar level of development. It was not an ideal democracy, nor even a democracy like the United States, but it gave its people far more influence over the structure and policies of their government and parties than any other Southeast Asian nation and probably as much as was feasible given the social structure. Literacy and politicization of the society were far more widespread than in other comparable societies; here the Philippines had an advantage from colonial days, but democratic processes ensured pressure on the government to maintain the advantage. Political freedom was superior to any other nations in the

developing world. Economic development at an average rate of five to six percent was not spectacular, but was certainly respectable and well above the Southeast Asian norm.

Martial law represents a reaction to both the very real problems of the First Republic and to the frustration of elite urban, western aspirations. Efficiency of several kinds will be greatly increased at least temporarily. Decisions will be made more quickly. Bureaucrats will be more honest. Garbage will be collected regularly. Criminals will be captured. Politicians will not interfere. Military men can be professionals for once. A group of bright, American-educated technocrats in their thirties and forties has been given enormous power. Jeepneys, which are a terrible nuisance to big cars in a hurry, have been restricted—at considerable cost to cheap and quick transportation for the masses of Manila. Squatters, who used to build homes illegally and then vote into office politicians who would allow them to remain, are being removed to areas more convenient to the government. The interminable delays associated with democratic judicial processes have given way to more efficient military decision processes. The ability of Everyman (not just elites) to have a local politician intervene in judicial and bureaucratic proceedings has been short-circuited. Thus real gains in efficiency occur but shade imperceptibly into imposition of elite concepts of efficiency in place of mass concepts. Land reform is in a fortunate position at the intersection of mass enthusiasm, intellectual self-righteousness, and the political self-interest of the technocrats. In the combination of land reform and improved governmental efficiency are located the brightest prospects of Marcos's New Society.

The dangers of this New Society are that it will not go far enough or that it will go too far. If the reform processes are short-circuited because something happens to President Marcos, chaos might ensue. If the reforms get bogged down, or if resistance to the reformers and their methods become too intense, the justification for martial law might continue indefinitely and the New Society might go round and round a vicious circle in which martial law leads to more dissidence and more dissidence leads to harsher martial law. Excessively harsh martial law could achieve what no guerilla leader or communist party committee has approached: unification of rural discontent and intellectual revolutionaries into an enduring coalition whose rise coincides with a civil war between Christians and Moslems. This is a country which has for a quarter century been stabilized and unified by the catharsis of regularly throwing out the incumbents, by the knowledge of Everyman that he had a friend, or a friend of a friend,

in Congress, by the careful aggregation of conflicting interests that occurred through the "inefficient" bargaining of the national parties, and by Everyman's feeling that he understood and could manipulate (in a small way and through powerful friends) the machinery of the bureaucracies. The defects of this process threatened to put the country into a skid; Marcos and his technocrats now face both the dangers of undercorrecting and oversteering. And the irony is that they will find themselves doing both if they are not careful: they could so negate normal political processes and expectations that they create a united front against themselves and yet not succeed in creating the social discipline and government efficiency that they seek. Such an outcome is by no means inevitable, but the dangers must not be underestimated either.

Time is the central variable in this process. The cement which binds the Philippines together despite apparently overwhelming regional tensions is the political parties. To the extent that they are not employed their binding power is lost. To the extent that they are allowed to wither they will be difficult to regenerate. And paradoxically the more they wither as democratic political parties the more will the network of ties and mutual obligations which once constituted the parties be transformed into narrower but stronger conspiracies against the government.

Likewise the longer martial law lasts the weaker will become the political cement binding the government together. On NBC's "Meet the Press" (October, 8) Marcos said:

"It is my hope that I will be able to lift martial law within the period of my term as the President. That is, before the end of 1973. However, I cannot guarantee this."

It is well to put the last sentence in the context of the difficulty of the reforms, the likelihood of continuing military challenges especially in the south, and rising public opposition. Likewise, it is worth noting that, if the new proposed Constitution is approved Marcos will be operating under an interim clause which provides him with both the powers of the old President and the powers of the new Prime Minister for an indefinite period. The Constitutional Convention seriously considered limiting the interim period to the time between ratification and 1976. They were dissuaded from writing such a limit into law.

Over such a period of time the Philippine Army and Constabulary will gradually prove themselves an inadequate substitute for democratic processes. The Armed Forces of the Philippines are small and

politically divided. They contain officers strongly dedicated to democratic ideals. They are not free from corruption. As is appropriate to professionals proud of their professionalism they generally understand the requirements of capturing a few guerillas better than the requirements of maintaining the loyalty of a broad population. The professionals of the army and the other bureaucracies are not an appropriate instrument for ruling one of the world's most politicized societies.

Martial law has obtained the moral justification as a rejuvenation of decadent democracy and its legal justification first as a constitutional response to insurgent threats and subsequently as a constitutionally approved transition between one constitution and another. Space does not allow thorough consideration of the constitutional issues, but an article on "Martial law, Revolution and Democracy" can hardly escape brief comment on some of the major issues.

The first constitution of the Philippines was by any reasonable standards a success. Under it the Philippines enjoyed a quarter century of stability and freedom which her neighbors could not match. The strong presidency and unitary form of government proved wise choices given the strains of Philippine society. All of the major institutions proved congruent with the main themes of Filipino social structure. The large House of Representatives provided sufficient locally elected representatives to keep the center of government in touch with the periphery of society. The small, nationally elected Senate developed a group of nationally oriented leaders with national reputations in a country which desperately needed such leaders. (The U.S. is far less successful in casting up leaders of national stature.)

But this constitution had serious defects. Too many checks and balances imposed vetoes on the decisive changes that a rapidly modernizing society required. The constitution provided inadequate legal grounds for decisive action to promote social equality. An emphasis on rights to the exclusion of responsibilities reflected an alien model developed for a Puritan society in which duty and responsibility could be taken for granted. The great powers of the President, and the absence of close ties between Presidential operations and Congressional operations, inclined the Congress to irresponsibility, and the personal obligations of Senators through family and party aggravated this irresponsibility. The first constitution, moreover, was developed under American tutelage, subject to an American veto and contained rights for Americans that infringed Filipino sovereignty.

To remedy these, and many other, perceived defects, a Constitu-

tional Convention was called, and this Convention finished its work in 1972. The resulting proposed new Constitution, which will probably be the subject of a plebiscite before this article is published, would bring about a change from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government. The Prime Minister would retain the extraordinary powers of the existing President, including an item veto over legislation and the right to suspend habeas corpus and declare martial law when disorder is threatened. In addition there will be a symbolic President, who will not counterbalance the powers of the Prime Minister although proponents of the Proposed Constitution assert that he will. The parliamentary form solves the disjunction between executive and legislature, but fails to replace the leadership development function of the old Senate; this is a major loss. (A previous version of this paper, written before approval of the Proposed Constitution by the Convention, suggested a parliamentary system with one house, but containing locally elected Representatives with one vote and nationally elected Senators with five votes. Such a system would have possessed all the virtues of the Proposed Constitution, but would have retained the functions of the old Senate.)

The Proposed Constitution gives the government sweeping welfare functions, great powers for restructuring society (including a responsibility for maintaining an optimum level of population), emphasizes the duties of citizens, attempts to force responsible behavior upon public servants and governmental institutions by prohibiting many of the abuses that accompanied the old system, and establishes a number of independent commissions and offices that collectively are supposed to operate as a cross between the U.S. General Accounting Office and the Old Chinese Censorate.

In these regular provisions the Proposed Constitution is a sensible, balanced document. It runs a verbose sixty pages, and frequently reflects the tremendous influence of lawyers in Filipino society and the absence of extensive social science knowledge. Attempts to legislate a disciplined, multi-party system (Article XII B. Sec. 8, 10) would be disastrous if they succeeded, since such parties would be based on ethnic groups and would tear the society apart rather than hold it together but here as in other places social processes will almost certainly dominate legal intricacies, and the provisions will prove harmless.

Martial law impinges on the two constitutions in a number of ways. First, under the old Constitution the powers of the President under martial law are not spelled out, and Marcos has employed the martial law power to go far beyond meeting the threat of disorder for which

the power was included in the Constitution. He intends to remake Filipino society and politics by decree, with little pretense that all the decrees have any relation to existing military threats. In doing this he has denied that Congress has any power under martial law, and in attempting to buttress this position and to carry out a plebiscite under martial law conditions he has created a crisis for the Supreme Court. The position of the Supreme Court is far stronger than that of Congress, because of the great respect which Filipinos have for the Court and because Marcos appears to retain some of the respect or fear of the Court inculcated in his legal training. But he does not seem ready to allow the Court to constrain his major goals. Thus he has created a crisis over the old Constitution and at best a dangerous precedent for the new Constitution.

Second, considerable doubt has been cast on the honesty of the process by which the Proposed Constitution was developed. It has long been the practice of Filipino politicians to provide financial support to those who voted their way, and it was probably naive for anyone to think that the Constitutional Convention would prove an exception to this practice. It was not an exception, as one of the delegates, Quintero, revealed quite dramatically just before the declaration of martial law.⁴⁹

Third, these problems have been greatly exacerbated by martial law. The Proposed Constitution was approved after martial law was imposed. Delegates feared imprisonment if they did not vote for the Constitution. Many delegates were typical of Filipinos in having avoided taxes or infringed the law in one way or another at some time in their careers, and it is alleged that some were reminded of this by administration officials prior to their votes. And the transitory provisions of the Constitution included an enormous incentive for a positive vote: those who voted for the Constitution were promised seats in the interim Assembly, which is expected to continue for at least several years, and with those seats came emoluments totalling 216,000 pesos per year, a princely sum by Filipino standards. The transitory provisions (Art. XVII) provide continuation of the current President in power, with the full powers of both the old President and the new Prime Minister, for an indefinite period. As mentioned earlier a time limit of 1976 on such powers was rejected.

Finally, the plebiscite for ratification of the Proposed Constitution is supposed to be held under conditions of martial law. The earlier provisions of martial law have been relaxed somewhat to allow greater public debate, but the principal facets of martial law remain. The principal opponents of martial law are jailed. The controlled press

presents the opinions of those opposed to ratification, but invariably follows each objection to the Proposed Constitution with a refutation of that objection. Opponents of ratification are largely silent from fear of imprisonment; whether or not Marcos's intentions are democratic, fear prevents fair debate. The President has announced, in a "Time" magazine interview widely published in the Philippine press, that he will impose harsher martial law if the Proposed Constitution is rejected.

Holding the plebiscite under these conditions has naturally caused severe controversy. Elite pressure, and seven suits before the Supreme Court, have forced postponement of the plebiscite for a short time. But conditions for a democratic plebiscite can now no longer be created so long as President Marcos is in office—regardless of the possible good will of the President himself. And it is very unlikely that the plebiscite will be postponed indefinitely, so it is almost inevitable that the new Constitution, if it is approved, will exist under conditions of impaired legitimacy at least as severe as the impaired legitimacy which resulted from American influence over the last Constitution.

Such impairments need not be decisive if people support the basic provisions of the Constitutions. The old Constitution was relatively successful for a quarter century under such conditions.

Can people support the new Constitution? Here it is impossible to gather the appropriate data to provide a methodologically sound conclusion, but perhaps it is not illegitimate to draw on extensive travel and interview, together with ten years of following Philippine politics, to provide a speculation clearly labelled as such. The new Constitution, in its permanent provisions, is not so different from the old as to provide a basis for massive discontent. It was written by Filipinos and draws support from that fact. Most people do not understand the details sufficiently to care a great deal, so long as the provisions are well within the limits of democratic ideals. Nonetheless, an overwhelming majority of the opinion leaders who are most respected appear—on the basis of a very small and unsystematic survey—to reject the Proposed Constitution because of the transitory provisions. On the other hand, they would overwhelmingly accept the Proposed Constitution in the absence of those provisions. Under the circumstances of martial law most of the dissenting elite will, from fear, fail to participate in the pre-plebiscite debate and refuse to vote. The election will therefore be determined by the overwhelming administration campaign for ratification, by rural appreciation of improved law and order, and by the promise of land reform—as well as by the methods used to count the votes. A full scale

campaign by the opposition might well have counteracted these pressures, but it is unlikely that informal filtration of elite opinions down to the villages could come close to reversing the administration campaign.

One need not believe in "great man" theories of history to see that the future of democracy, martial law, and revolution in the Philippines rests largely with President Marcos. He cannot ensure that Philippine society will follow his wishes, but he has the initiative. He can provoke civil war with the Moslems or avoid it. He can allow military campaigns to disrupt the society and push his opponents into a united front against him or he can conserve the social ties which maintain stability and lead a broad coalition toward social reforms. He can make martial law a brief transition period between two periods of successful democracy or he can use the reactions of his opponents and the political failings of his efficiency experts as an excuse for prolonging his tenure and leading Philippine society into internecine strife which will render future democracy difficult.

Governing the Philippines democratically is difficult. What is perhaps not so obvious is that governing the Philippines non-democratically would prove even more difficult.

NOTES

1. Parts II and III of this article come from the author's, "*Peasant Organizational Capabilities and the Possibility of Revolution in the Philippines*", presented at the 1972 meeting of the Association for Asian Studies. This article was completed December 31, 1972.

2. For instance, H. A. Averch, F. H. Denton, and J. E. Koehler, "*A Crisis of Ambiguity*" (Santa Monica: RAND, 1970), found the Marcos administration rice, school and road programs effective.

3. All available statistical analyses of political activity, democratic and insurgent, point to regional ties as the most significant variable.

4. On the history of Philippine bureaucracies, cf. O. D. Corpuz, "*Bureaucracy in the Philippines*" (Manila, 1957).

5. Cf. John H. Romani, "*The Philippine Presidency*" (Manila, 1956); Jean Grossholtz, "*Politics in the Philippines*" (Boston, 1965), Chapter 5.

6. On the need for central concentration of power in developing countries, cf. S. P. Huntington, "*Political Order in Changing Societies*" (New Haven, 1968), Chapter 3.

7. Jose V. Abueva, "The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils and Graft to Political Development", "*East West Center Review*" (1966) Cf. Also Averch et al., op. cit., on rural political attitudes.

8. Cf. M. Hollnsteiner, "*Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Village*" (Diliman: Community Development Research Council, 1963), 95, on the diffuseness of the political role. Also Carl H. Lande, "*Leaders, Factions and Parties*" (New Haven, 1966), 114-117, on the broad popular base of the parties. Cf. also Averch, op. cit., 64-66; Carl Lande, "Political Attitudes and Behavior in the Philippines," "*Philippine Journal of Public Administration*" III, 3 (July, 1959), p. 353.

9. E.g., attempts by the President to perpetuate himself or his wife in office. Also, major reforms can be disruptive, as in the French and 1911 Chinese revolutions.

10. Robert O. Tilman, "Student Unrest in the Philippines," "*Asian Survey*" (Sept. 1970).

11. These comments are based on interviews conducted by the author.
12. Mao Tse-tung, "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?", *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 65.
13. For a detailed discussion of the theoretical issues involved in analysis of the importance of organization in a revolution, and of the ability of a particular group to organize, see William H. Overholt, "Organization, Revolution and Democracy: Toward a Sociology of Politics" (New Haven: unpublished Yale University dissertation, 1972), chapter on "Revolution." For organizational approaches to revolution, cf. Franz Schurmann, "Ideology and Organization in Communist China" (Berkeley 1966); Philip Selznick, "The Organizational Weapon" (New York: 1952); Huntington, op. cit.; Barrington Moore, "Political Power and Social Theory" (New York, 1965).
14. This list is taken, much of it verbatim, from Edgar Snow, "Red Star Over China" (New York 1941), pp. 234ff.
15. Selznick, op. cit., 81, 97.
16. Roy Hofheinz, Jr., "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success", in A. D. Barnett, ed., "Chinese Communist Politics in Action" (Seattle, 1969); Averch et al., op. cit. Edward J. Mitchell, "Inequality and Insurgency", "World Politics" (April 1968) and his "Some Econometrics of the Huk Rebellion", "American Political Science Review" (Dec., 1969); Mitchell's work is challenged in Averch et al.; 207n., and in J. M. Paige, "Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Reanalysis", "World Politics" (Oct. 1970). Cf. also de Tocqueville's "The Old Regime and the French Revolution" (Garden City, 1955).
17. Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Insurgency: the Relation of Land Tenure to Politics", "World Politics" (April, 1964).
18. A more technical discussion is available in the chapter on revolution in my "Organization, Revolution and Democracy," op. cit. The previous chapter discusses some of the mathematical nuances of the problem.
19. Frank Lynch, "Social Class in a Bikol Town," in S. C. Espiritu & C. L. Hunt, eds., "Social Foundations of Community Development" (Manila: Garcia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 164-169; Mary B. Hollnsteiner, "Reciprocity in the Lowland Philippines," Frank Lynch ed., "Four Readings on Philippine Values" (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1964).
20. Huntington, op. cit., 300ff.
21. Cf. deed number seven of the fourteen great deeds listed in Mao's report on Hunan, "Selected Works," op. cit.; cf. also the description of mass organization in David and Isabel Crook, "Revolution in a Chinese Village" (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959).
22. George M. Guthrie and Pepita Jimenez Jacobs, "Child Rearing and Personality in the Philippines" (University Park Pa., 1966), 115-116, point out that children must obey but are given time to obey. It is clear from their study that Filipino children are not bound by rigid rule systems. With regard to women: the relatives of husband and wife are regarded as of equal significance; village women often manage businesses; urban women are often treasurers and men presidents, with real power often in the hands of the women. Bulatao calls this pattern "Achievement through gentleness" in his *Symposium of the Filipino Personality* (Manila: Psychological Association of the Philippines, 1965), 16. "Traditionally there are few societies in the world which display as much equalitarianism as Philippine societies, whether pagan or Christian," according to Robert Fox, "Social Organization", "Human Relations Area Files, Area Handbook for the Philippines" (New Haven, 1955), I, 420.
23. Grossholtz, op. cit., 91-95. Jaime Bulatao, ed., "Split Level Christianity" (Manila: Ateneo, 1966). An excellent example of the way Filipino religion confounds class analysis is the labor union in Cebu which used its funds to build a large, lovely church while its members continued to live in huts.
24. Cf. note 7 above.
25. Martin Yang, *A Chinese Village* (New York, 1965), 117.
26. Lacking data, I base this remark entirely on interviews in Manila and Central Luzon.
27. Grossholtz, op. cit., 14. Note also in Averch et al., op. cit., that Pampanguenos rate crime as their second most important problem, unlike other areas.
28. It is customary, and for many purposes important, to stratify rural poor. But rural revolution does not rest on any single group. "Poor peasants" may (or may not) be most motivated to revolt, but "rich peasants" usually supply crucial leadership skills. The revolutionary sees the village as a reservoir of resources, with different groups supplying different resources. Excessive concern for stratification results from some social scientists' emphasis on motivation to the exclusion of leadership, communications, and so forth.
29. Cf. descriptions of village organizations in Martin Yang, op. cit., 143, 157ff.

A Doak Barnett, *"China on the Eve of the Communist Takeover"* (New York, 1963), 126ff.; also Crook, *passim*.

30. C. K. Yang, *"The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution,"* in his *"Chinese Communist Society: The Family and the Village"* (Cambridge, 1959). For a discussion of filial piety and identity issues, cf. R. J. Lifton, *"The Psychology of Totalism"* (New York, 1963), Chapter 19.

31. John de Young and Chester L. Hunt, "Communication Channels and Functional Literacy in the Philippine Barrio," in Hunt and Espiritu, *op. cit.*, 263-4.

32. Cf. Guthrie and Jacobs, *op. cit.*, *passim*; and Fox, *op. cit.*

33. On relations with landlords, cf. Frank Lynch, "Social Class in a Bikol Town," in Espiritu and Hundt, eds., *"Social Foundations of Community Development"* (Manila, 1964), 164ff. On politicians, cf. Lande, *op. cit.*, which makes this "dyadic relationship" a major theme.

34. The following discussion of Huk organizations is based on this writer's interview with Luis Taruc and others in 1967. This section has also benefited from Eduardo Lachica's *"The Huks"* (New York, 1971); R. L. Hoeksema, (Harvard University dissertation, 1956); and others. My conversations with Taruc were more detailed than his two books, but much of my argument can be confirmed by reading *"He who Rides the Tiger"* (New York: Praeger, 1967) and *"Born of the People"* (New York: International Publishers, 1953).

35. This is based on 1967 interviews. The demise of Commander Sumulong undoubtedly changed at least the details of such revolutionary activities.

36. For an analysis of the implication of high decision loads and low resources for organizational structure, cf. Overholt, *"Organization, Revolution and Democracy,"* *op. cit.*, Ch. Two.

37. The frequent American emphasis on electoral corruption and political killings is overdone. If elections were determined by corruption and killings, then the incumbents should have been sure winners since they had more money, power and guns. A high proportion of election-period killings seems to result from local and personal disputes and from the liquor, rather than the political passion, that so often accompanies Filipino elections. Violence and corruption certainly occur, but in the perspective of earlier American history and by comparison with the methods of political power transfer employed by neighboring countries, the Philippines have fared relatively well.

38. A policy of uprooting peasants to isolate guerrillas may greatly exacerbate rural unrest where it is employed.

39. Conversation with LTC Achmor, Philippine Constabulary, 19 December 1972.

40. In the 1950s such inappropriate tactics included excessive militarization and terrorization of the villages, as well as attempts to mobilize inappropriate groups (e.g., rural women and youth). In the 1970s tunnel warfare—a preoccupation of Chinese Cultural Revolution propagandists—joined the list.

41. In an interview with this writer Marcos's Executive Secretary, Alejandro Melchor, asserted that wooden gunstocks from the ship originated in North Vietnam and that ship markings remembered by the crew (who were unaware of the ship's course and destination) indicated that the cargo had been loaded in North Vietnam. Further details of the government's findings regarding the ship can be found in a thirty page undated document by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, "The Palanan Incident". Opposition critics have expressed considerable skepticism about the connection with foreign communist countries. These critics assert either (1) that the incident, and others like it, were staged by the Armed Forces, a possibility which cannot be completely discounted but which if true would imply skills at acting, coordination and secrecy not usually attributed to the AFP, or (2) that the ship was one of Congressman Ablan's illegal gunrunning expeditions and that the apparent tie-up with the NPA was fictitious or purely monetary. Ablan, a close associate of President Marcos, frequently engages in such activities, and clearly possesses the logistics and communications to mount an operation of this size. Until further evidence becomes available, none of these theories can be decisively discounted. But regardless of which theory is correct, it is clear that the incident helped justify, and perhaps precipitate, the martial law declaration.

42. For more details of the government's case for martial law see Ferdinand E. Marcos, Proclamation No. 1081, "Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines" (Manila, September 22, 1972).

43. Ferdinand E. Marcos, *"Today's Revolution: Democracy"* (Philippines, no publisher listed, 1971). Reportedly most of the research and writing of the book were done by Adrian Cristobal.

44. In an interview Alejandro Melchor asserted that the New People's Army planned an alliance with the opposition Liberal Party and cited as evidence a letter

to that effect which he alleges was given to the government by Benigno Aquino, one of the alleged LP conspirators, after Aquino allegedly discovered that the government knew of the conspiracy. It is worth noting that supposing the allegation to be true, the LP and NPA would have little to gain from one another as parties, and the LP could not deliver to the NPA more than a few of its members, so the conspiracy could at most involve a few leaders.

45. This section is based on extensive travel and interviews, Dec. 1972.

46. "Bulletin Today", 25 Dec. 1972.

47. "Daily Express", 26 Dec. 1972. This report may be greatly exaggerated, despite governmental censorship.

48. Ibid. This report may also be exaggerated.

49. Interviews confirm the Quintero allegations.

Postscript—

After this article went to press, Marcos held the referendum on the new Constitution by polling village level councils. To an unsophisticated observer such a poll might appear to be the equivalent of a national referendum. But the effect of this form of election is to cut off communications between opposition elites and the villages, while maintaining communications between Marcos's proponents of the constitution and the villages. Put another way, Marcos used this tactic to deny his opponents freedom of organization, the freedom which is the heart of democratic processes. (For a more thorough discussion of issues of freedom of organization, see the chapter on "Democracy" in my *Organization, Revolution and Democracy*, *op. cit.*) Apologists for Marcos's "referendum" rely on the standard image of the "independent" voter and fail to note the contradictions which result from such a concept; these issues are explored in the chapter cited. In addition, of course, they ignore the need for freedom of communication even in the context of a democratic theory based on the concept of informed, rational, independent voters. The Supreme Court of the Philippines rules the referendum valid, disregarding such considerations out of ignorance or fear or corruption.

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